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Abstract 
 
Of all natural resources, water is particularly under pressure due to its intensive use. 
Therefore, it is vital to better understand the decision-making processes that could 
reverse trends in environmental deterioration. Policy appraisal tools can help decision 
makers develop sustainable public policies, as they support evidence-based policy 
choices. In practice, however, they are rarely used as a basis for decisions. In this 
context, this PhD has aimed to answer the following research question: How can we 
explain the different uses of policy appraisal - in particular of economic analysis – 
beyond evidence-based policy making in water decision making? To this end, I studied 
the case of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) (2000/60/EC) and the use of 
cost-benefit analysis in its application in the United Kingdom and France, as recent 
examples in which economic-based policy appraisal plays, in principle, a key role. 
I showed that appraisal tools could reflect political objectives and environmental policy 
ambitions in two ways. Firstly in the choice of the appraisal tool itself, which follows a 
specific logic. Secondly, the operationalisation of the tool selected may be influenced 
by political goals. As a consequence, the use of policy appraisal for evidence-based 
decision making can partly be explained by the discrepancy between the output of the 
appraisal and the political objectives pursued. More generally, I found that the politics 
stream – i.e. the political context - determines the presence and importance of appraisal 
tools in the policy process and explains further uses, in particular in problem definition 
and policy formulation. 
I also provided an empirical contribution to the knowledge on WFD implementation in 
member states. I explained the process of setting objectives and exemptions in two 
member states, and the role that economic analysis played in the decision-making 
process. I showed that ambitions related to the implementation of the WFD, and the 
political context more generally, shaped the decisions on the analytical tools used and 
that choices made in the operationalisation of these tools partly influenced the 
protection standards of individual water bodies. These results imply that debates on the 
use of policy appraisal in WFD implementation should go beyond experts’ circles and 
be considered in the political sphere. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The seriousness of the environmental challenges we face no longer needs 
demonstrating. The State of the World report (The Worldwatch Institute 2015) assesses 
the environmental damages caused by human pressures, including dramatic species loss, 
increased air and water pollution, exhaustion of fisheries, considerable wetland losses, 
and deforestation. All parts of the environment – water, oceans, biodiversity, land and 
atmosphere – continue to deteriorate (United Nations Environment Programme 2011). 
Humans have already crossed at least three planetary boundaries, i.e. ecological 
thresholds: they have increased the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere (climate 
change), the quantities of nitrogen in the environment (disruption of the N cycle), and 
fostered the extinction of species (biodiversity loss) beyond sustainable levels 
(Rockström et al. 2009). This may cause sudden and large-scale changes to 
environmental systems, with potentially catastrophic consequences for humanity 
(Rockström et al. 2009). The environmental footprint – i.e. the measure of human 
pressure on ecosystems – shows that anthropogenic activities are not sustainable at the 
global scale and continues to grow. In particular, the blue water footprint, which 
assesses the quantity of freshwater used, has increased 5.6 times over the course of the 
20th century (Hoekstra & Mekonnen 2011; Hoekstra & Wiedmann 2014). 
In this context, public policies that address these environmental challenges are vital. 
Nevertheless, environmental policies often fail here: they lack ambition, efficiency or 
are poorly implemented (Jordan 1999; Blühdorn 2000; Newig 2007). Public policies are 
the result of political decision-making processes. Therefore, if we want to make sense of 
these failures, we need to better understand the decision-making processes that could 
reverse trends in environmental deterioration. In fact, “studying a decision means to 
study the decisional processes, the mechanisms through which we ‘decide to decide’ 
and analyse or exclude possible alternatives before reaching the final result” (Dente 
2014, p.5). Understanding decision-making processes is therefore a pre-condition for 
providing advice to policy makers on how to best take decisions, have policy impact 
and thus take actions that adequately address current environmental issues. 
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Rationality, defined as the “ability to apply logic and reason” (Cairney 2011, p.136), is 
often presented as key to optimal decision making. Rationality is usually praised and 
assimilated to intelligence. Consequently, numerous scholars and organisations have 
worked on helping decision makers enhance the rationality of their decisions (Brunsson 
2007). According to the rational choice theory, individuals seek to maximise the 
satisfaction of their preferences (in other words their utility) in the most effective and 
efficient way (Holland 2002; Brunsson 2007). To this end, they compare all possible 
options and their consequences. They assess the value of each alternative, taking into 
account their preferences, and usually compute them in terms of costs and benefits. 
Individuals then select the alternative that promises the highest utility (Holland 2002; 
Turpin & Marais 2004; Brunsson 2007; Griggs 2007; Cairney 2011). Although the 
rational choice theory was originally restricted to individual agents, authors have later 
used it to study collective actors as well, most prominently public- and private-sector 
organisations (Brunsson 2007). 
Policy making is decision making “undertaken on behalf of society by some authority” 
(Adger et al. 2003, p.1095). Policy decisions are “processes of choice between 
alternative ways to solve a collective problem” (Dente 2014, p.8). In order to reach 
optimal decisions for society, applying rationality would then suggest that policy 
makers should use the same decision steps as rational agents. However, they should not 
seek to maximise their own utility, but the aggregated utility of society (Andrews 2007; 
Cairney 2011). An essential part of such a rational process is the reliance on evidence-
based decision making when policy makers choose between policy options. This is 
when policy appraisal tools come into play (Turnpenny et al. 2015b).  
Policy appraisal is defined as “a test or judgment of some policy, with the aim to inform 
the decision makers on the suitability, desirability, effectiveness or efficiency of it” (de 
Ridder 2006 p.21). In other words, policy appraisal seeks to provide information to 
policy makers on the pros and cons, and sometimes even a ranking, of various policy 
options (Howlett et al. 2015b; Turnpenny et al. 2015a). This way policy appraisal 
supports evidence-based policy making, a function with which appraisal tools are 
associated, in particular in Europe. We will later see that appraisal tools have taken a 
different role in the US, where the focus usually lies on ensuring control and 
accountability. Evidence-based policy making seeks to promote effective and efficient 
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policies that integrate various sources of academic and non-academic knowledge 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2008; Rissi & Sager 2012; 
Adelle & Weiland 2015). Therefore, policy appraisal reflects the underlying 
assumptions of rational choice theory, but again - provided that analysts and decision 
makers seek to maximise utility for society.  
Economic analysis is the backbone of policy appraisal (Dunlop & Radaelli 2016). Cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) in particular – a specific appraisal tool - is rooted in neoclassical 
welfare economics (Pearce et al. 2006), which seeks to maximise welfare for society 
(Mathis & Steffen 2015). Welfare is a measure of social conditions (Mathis & Steffen 
2015). It is considered as equivalent to preferences: when individuals prefer an option 
among several alternatives, welfare economics assumes that the welfare of those 
individuals would increase with this option (Hausman 2012). CBA provide rules to 
aggregate preferences and determine whether a policy increases overall welfare for 
society, i.e. whether benefits (increases in welfare) outweigh costs (decreases in 
welfare) (Pearce et al. 2006). Welfare economics is grounded in rational choice theory. 
CBA is widely used in environmental policy and guides policy makers towards utility-
maximising alternatives and efficiency (Hahn 2000; Andrews 2007; for a critical 
perspective, see McGarity 1991 and Ackerman & Heinzerling 2002). 
Despite the dominant support for rational decision making in the literature and political 
discourses, policy decisions in the field of environment do not always reflect aggregated 
individual preferences at a societal level (Andrews 2007). In fact, in many instances of 
environmental policy making, economic analysis – particularly CBA – is not the basis 
for collective decisions (Hahn 2000; Bromley & Paavola 2002; Paavola 2002). If this is 
so, which role then does economic analysis, and policy appraisal more generally, 
actually play in public policy making? 
Political scientists argue that environmental policy making is complex, chaotic and 
often unforeseeable (Cairney 2011; Adelle & Weiland 2015). It is the result of lobbying 
processes, coalitions of interest groups and political debates. In this framework, policy 
appraisal does not appear to really be supporting evidence-based decision making. 
Instead, it is a new venue for political dispute (Adelle & Weiland 2015). Some authors 
even question the link between policy appraisal and evidence-based policy making, 
suggesting alternative uses and functions of policy appraisal in the political process 
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(Adelle et al. 2011; 2012). Such uses can still be explained through the rational choice 
theory: analysts or decision makers may seek to maximise their own self-interest rather 
than utility for society (McCubbins et al. 1987; Damonte et al. 2014).  
However, other authors chose to depart from rational choice theory entirely to 
understand the role of policy appraisal in public policy making, often relying on social-
constructivist thinking (see, for example, Radaelli et al. 2013). Finally, quite a few 
authors in public policy have departed from meta-level approaches such as rational 
choice or social constructivism, and use meso-level theories instead. This includes the 
multiple streams approach (Kingdon 2014; Howlett et al. 2017), which has not yet been 
applied in the context of policy appraisal, but which will form an important part of my 
argument. I will discuss the multiple streams approach further below. 
That said, some scholars thus consider appraisal as an “instrument of public policy” 
(Turnpenny et al. 2015a, p.247) and thereby assume that it can play a political and 
strategic role (Hertin et al. 2009). A political use of appraisal tools involves employing 
the outcome of an analysis to justify a political objective (Hertin et al. 2009). Such 
political objectives include decisions already made, diluted or postponed (Hertin et al. 
2009; Turnpenny et al. 2015a), decisions based on political values such as 
environmental effectiveness, equity, political legitimacy (Adger et al. 2003) and ethical 
concerns (Bromley & Paavola 2002; Paavola & Bromley 2002), or procedural aspects, 
e.g. participation and inclusion (Paavola & Røpke 2008). In the case of strategic uses, 
appraisal tools support various actors in the policy-making process when it comes to 
managing conflict, gaining influence, and bargaining with interest groups (Turpin & 
Marais 2004). Various stakeholders use technical arguments, e.g. costs or additional 
impacts, in order to support and further their interests and positions (Hertin et al. 2009). 
In such cases, analyses may be manipulated (Hahn 2000). In addition, policy makers 
may consider economic analysis as a mere “tick box” exercise (Hertin et al. 2009, 
p.1199), i.e. they view assessments as useless when it comes to supporting decision 
making. Appraisal is then perceived as a bureaucratic impediment that needs to be 
performed as rapidly as possible (Hertin et al. 2009). 
This research starts from the observation that policy-making processes, in the field of 
environment and elsewhere, are complex and chaotic (Cairney 2011; Adelle & Weiland 
2015). This work explores, from a political science perspective, the logics and 
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motivations of decision makers in using policy appraisal. It focuses more particularly on 
the functions of policy appraisal tools in policy making. If these tools were designed to 
integrate evidence into the decision-making process, how can we explain the fact that 
the policies adopted do not always build on the outcome of appraisals? What are the 
motives of decision makers when it comes to using policy appraisal? Consequently, this 
work focuses on the various uses and functions of policy appraisal tools in 
environmental policy making, beyond evidence-based decision making. 
In this study, I focus on economic analyses only, most prominently the use of CBA. 
Moreover, as argued above, and as I will outline below, I consider meso-level theories 
such as the multiple streams framework to be more promising than rational choice 
theories, since they better account for the chaotic policy-making process. Finally, to 
explore the functions of appraisal tools, I study water management as a policy process 
in which economic analysis has been given a prominent role.  
In this chapter, I first discuss the historic uses of economic analysis in water 
management. Then I detail the research objectives and rationale for this work, the 
context and the research design. I also explain the theoretical basis on which I rely to 
interpret my findings and the methodological approach used throughout the research. 
Finally, I present the structure of this thesis. 
 
 1.1 Economic analyses and water management 
Of all natural resources, water is the most crucial for human life. We use water for our 
most basic needs, such as drinking, sanitation and hygiene. But it is also vital for our 
economies, being necessary for irrigation, energy production, transportation, 
manufacturing and tourism. Aquatic environments are also major providers of 
recreational activities, such as boating, bathing and fishing, as well as granting aesthetic 
and cultural benefits (Wilson & Carpenter 1999; European Commission 2010; Ward 
2012). More recently, the value of water for natural ecosystems in terms of habitat and 
biodiversity has also been acknowledged. Water thus provides a wide range of goods 
and services (e.g. flood control, provision of basic material, disposal of pollutants) 
(Reid et al. 2005; Maltby et al. 2011), making it a scarce and precious resource (Wilson 
& Carpenter 1999 ; European Commission 2010; Ward 2012). 
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Due to their high value and intensive use, water resources are now endangered. They 
are under constant pressure: the growing demand for water supply, discharge of 
pollutants, hydromorphological modifications (e.g. the building of dams or reservoirs), 
the introduction of alien species and climate change threaten its availability, quality and 
capacity to support water-dependent ecosystems and human societies (European 
Commission 2010; Stocker et al. 2013; Rodriguez-Labajos & Martinez-Alier 2015). 
Current challenges for water managers include the protection of the resource and of 
aquatic ecosystems, but also the sustainable, equitable and efficient sharing of water 
between conflicting uses (Ward 2012; European Commission 2017). The access of 
water and sanitation for all has also been included in the Sustainable Development 
Goals, as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations 
Development Programme 2015), which the EU has endorsed (Eurostat 2017). 
In 1992, the scarcity and vulnerability of water resources were officially recognised in 
the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development (January 1992—
International Conference on Water and the Environment). At this occasion, the value of 
water as an economic good was acknowledged (Berbel et al. 2017). This declaration 
triggered a paradigm shift since water could from now on be considered from an 
economic perspective. Since then, water economists have agreed that economic 
instruments and analysis – in particular CBA – can help allocate scarce water resources 
efficiently and maximise the benefits of their usage by society by providing the means 
of measuring the trade-offs involved in water management decisions. It can even speak 
for environmental preservation as it may show that protection measures are sometimes 
economically efficient and cost-beneficial (Loomis 2000; Wilson & Carpenter 1999; 
Ward 2012; Convery 2013 ; Berbel et al. 2017). 
In the United States, CBA was originally used for water decisions as early as the first 
half of the 20th century. In fact, among all environmental issues, economic analysis was 
first applied to the water sector and evolved with the emergence of new water concerns. 
CBA was originally used for water projects, such as dams, navigation infrastructures or 
irrigation schemes. The high costs and public spending involved triggered the need to 
check whether these projects were actually worth the cost to society. Environmental 
amenities and aquatic ecosystems were taken into account a few decades later, as water 
quality, equitable sharing between conflicting uses and recreational activities were 
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increasingly considered as important (Hanley 2011; Convery 2013; Dinar & Schwabe 
2015; Rodriguez-Labajos & Martinez-Alier 2015). 
In Europe, water managers started using economic analysis for the management of 
water resources much later. We can find examples in the late 20th century, for example 
for the first river basin management plans in France in 1992 (Laurans et al. 2001). 
However, scholars seem to agree that the use of economic analysis in European water 
management really started with the Water Framework Directive (WFD, 2000/60/EC) 
(Morris 2004 ; Hanley 2011; Convery 2013). Although this is not its prime ambition, 
the WFD promotes economic principles as a means to improve aquatic ecosystems and 
to achieve sustainable use of water resources (Morris 2004; Destandau et al. 2008; Convery	 2013). These principles include the use of economic analyses (analysis of 
current economic water uses and future trends, cost-effectiveness analysis of measures, 
disproportionate costs analysis) in identifying pressures, setting objectives and 
designing actions plans, the cost-recovery of water services (including the 
environmental and resource costs according to the polluter-pays principle) and the 
employment of economic instruments such as incentive tariffs (Brouwer 2006; Convery 
2013). Economic principles are in fact considered of paramount importance to the 
implementation of the WFD (Laurans 2006) and often mentioned as one of the key 
paradigmatic changes introduced by the Directive in European water management 
(Martin-Ortega 2012). 
 
 1.2 Research objective and rationale 
This research brings together two separate strands of literature: policy appraisal in 
public policy research on the one hand and economic analysis and tools, in particular 
CBA, in environmental economics on the other. The literature in political science and 
public policy studies the same tools and processes as environmental economics. 
However, it discusses the causes, roles, functions and consequences of these tools in 
political processes – rather than questions of economic efficiency and the like. This 
involves, in particular, analysing the distribution of political power and influence 
mechanisms between stakeholders. In addition, public policy scholars consider CBA 
and economic analysis as part of a wider assessment process called impact assessment, 
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i.e. a specific type of policy appraisal. This shift in terminology might cause confusion 
from an environmental economics perspective, as impact assessment is usually used to 
designate a more specific type of economic analysis in economics. Finally, political 
scientists not only focus on economic analysis per se, but also on other tools that may 
support the policy process, e.g. multi-criteria analyses (see for example Jordan & 
Turnpenny 2015). This work tries to establish a dialogue between public policy and 
environmental economics, thus crossing disciplinary boundaries. 
This study aims to provide a broader explanatory framework for the different uses of 
economic analysis. As mentioned above, the literature on policy appraisal noticed 
various functions of appraisal tools, e.g. supporting evidence-based decision-making, 
perfunctory or manipulative (Hahn 2000; Hertin et al. 2009; Dunlop et al. 2012). It also 
discusses constraints and factors that may explain these various uses e.g. political 
impediments, legal restrictions and institutional frameworks (Turnpenny et al. 2008; 
Hertin et al. 2009; Radaelli 2010). Here, I aim to give an explanation for the use of 
economic appraisal. To this end, I partly rely on policy making and policy change 
theories. Theoretical frameworks interested in the policy process are numerous. For 
example, they aim to explain why some topics come to the political agenda, why some 
proposals are selected while others are not, what the role of interest coalitions or policy 
entrepreneurs is, and so on. Such approaches include path dependency, punctuated 
equilibrium, the advocacy coalition framework, the garbage can approach, the multiple 
streams approach, to name but some of them (Araral et al. 2015).  
The policy cycle conceptualises the policy-making process as a five-stage cycle 
(Howlett et al. 2015a; 2017). Of specific interest here is the policy formulation stage as 
it shapes decision making (Turnpenny et al. 2015b). Policy formulation refers to the 
“process of identifying and addressing possible solutions to policy problems or, to put it 
another way, exploring the various options or alternatives available for addressing a 
problem” (Howlett 2011, p.30). The use of appraisal tools for choosing between policy 
options is an essential part of this process (Turnpenny et al. 2015b). Therefore, policy 
appraisal comes into play at the formulation stage. Consequently, I will not apply 
policy-making theories to all stages of the policy cycle. Since I am interested in the role 
of appraisal tools in supporting decisions, I will only focus on the formulation and 
decision stages. 
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This research focuses on one particular environmental aspect, water management. 
Therefore, this work explores how policy appraisal and economic analysis are used in 
water decision making. European water practitioners have not been using economic 
analysis for long, mainly since the WFD entered into force (Morris 2004). As a 
consequence, this work focuses on the WFD implementation in member states and, 
more precisely, on the use of economic appraisal in decision making.  
The WFD encompasses many economic provisions. Nevertheless, the incentive to use 
economic appraisal as a tool to decide between economic constraints and environmental 
goals appears most strongly in the process of setting objectives. Every six years, 
member states may choose when and whether or not they will implement measures to 
restore water bodies, justifying non-implementation through the use of exemption 
clauses. They should however ground this decision in economic analyses. This research 
therefore focuses on the process of setting objectives and exemptions since member 
states are most likely to use economic appraisal for this aspect of WFD implementation. 
This project explains the various uses of economic analysis during the process of setting 
objectives across member states. 
In a WFD context, the research question can be phrased as such:  
How can we explain the different uses of policy appraisal – in particular of economic 
analysis – in water decision making? 
I focus more particularly on the relationship between the political objectives pursued 
and the economic appraisals performed. In order to answer the overarching question, I 
divided my work into several objectives.  
Objective 1: To unveil the motives of the various EU institutions for recommending a 
specific tool for economic analysis. I thus aim to explore the relationship between the 
political goals pursued and the support for a specific type of economic analysis at EU 
level. Since I chose to study an EU directive, the European dimension and the 
coordination processes at EU level are likely to influence decisions at member state 
level. The research steps are first to uncover the nature of the recommendations 
formulated at EU level; second, to explain why particular appraisal tools are preferred; 
and finally, to understand how EU institutions came to formulate guidance, e.g. through 
which negotiations and power relations. Here I will explore consenting or diverging 
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views on the Directive’s ambition and on the appraisal tools to use which arose among 
legislators during the WFD negotiation process, or at a later stage between member 
states and the European Commission. I will also investigate to which extent diverging 
interpretations of the WFD could explain the apparent lack of progress on WFD 
implementation at EU level. 
Objective 2: To determine whether and how the choices made for the economic 
appraisal impacted the decision-making process domestically. Research stages include 
exploring the economic analysis performed in terms of tools used and decisions made 
for their operationalisation; estimating potential divergences with agreements reached at 
EU level; and assessing the influence of the appraisal process on water quality 
objectives. Here I compare the economic analysis performed in two diverging countries. 
Objective 3: To unveil the processes underpinning decision making and the role of 
appraisal tools therein. Here, I aim to explain the different roles played by appraisal 
tools (e.g. symbolic or perfunctory uses). Research steps are first to determine the 
various uses of economic appraisal in two member states and to identify whether 
appraisal only supports evidence-based decision making or whether it plays another 
role. I then compare the situation in both countries and account for the differences 
observed. Here, I rely on a theoretical framework to explain my findings. 
Each objective rests on a systematic review of the existing literature on WFD 
implementation in member states. The research objectives will be pursued through 
nested cases.  
At the first level, I choose to address the overall research question through the case of 
the WFD. I thus study the different uses of policy appraisal in water decision making by 
looking at the most comprehensive and environmentally ambitious EU directive in 
water management. However, the WFD focuses on two aspects. First, as a EU directive, 
it restricts the geographical extent of the research to EU member states. Second, looking 
exclusively at WFD implementation limits the scope of water management activities 
covered. Here I study more particularly the process of setting objectives and 
exemptions.  
At the second level, I study the implementation of the WFD itself where I examine two 
member states in-depth through a cross-country case study. The idea is to get a 
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representative picture of WFD implementation in the EU through a careful choice of 
national case studies. I therefore use case study research at two levels.  
This study aims to contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, I bring 
insights from environmental policy-making theories and environmental economics to 
the policy appraisal literature. Second, I provide an explanatory framework for the 
various uses and functions of policy appraisal, thereby contributing to the policy 
appraisal literature. Finally, I explain the WFD implementation process in two member 
states and analyse in-depth the planning process, the decisions taken on objectives and 
exemptions, and the use of economic analysis as a tool supporting decision making. I 
thus contribute to the WFD body of literature. 
 
 1.3 Research context 
1.3.1 The Water Framework Directive: a major policy for water protection 
in Europe 
The EU WFD is the most ambitious piece of EU legislation in the field of water. This 
Directive introduced major changes and regulatory innovations in water resources 
management across Europe. While previous legislation was only concerned with 
specific pollution sources and water uses, the WFD introduced a sustainable, holistic 
and ecosystem-based approach to water management. The Directive thus defines for the 
first time a general and common framework for integrated river basin management in 
Europe (Kallis & Butler 2001; Adshead 2004; Hering et al. 2010; Martin-Ortega et al. 
2011). The WFD ultimately aimed to achieve ‘good water status’ by 2015 for all water 
bodies. Moreover, it prevents any further deterioration of the water resource and aquatic 
ecosystems.  
Although this ambitious goal has not been met so far, the WFD introduced several 
institutional novelties that should help water managers work towards ‘good water 
status’. These include the publication of River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) 
every six years, where member states specify the objectives set, the participation of 
stakeholders and the general public, and the performance of economic analyses such as 
CBA to support decisions (Kallis & Butler 2001; Kaika 2003; Grimeaud 2004). 
Moreover, the European Commission and member states practitioners established in 
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2001 an innovative coordination process at the EU level, the Common Implementation 
Strategy (CIS). CIS working groups seek to resolve technical controversies through 
implementation guidelines, including on the economic analyses to perform (Martin-
Ortega et al. 2014). 
1.3.2 Setting objectives and exemptions to the Water Framework Directive  
As mentioned above, member states are strongly encouraged to use economic appraisal 
during the process of setting objectives. Therefore, I will mainly focus on this WFD 
aspect. 
When writing RBMPs (which occurred in 2009, 2015 and with another planned for 
2021), member states should specify for which water bodies they will aim to reach good 
status over the next six years. This might at first seem contradictory with the overall 
WFD objective, which is to reach good status for all water bodies by 2015. In fact, 
several provisions allow member states to lower the Directive’s objectives; member 
states may delay the achievement of good status to 2021 or 2027 (Art. 4.4). EU 
countries may even lower their environmental ambitions, i.e. to achieve a ‘less stringent 
objective’ than required by the Directive (Art. 4.5). These provisions may be used for 
three different reasons: when reaching good status in time is technically infeasible, 
when natural conditions hinder the restoration process, and when the costs of measures 
are disproportionate. As this research is concerned with economic analysis, I will only 
focus on exemptions based on ‘disproportionate costs’.  
Member states used exemptions extensively, having granted deadline extensions for 40 
per cent of all surface water bodies and eleven per cent of all groundwater bodies in 
2009. Furthermore, member states authorised the achievement of ‘less stringent 
objectives’ for 19 per cent of all surface waters and one per cent of all groundwater 
bodies (European Commission 2012a). According to the European Commission, the 
“extensive use of exemptions may reflect the low level of ambition in many of the plans 
as regards achieving the environmental objectives” (European Commission 2012a, 
p.181). In practice, member states differ greatly as to the overall ambition displayed in 
WFD implementation, i.e. the degree to which they would make use of exemption 
clauses (Bourblanc et al. 2013).  
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Of particular concern is the fact that the term ‘disproportionate costs’ – on the basis of 
which exemptions can be requested – is somewhat ambiguous and the process of 
justifying exemptions not very well defined (Görlach & Pielen 2007). This ambiguity 
leaves to member states the choice of their ambition for implementing the WFD and of 
the extent to which they may push for environmental objectives in spite of economic 
constraints. To address this issue, member states tried to agree on the use of common 
appraisal tools. Consequently, they produced CIS guidance documents suggesting using 
cost-benefit analyses (CBA) to evaluate disproportionate costs. Nevertheless, the 
guidance offers another possibility, to assess the affordability of measures for the payers 
(European Commission 2003). In this study, I do not only focus on the question: which 
instruments member states support at EU level or choose to use domestically, but I also 
aim to understand the reasons for why they do so.  
 
 1.4 Theoretical basis 
In this study, I rely on policy-making theories to explain the different functions and uses 
of policy appraisal in organisations, in line with the third research objective. As 
explained earlier, I focus on the formulation and decision stages of the policy cycle. I 
therefore use a theoretical framework, which is applicable to these stages. 
I chose to rely on an adaptation and combination of two existing frameworks: the 
Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). An 
adaptation of both theories is necessary, since they were not originally developed to 
explain the formulation and decision stages. The Multiple Streams Approach in 
particular was created to explain the agenda-setting phase. Combining these theories 
also provides several advantages. First, both theories are complementary, meaning I can 
use the explanatory power of each to better account for policy-making processes 
(Howlett et al. 2017). Second, combining theories can create new ways of thinking 
(Cairney 2013). Finally, the literature usually advises combining the advantages of 
several theories (Cairney 2011).  
To this purpose, I resort to the recent work of Howlett et al. (2015a; 2017). Their work 
combines the MSA and the ACF, and expands both theories to all stages of the policy 
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cycle. Before I explain this framework in more detail, I introduce the MSA and the 
ACF.  
1.4.1 The Multiple Streams Approach 
The MSA was developed by Kingdon (1984) and focuses on the agenda-setting stage. It 
relies on the assumption that three ‘streams’ co-exist. 
The problem stream: This stream focuses on the acknowledgement of a societal issue 
that needs to be addressed by the government. This problem recognition is influenced 
by several factors: changes in indicators, feedback from past policies that may shed 
light on particular failures, or “focusing events” such as “a crisis or disaster” (Kingdon 
1984, p.19). The availability of budgets may also play a role here by pushing more or 
less expensive programmes to the agenda.  
The policy stream: This stream mainly deals with policy proposals. Solutions to 
problems are selected based on their technical feasibility, their adequacy with broader 
political requirements (for instance, efficiency and benefits outweighing costs), their 
acceptability and support, and their budgetary implications. Based on the Garbage Can 
Model, according to which “solutions [are] looking for issues to which they might be 
the answer” (Cohen et al. 1972, p.84), Kingdon (2014, p.19) refers to all existing 
solutions as the “policy primeval soup”. Specialists in policy communities develop 
ideas that “float around” (Kingdon 2014, p.19) waiting to be promoted. Consensus in 
this stream is reached through persuasion. 
The politics stream: This stream refers to the political context, such as elections, 
changes in public opinions or lobbying. Here, consensus is reached through bargaining. 
Although the three streams are assumed to be largely independent, they might influence 
one another, e.g. through budgetary constraints (Kingdon 2014). Policy change may 
take place without these three streams interacting, depending more on their 
convergence, which creates a “policy window” (Kingdon 2014, p.88).  
Policy entrepreneurs play a particularly important role in shaping the streams and in 
coupling them. They seize the opportunity of policy windows to advance their own 
proposals. More generally, political parties and elected officials tend to have a greater 
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role in the agenda-setting phase, while civil servants mainly work out policy alternatives 
during the implementation phase (Kingdon 2014). 
The MSA has been applied widely in the scholarly literature. It provides complexity and 
dynamism in explaining decision-making processes (Howlett et al. 2017). I chose to use 
this theory as it relies on focusing events, policy solutions and political context to 
explain policy change. All these aspects play an important role in the case I chose to 
study. However, the MSA applies to the agenda-setting phase and therefore needs 
adaptation. 
1.4.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The ACF was developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith in the 1980s in order to explain 
policy change (Weible & Nohrstedt 2015). The ACF focuses on policy subsystems. It 
relies on the assumption that various stakeholders (government organisations, agencies, 
environmental associations, industries, researchers, journalists…) form coalitions in 
order to influence decisions. Coalitions are built around shared beliefs and organised to 
compete with other coalitions. “Policy brokers” mediate disputes so as to settle a 
compromise (Sabatier 1998, p.104), resulting in a policy programme which integrates 
the beliefs of the winning coalition. In this framework, individuals are presumed to be 
boundedly rational and identify themselves with their own beliefs. They are also 
considered biased in judgement and as perceiving their environment through the prism 
of their convictions (Weible & Nohrstedt 2015).  
The ACF distinguishes three levels of belief. Most strongly anchored are “deep core 
beliefs”, which refer to fundamental individual values and, as such, are very unlikely to 
evolve. “Policy core beliefs” are the transposition of “deep core beliefs” to specific 
policy issues or subsystems. They are considered as the “glue” holding coalitions 
together. Finally, secondary beliefs are narrower and thus easier to change, and include 
the reasons for an issue in a specific location for instance. Members of coalitions are 
prone to the “devil shift”, i.e. they tend to see their adversaries as powerful and wicked. 
This perception reinforces existing coalitions and complicates the achievement of a 
compromise (Sabatier 1998, p.103, p.110; Sabatier & Weible 2008). 
In order to get more influence on the policy process, advocacy coalitions rely on various 
resources such as favourable public opinion, leadership from policy entrepreneurs, 
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technical information and studies, human and financial resources or legal authority 
(such as support from government agencies or legislators) (Sabatier & Weible 2008). 
According to the ACF, policy change may occur through three pathways: events, 
learning and negotiated agreements. External and internal events are perturbations, such 
as disasters or changes in the economy, that might affect coalitions’ resources or direct 
attention to a particular problem. Learning mainly occurs for secondary beliefs and may 
be triggered by personal experience or the availability of new scientific data. Finally, 
negotiated agreements may be reached through policy brokers under specific conditions 
(Sabatier & Weible 2008). 
The ACF has several advantages: it focuses on agency through advocacy coalitions and 
it takes into account the role of beliefs and learning in policy making (Howlett et al. 
2017). However, it has limited explanatory power when there is one clearly prevailing 
coalition (Fischer et al. 2007). I chose to rely on this framework for the importance it 
gives to beliefs in organisations. This aspect can also be used to explain cultural 
differences across countries. However, coalitions do not play a prominent role in the 
case I chose to study. Therefore, I use it in combination with the MSA. 
1.4.3 Recent developments: combining the MSA and the ACF 
Howlett et al. (2015a; 2017) have suggested extending the MSA to all stages of the 
policy cycle by using a five-streams framework. While the agenda-setting stage is 
composed of the three streams identified by Kingdon (problem, politics, policy), a 
process stream joins in at the policy formulation phase. A programme streams also 
appears during policy implementation. The process stream designates the actual process 
of tackling the problem, as opposed to finding a solution for it (e.g. successive steps, 
timetable). The programme stream focuses on a particular solution (e.g. instruments). 
Policy stages progress when ‘critical junctures’ or ‘windows’ occur, i.e. when several 
streams meet. During this whole process, some streams may be dominant over others 
and “guide the current” (Howlett et al. 2015a, p.9). External factors such as elections or 
catastrophes can change the course of streams. 
Throughout the different stages of the policy cycle, stakeholders form coalitions to 
change the course of the streams and push their own ideas to the forefront (Howlett et 
al. 2017). Mukherjee and Howlett (2015) argue that distinct groups of stakeholders try 
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to influence the course of each stream. This distinction does not exclude the fact that 
some individuals may be active in different streams at the same time. All these agents 
are responsible for moving policy making forward.  
In order to address the third research objective, this study relies on this new framework 
developed by Howlett et al. (2015a; 2017), combining the MSA and the ACF, and 
applies it to the formulation and decision stages of the policy cycle. The idea is to 
explain the use of policy appraisal in the decision-making process, thereby taking into 
account the political and policy contexts, the process of tackling a problem, external 
factors and coalitions beliefs.  
 
1.5 Research strategy and methodological approach 
1.5.1 Research strategy 
In order to address the first research objective, I conduct research at the European level. 
I aim to understand how exemption clauses emerged during the negotiation process, 
whether legislators already had in mind a specific appraisal tool when they introduced 
the concept of ‘disproportionate costs’ and why this tool was selected. The aim is to 
grasp the original meaning and the intentions underlying disproportionality. I then look 
at the CIS. Here, I explore the various meanings attached to disproportionate costs for 
different member states and for the European Commission, in particular which appraisal 
tools are promoted. Looking at divergences provides insights into why specific tools are 
endorsed and member states’ intentions regarding their use. I seek to go beyond experts’ 
discussions on economic analysis to comprehend the political dimensions of debates. 
Regarding the second and third research objectives, and once this European framework 
is investigated, I analyse two member states in-depth, England and France. In fact, the 
actual use of economic appraisal for WFD implementation in member states has so far 
not been studied extensively. Extant research gives a broad overview of the appraisal 
tools used before 2009 in several member states (Görlach & Pielen 2007; Laurenceau et 
al. 2009; Martin-Ortega et al. 2014); other pieces describe the economic appraisal 
performed in specific countries (van der Veeren 2010; Gómez-Limón & Martin-Ortega 
2013; Feuillette et al. 2016). They show the diversity of approaches taken across Europe 
and the contrasting attitudes of practitioners towards economic appraisal (Thaler et al. 
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2013). However, in-depth comparative work that details and explains the choice of 
appraisal tools as a support for decision-making processes in member states are still 
lacking (but see Dehnhardt 2013; 2014 for a causal perspective on the non-use of CBA 
and practitioners’ reluctance towards this appraisal tool in Germany). Here, I aim to 
explain differences in the use of policy appraisal between two countries. To this 
purpose, I first go into the details of the economic appraisals performed in each country. 
Then, I explore their institutional, cultural, and political context so as to explain the 
different uses and purposes of policy appraisal.  
In order to answer the overarching research question, I chose to use nested case studies. 
I first focus on water management and the WFD as a case study for the use of policy 
appraisal in environmental decision-making. Within this particular case, I then chose to 
study the process of setting objectives and exemptions in two member states. In other 
words, I focus on two case studies (France and England) to analyse in-depth the WFD 
implementation in member states. I thus have two levels of case studies: first the WFD 
as an environmental policy and second a cross-country comparison of the WFD 
implementation.  
1.5.2 Case study research 
According to Gerring (2007), a “case study may be understood as the intensive study of 
a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a 
larger class of cases (a population).” However, case studies are “not perfectly 
representative of the population” (Gerring 2007, p.20). Why then use case studies?  
Actually, this methodology brings several advantages. A case study is an in-depth study 
of a phenomenon. In contrast to large samples, case studies favour depth over breadth 
(Flyvbjerg 2006). As such, they are particularly suited to understanding complex and 
understudied situations (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 2009). Case studies are especially useful 
to “investigate causal mechanisms” (Gerring 2007, p.5) in a given context, i.e. to clarify 
how and why a problem occurs (Yin 2009). They are also particularly helpful in 
explaining decisions (Yin 2009); they “may offer insight into the intentions, the 
reasoning capabilities, and the information-processing procedures of the actors involved 
in a given setting” (Gerring 2007, p.45). Since my research aims to explain the use of 
policy appraisal in the context of the WFD implementation in member states, relying on 
a case study is consistent with my objective.  
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In addition, case studies can both build or test theory (Flyvbjerg 2006; Gerring 2007; 
Yin 2009). Although I partly rely on theories to explain my findings, my objective is to 
contribute to theory building rather than testing. Using case study analysis is therefore 
adapted to this goal. However, the choice of cases is particularly important for the 
generalisation of findings (Flyvbjerg 2006). As to WFD implementation, I do not aim to 
produce an extensive and complete picture of the situation in all EU member states. 
Rather, I give insights into the use of policy appraisal that might be applicable to a set 
of countries in order to explore possible explanations for the use of economic analysis. I 
therefore selected the countries strategically so as to reach this objective.  
1.5.3 The choice of England and France for the cross-country comparison 
Here a trade-off between the depth of the analysis and the number of countries covered 
has to be made. While it is possible to describe the economic analyses performed in 
each EU country, i.e. to use a large sample, it seems much less feasible to study in depth 
the role that appraisal tools played and the reasons explaining their usage. According to 
Gerring (2007), a small-N comparison is preferable over a large-N study if one wants to 
get a deeper understanding and analysis of the cases. Consequently, I chose to focus on 
a small number of cases. Since I aim to account for differences across countries and to 
account for cultural differences, I studied two member states with a different approach 
to WFD implementation in-depth. This cross-case comparison enables identification 
and comparison of the various factors which influence decision making in different 
countries. Moreover, the vast majority of studies that investigated WFD implementation 
in Europe have used small-N case studies (see Chapter 2). Consequently, this 
methodology seems to be the most appropriate for examining in sufficient detail WFD 
implementation processes, which highly vary from one country to another.  
According to the literature, EU member states rely on very different appraisal tools 
when setting objectives and exemptions (Görlach & Pielen 2007). Moreover, three main 
attitudes towards economic analysis seem to prevail. First, some countries like Germany 
are somewhat reluctant to use economic analyses (Dehnhardt 2013). Policy makers 
prefer to address WFD issues from an engineering and natural science approach 
(Dehnhardt 2014). Second, member states such as France perform to a large extent ex-
post CBA to comply with European requirements and to avoid an infringement 
procedure (Feuillette et al. 2015). A third group of countries, such as the UK, used CBA 
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to justify numerous exemptions. This was however perceived as a way to delay the 
WFD implementation, and environmental non-governmental organisations contested its 
overuse (e.g. in the UK, see Cook et al. 2012; European Commission 2012c).  
The choice of member states for the cross-country comparison has to be compatible 
with the research question addressed. Since I aim to understand the reasons for using 
economic analyses in the process of setting objectives, I need to choose member states 
that have relied significantly on exemptions based on disproportionate costs and that 
have used economic analysis during this process. This condition discards member states 
from the first category. Since I am interested in comparing different uses of policy 
appraisal between countries, it seems more logical to choose one country that belongs to 
the second category of attitude towards economic analysis and another from the third. 
Evolutions with time are also an important part of my research. Consequently, I 
preferentially discarded member states that have joined the European Union after 2004, 
since the evolution of their practices is necessarily less pronounced. I also favoured 
countries that have been more active at the European level (in particular in the CIS 
working groups), which again excludes new member states that were not involved in the 
drafting process of the guidelines. These three conditions actually greatly limit the 
scope of possible member states to investigate. 
Among the member states that have joined the European Union prior to 2004, only 
some of them have actually used exemptions based on disproportionate costs. 
According to the reports produced by the European Commission to evaluate the RBMPs 
of each member state (for example, European Commission 2012c), only Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands and the UK significantly used 
disproportionate costs as justification for exemptions. However, it seems that in practice 
Belgium has not used many exemptions based on disproportionate costs (European 
Commission 2012b). In Germany and Finland, only a few proportion of exemptions 
were due to disproportionate costs, while in Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden, this 
argument was not used at all. No data were available at that time for Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. However, Gómez-Limón and Martin-Ortega (2013) report that 
disproportionate costs were scarcely used in Spain. Consequently, possible member 
states for the case studies had to be chosen among Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the UK. 
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The choice of the UK was rather straightforward for several reasons. First, according to 
Thaler et al. (2013, p.1525), “in the UK there is a long tradition of using assessments 
such as detailed impact assessments and environmental CBA. UK requirements for 
impact assessments and other CBA precede and exceed EU requirements.” As Görlach 
and Pielen (2007, p.8) explain, the UK had “the most systematic approach, and most 
solidly embedded in economic methodology” towards exemptions, which seems rooted 
in a more general belief into “evidence-based policy making” (Nilsson et al. 2008, 
p.342). Consequently, the UK is ideal regarding the use of economic appraisal to 
support environmental decision making. Second, among all the member states 
previously mentioned, the UK is the only country that has used disproportionate costs as 
the main justification for exemptions (whereas in most countries, technical feasibility is 
usually the main argument) (European Commission 2012c). Consequently, the UK has 
used disproportionate costs most extensively. Third, this member state is rather active in 
the CIS working group on economics, since it is co-leading this group for the second 
management cycle (European Commission Undated). Fourth, although many studies 
have researched the UK so far, none of them has explored the use of policy appraisal 
and economic analyses in the framework of disproportionate costs for exemptions (see 
Chapter 2). Finally, the process of data collection in the UK was easier due to the 
University of Leeds’s close contacts with officials in the UK. I focused more 
specifically on England, where the use of economic analysis and exemptions based on 
disproportionate costs was the highest in the UK (European Commission 2012c).  
France was used as second case study. According to the literature, this member state 
resorted to economic appraisal in an almost opposite way to England and showed very 
different attitudes towards disproportionate costs (Feuillette et al. 2015). Accordingly, 
CBA was used during the first management cycle but mostly as a way to justify 
exemptions ex-post, i.e. decisions were mainly taken based on other criteria, such as 
stakeholders’ ability to pay. Moreover, Görlach and Pielen (2007, p.5) explain that 
France seemed to have opted for a “social-minded approach”. More generally, and in 
contrary to the UK, France was generally a late adopter of economic appraisal (Renda 
2011). Consequently, a study of France and the UK would constitute an “extreme-case” 
comparison (due to the “extreme value on an independent or dependent variable of 
interest” (Gerring 2007, p.101)). Such cases are particularly helpful for generating 
hypotheses, in particular to explain why these two countries use economic appraisal and 
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rely on disproportionate costs in such different ways. In addition, the choice of France 
has many other advantages. First, although the Ministry of Environment is in charge of 
writing national guidelines and is responsible for reporting back to the European 
Commission, the decision for exemptions is taken at the river basin level (Feuillette et 
al. 2015). This particular situation might reveal possible tensions and disagreements 
between the national and river basin levels. Second, France has always been a very 
active member of the CIS working group on economics, co-chairing the group both 
during the first and second management cycles (European Commission Undated; 2001). 
Therefore, this country has probably influenced the CIS process to some degree. In any 
case, this situation shows an advanced interest for economic issues. Third, very few 
studies have been conducted on France so far (see Chapter 2). My work thus helps 
enhance the knowledge on the implementation of the WFD in this country. Finally, data 
collection was facilitated by the contacts I have at the French Ministry of Environment 
and at the Water Agencies through my former position at the Ministry of Environment. 
Within each country, I also look at river basins since management activities (RBMPs, 
programmes of measures) and analyses are undertaken at the river basin scale. In the 
UK, I chose to study the Humber basin: it is close to Leeds and University of Leeds 
researchers already possess a lot of expertise here. In the second cycle, water 
practitioners in the UK conducted economic appraisals at the catchment level. 
Therefore, I also study one catchment within the Humber basin, the Aire and Calder 
catchment. In France, economic analyses were performed by the water agencies (six in 
total, excluding overseas territories). However, appraisals were rather heterogeneous 
across river basins (Feuillette et al. 2015), probably due to the decentralisation of water 
management. Therefore, in order to have a representative and comprehensive picture of 
the economic analyses performed in France for the implementation of the WFD, I 
perform detailed research in all mainland French river basins. I thus use an embedded 
case study design (Yin 2009) to analyse the WFD implementation in the UK and 
France: for each case country considered, I study several subunits, i.e. river basins or 
catchments. These subunits are not case studies themselves, but are part of the case 
analysis and help to get a better understanding of the situation in the country considered.  
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1.5.4 Methodological scope 
The existing literature recommends using specific methods for studying the policy 
process. First, the analysis should focus on the policy subsystem, i.e. on a particular 
policy area that includes all stakeholders involved in the process (members of interests 
groups, academics, officials and journalists) (Weible & Sabatier 2006; Weible & 
Nohrstedt 2015). Nevertheless, few stakeholders take part in the formulation stage, 
which is usually limited to experts (Sidney 2007). I thus take into account in my 
research all stakeholders that were involved in policy appraisal processes during the 
stage of setting objectives and deciding on exemptions.  
Second, a long-time scale (ten years at least) is usually necessary to analyse policy 
processes (Weible & Nohrstedt 2015). Consequently, I chose to study the WFD from its 
negotiation to a few years after the publication of the second RBMPs. I thus analyse the 
period 1996-2017, i.e. 21 years. 
Moreover, some researchers advise examining the particularity and the context of 
environmental policy making in order to grasp which factors impacted the decision. In 
particular, institutions, scale, and cultural and historical context play an important role 
and should therefore be scrutinised (Adger et al. 2003). All these aspects are taken into 
account when applying the MSA and the ACF. In addition, policy-making styles differ 
substantially across member states and partly explain policy choices, failures and 
successes. They are thus worth considering (Andersen 2001). I analyse these aspects 
through a cross-country comparison of WFD implementation. 
Finally, policy-making theories are generally not good predictors of change, partly 
because some factors are assumed to be unforeseeable (e.g. external events, shocks). As 
such, they can better explain outcomes ex-post and produce contextual information 
(Sabatier 1999; Flyvbjerg 2006; Kingdon 2014). I therefore use the theoretical 
framework as an ex-post explanation of a case study. 
1.5.5 Data collection and analysis 
I first mapped existing scholarship on the WFD through the use of a meta-analysis. 
Here, I only considered social-science research published in English-language academic 
journals exploring empirically the implementation of the WFD in EU member states. 
Based on a codebook of more than 35 items, I coded and analysed 89 journal articles. 
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I then used qualitative methods to address the three research objectives. I mainly relied 
on document analysis and semi-structured interviews, since particularly suited to 
qualitative case studies (Bowen 2009). Data collection first served to identify the 
appraisal tools recommended at the EU level and those used at the domestic level. 
Second, the idea was to understand which member state or EU institution promoted 
which tool for which purpose, how appraisal was used nationally or locally, and 
whether it served to support decisions.  
I therefore analysed in-depth over 200 policy documents covering the period 1996-
2017. These include position papers, CIS guidance documents, RBMPs, official and 
consultancy reports, and EU assessments of WFD implementation in member states. 
Documents served several purposes. First, they were a substantial source of research 
data. Second, I used them in order to track changes and evolutions. For example, I 
compared all the different draft versions of the WFD, in order to understand the position 
supported by each EU institution. Third, documents provided insights into the context, 
background and history within which WFD implementation took place. Finally, I used 
policy documents as a basis for interview questionnaires (Bowen 2009).   
I also conducted a total of 64 semi-structured interviews, including 16 at the European 
level (research objective 1) and 48 at member states level (research objectives 2 and 3). 
At the European level, I selected participants that took part in the WFD negotiation 
process or the CIS. Interviewees include representatives of the European Commission, 
member states, stakeholders - mainly non-governmental organisations - and academic 
experts. I contacted members of the CIS working group on economics and guideline 
authors, academics and member states officials that are part of my professional network, 
and I used snowball sampling to get access to participants in the WFD negotiation.  
At member states level, I targeted actors involved in the WFD implementation in 
England and France, in particular in objective-setting and economic analysis. These 
include State officials from central governments, departments and agencies, non-
governmental organisations and various stakeholders (representatives of farmers, 
landowners, water user associations, and water industries). I identified interviewees 
through my professional network, organisations websites and snowballing. Interviewees 
were conducted jointly for Chapter 4 and 5. Interviews results informed one or both 
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chapters, or provided contextual information (e.g. water governance, legislation, 
historical background, political framework). 
Interviewees were recorded and then transcribed. The first objective of conducting 
interviews was to complete findings from the document analysis, and to understand 
evolutions, strategies, constraints, lobbies and possible conflicts between EU 
institutions, member states, interest groups, national ambitions and local 
implementation. The second goal was to corroborate findings from the document 
analysis so as to increase the reliability of the results obtained (Bowen 2009). 
I analysed documents and transcripts iteratively, combining content and thematic 
analysis. I selected the most relevant information in the document and organised data 
into categories for analysis. I then identified emerging themes and coded data 
accordingly. This process was performed through a superficial reading first followed by 
a more thorough scrutiny. Finally, information was interpreted and synthesised (Bowen 
2009). A complete list of interviewees and policy documents is available in Appendices 
A and B. 
 
1.6 Outline of PhD 
This PhD is presented in the form of four research articles presented in the following 
four chapters.  
First, I map and provide a systematic review of existing scholarship on the WFD in 
Chapter 2, through the use of a meta-analysis. This chapter is a published paper: Boeuf 
B, Fritsch O (2016). Studying the Implementation of the Water Framework Directive in 
Europe: a Meta-Analysis of 89 Journal Articles. Ecology & Society 21(2), 19.  
Then I address the first research objective, which is to understand how and why EU 
institutions came to recommend a specific economic analysis for the process of setting 
objectives and exemptions. This is tackled in Chapter 3 through research at the 
European level that explores WFD negotiation and the CIS process. This chapter is a 
published paper: Boeuf B, Fritsch O, Martin-Ortega J (2016). Undermining European 
Environmental Policy Goals? The EU Water Framework Directive and the Politics of 
Exemptions. Water 8, 1-15.  
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The second objective is to investigate whether and how the methodological choices 
made for economic appraisal influenced the decision-making process. This is dealt with 
in Chapter 4 through a comparison of the economic analyses performed in England and 
France. This chapter is a paper accepted for publication on 26th January 2018: Boeuf B, 
Fritsch O, Martin-Ortega J (2018). Justifying exemptions through policy appraisal: 
ecological ambitions and water policy in France and the United Kingdom. Water Policy 
20(3), 647-666.  
The third objective is to explain the different uses of policy appraisal in supporting the 
process of setting objectives for individual water bodies. This is addressed in Chapter 5, 
where I compare the various functions of appraisal tools in England and France, and 
account for differences through a theoretical framework. This chapter will be submitted 
to Regulation & Governance in due course. 
Finally, Chapter 6 synthesises and discusses findings, considers research limitations and 
provides avenues for future researches. 
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Chapter 2: Studying the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive in Europe: a meta-analysis of 89 
journal articles 
B. Boeuf and O. Fritsch 
Abstract 
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is arguably the most ambitious piece of 
European Union (EU) legislation in the field of water. The Directive defines a general 
framework for integrated river basin management in Europe with a view to achieving 
‘good water status’ by 2015. Institutional novelties include, among others, water 
management at hydrological scales, the involvement of non-state actors in water 
planning, and various economic principles, as well as a common strategy to support EU 
member states during the implementation of the Directive. More than 15 years after the 
adoption of the WFD, and with the passing of an important milestone, 2015, we believe 
it is time for an interim assessment. This article provides a systematic review of existing 
scholarship on WFD implementation. We identify well-documented areas of research, 
describe largely unchartered territories, and suggest avenues for future studies. 
Methodologically, we relied on a meta-analysis. Based on a codebook of more than 35 
items, we analysed 89 journal articles reporting on the implementation of the Directive 
in EU member states. Our review is organised around three major themes. The first is 
‘who, when, and where’; we explore publication patterns, thereby looking into authors, 
timelines, and target journals. The second is ‘what’; we analyse the object of study in 
our source articles with a particular focus on case study countries, policy levels, the 
temporal stage of WFD implementation, and if the Directive was not studied in its 
entirety, the aspect of the WFD that received scholarly attention. The third is ‘how’ i.e., 
theoretical and methodological choices made when studying the WFD. 
 
Key Words 
EU Environmental Policy; Meta-analysis; Policy Implementation; Systematic Review; 
Water Framework Directive; Water Governance 
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2.1 Introduction 
The Water Framework Directive (WFD), adopted in 2000, is arguably the most 
ambitious piece of European Union (EU) legislation in the field of water. The Directive 
defines a general framework for integrated river basin management in Europe with a 
view to achieving ‘good water status’ by 2015. Institutional novelties include, among 
others, water planning at hydrological rather than administrative scales, the involvement 
of non-state actors, various economic principles as reflected in tools such as cost-
effectiveness analysis, and a common strategy to support EU member states 
implementing the Directive (Kallis & Butler 2001; Kaika 2003; Adshead 2004; 
Grimeaud 2004). 
Not surprisingly, the WFD has attracted wide scholarly attention. At the time of writing, 
the Social Science Citation Index lists no less than 728 articles referring to the Directive 
in the title or the abstract. Researchers from disciplines as diverse as political science, 
legal studies, economics and sociology have studied the Directive. Interdisciplinary 
approaches are legion. Arguably, not all of those 700+ articles are ‘spot on’, but there is 
no denying that the WFD is a prime topic for social scientists working on water 
resources. 
However, as much as we know about the WFD and its implementation in Europe, 
attempts to map existing scholarship are scarce. Previous research provides a checkered 
pattern of single case studies or small-n comparative work, often within one country. 
Almost 15 years after the adoption of the Directive, and with the passing of an 
important milestone, 2015, we believe it is time for an interim assessment. Providing a 
systematic review of existing scholarship, this article identifies well-documented areas 
of research, describes largely unchartered territories, and suggests avenues for future 
studies. In doing so, this survey is the first to provide a comprehensive and systematic 
review of scholarship on WFD implementation in Europe. 
Our review is organised around three major themes. The first theme is ‘who, when, and 
where’; we explore publication patterns, thereby looking into authors, timelines, and 
target journals. The second is ‘what’; we analyse the object of study in our source 
articles with a particular focus on case study countries, policy levels, the temporal stage 
of WFD implementation, and if the Directive was not studied in its entirety, the aspect 
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of the WFD that received scholarly attention. The third is ‘how’, i.e. theoretical and 
methodological choices made when studying the WFD. 
That being said, we would like to make plain what we are not doing. We examined the 
nature of research questions asked, and we report on theory and methods. However, we 
do not provide answers given to those questions. In other words, we make no attempt to 
aggregate research findings to present a broader picture of WFD implementation in 
Europe. Scholars interested in accumulated data may consult the four official 
implementation reports published by the European Commission (2007; 2009b; 2012b; 
2015) and work carried out by Kanakoudis and colleagues (Kanakoudis & Tsitsifli 
2010; Kanakoudis et al. 2015); the authors focus on Greece, but also use European 
Commission data to report on WFD implementation in the EU27. We do not contribute 
to this discussion. 
Methodologically, we relied on meta-analysis. Meta-analytical approaches aggregate in 
a systematic fashion knowledge from source texts, thereby using partly or fully 
quantitative aggregation methods. Initially developed to make causal statements about 
the relationship between two or more variables across a range of source studies, i.e. to 
answer a specific research question, meta-analysis is increasingly being used to 
summarise an area of research as a whole. Such systematic reviews then do not explore 
questions of causality, but provide a thorough overview of a specific body of literature 
with regard to the research questions asked, theoretical approaches used, research 
designs and methods chosen, and jurisdictions and time periods covered (Poteete & 
Ostrom 2008; Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009; Lam et al. 2012). Our article reflects the 
latter ambition. We examined 89 articles, published in English-language academic 
journals, that explore empirically and from a social science perspective the 
implementation of the WFD in EU member states. To this end, we extracted 
information on more than 35 dimensions from each source article. 
 
2.2 The Water Framework Directive 
Water is one of the oldest and most heavily regulated areas in EU environmental policy, 
covering issues such as drinking water, waste water, and groundwater. However, the 
sector had always been plagued, since the adoption of the first directives at European 
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level in the early 1970s, by serious implementation deficits and a lack of policy 
effectiveness. Three factors were of particular importance: low acceptance rates on the 
part of target groups, the mismatch between ecological (river basins) and political 
(political and administrative institutions) scales, and the fact that standards-based 
approaches regulating individual or families of substances completely ignored the 
problem of synergetic ecological effects (Jordan 1999; Grant et al. 2000; Kallis 2005). 
Through the WFD, adopted in December 2000, the EU introduced a promising set of 
political instruments to tackle the challenges that have long characterised EU water 
management (Kallis & Butler 2001). Principally, the WFD aims to develop an 
“integrated community policy on water” (Preamble 3 WFD) by bringing together all 
water resources, uses, values, stakeholders, and relevant decision-making levels under a 
common legal regime (European Commission 2003, p.5-6). To this end, the Directive 
creates a framework for existing policies, repeals others, and provides a reference point 
for subsequent legislation, such as the new Groundwater Directive. 
Good surface water status, as well as good groundwater status, were the key objectives 
to be achieved by 2015. Additionally, member states are required to protect existing 
water bodies from deterioration. For surface waters, the assessment of the status is 
based on a measurement scale that rates biological and hydromorphological 
characteristics as high, good, moderate, poor, and bad, and chemical characteristics as 
good and fail. The Directive thus breaks new ground by complementing chemical water 
quality assessments with the more general assessment of ecological quality. In 
particular, a surface water body is of good quality if there are only minor departures 
from the quality of pristine water bodies with minimal anthropogenic impact. 
Groundwater is classified as good or poor, based on its chemical and its quantitative 
status. Artificial or heavily modified water bodies such as canals are to achieve at least 
good ecological potential, which is as close as possible to good status. The achievement 
of the 2015 water policy goals may be delayed up to 2027 or even lowered to a less 
stringent objective under reference to natural conditions, technical feasibility, or 
disproportionate costs. 
Taking into account that the existing body of EU water legislation already consists of 
far-reaching substantive measures, the WFD puts a high premium on the procedural side 
of water management. Five novelties are crucial: 
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River basin districts: Recognising that water is not static and that water bodies exist 
across political and administrative boundaries, member states are required to manage 
water at hydrological scales. To this end, River Basin Districts (RBDs) shall be 
established, respective management bodies shall be created, or if member states elect to 
remain within their existing administrative structures, collaboration shall be ensured 
between jurisdictions to manage river basins. 
River basin management planning: The WFD planning process consists of eight steps: 
assessment of water status, characterisation of physical and societal pressures on water 
bodies, designation of artificial and heavily modified water bodies, determination of 
water bodies at risk, revision of an existing River Basin Management Plan, adoption of 
a Programme of Measures to specify concrete actions, implementation of those two 
documents, monitoring, and review. This sequence of activities is to be repeated every 
six years. 
Public participation: Engagement activities involve three components: information, 
consultation, and active involvement. Information requirements mainly include 
obligations to make status and risk assessments, background information, and maps 
publicly available. In terms of consultation, member states must organise three rounds 
of public comment during the preparation of River Basin Management Plans. Active 
involvement describes a more intense mode of participation and may include planning 
in small groups and face-to-face. 
Economic analysis: The Directive encourages decision makers to consider economic 
principles at various stages of the planning process. This may involve cost-benefit 
analysis to justify exemptions, cost-effectiveness tests and other analyses to identify 
suitable management options, and pricing and cost-recovery mechanisms to change 
water consumption patterns. 
Policy integration: To achieve the Directive’s policy goals, member state authorities are 
required to ensure policy integration not only within the water sector (for instance, 
integration of surface water and groundwater), but also within adjacent fields, such as 
flood control, forestry, or climate change. Rather than being a specific governance tool, 
policy integration represents a guiding principle of WFD water management. 
These five components are held together by a strict timetable. Adopted in 2000, the 
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Directive required EU member states to transpose it into national law within three years. 
Until 2009, member states were then obliged to establish RBDs, to designate or create 
new management authorities at the river basin level, to identify and map water bodies, 
to establish monitoring networks, and to adopt a first River Basin Management Plan and 
Programme of Measures for each RBD. From 2009 onwards, member states would then 
reinitiate the above-mentioned sequence of management activities every six years. 
All member states engage, though in varying degrees, in the Common Implementation 
Strategy (CIS). Established by the European Commission and the member states in 
2001, the CIS brings together domestic water practitioners, regulators, and experts so as 
to report best practices and encourage mutual learning. In terms of organisation, CIS 
participants collaborate in working groups that reflect key challenges to WFD 
implementation, for instance, on monitoring, groundwater, heavily modified water 
bodies, or economics. CIS outputs include more than 30 legally non-binding 
implementation guidelines that provide best-practice cases, advice for specific water 
management problems, and benchmarks for good water governance. The CIRCABC 
website (Communication and Information Resource Centre for Administrations, 
Businesses and Citizens; https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/ 
container.jsp) serves as an important coordination and communication device. 
Who implements the Directive? The WFD is a legally binding EU policy, which is why 
all member states are obliged to transpose the Directive and put it into practice. EU 
candidate states may implement parts of the Directive as part of their accession 
agreements. Likewise, associated countries such as Norway and Switzerland may adopt 
key features of WFD water management. 
To sum up, all EU member states implement the WFD. In the past nine years, those 
countries may have engaged in at least six overlapping, yet conceptually distinct, 
activities: water management at hydrological scales, the preparation of River Basin 
Management Plans and Programmes of Measures, public participation, economic 
analysis, and policy integration, plus participation in CIS working groups at the EU 
level. However, there is also a temporal dimension: we distinguish the preparation 
period between 2003 and 2009, characterised by institution building and the preparation 
of the first set of River Basin Management Plans and Programmes of Measures, from 
the first management cycle, from 2009 to 2015. This perspective leaves aside the 
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transposition into national law (up until 2003). 
Let us now undertake a thought experiment and describe WFD implementation as a 3-
dimensional space, consisting of 28 (countries) x 6 (activities) x 2 (time periods) = at 
least 336 cells that could be filled with exciting data. Importantly, these 336 cells are 
not mere data points, but spaces that, each for itself, may tell complex stories about 
actors, ideologies, and institutions. To illustrate, one cell would contain information on 
public participation in France during the first management cycle. We appreciate that this 
thought experiment is somewhat crude, but we may still think of the above-mentioned 
space as a container subsequently to be filled with intriguing findings from WFD 
scholarship. Research priorities are distributed unevenly with regards to countries, WFD 
requirements, and time periods. This leads us to suggest that some sectors of this 3-
dimensional space are densely populated, whereas others remain largely unchartered 
terrain. We are not necessarily arguing that the research community should first and 
foremost seek to fill those 336 cells. After all, scholars may legitimately elect to use 
WFD implementation as a case study to further an agenda unrelated to the 
implementation of the Directive. However, scholars wishing to contribute to scholarly 
debates on WFD implementation, and on EU policy implementation more broadly, may 
use this image as a device to reflect on areas of research that are well documented and 
on those that are understudied or widely ignored. 
 
 2.3 Studying EU policy implementation 
The previous section outlined a purely descriptive research programme: what 
requirements could or should be taken into account in WFD implementation research? 
However, to explain the implementation patterns described in the matrix above, one 
would have to consider a set of independent variables. For this, one would have to make 
use of one of the explanatory frameworks developed in the EU policy implementation 
and Europeanisation literature. 
This literature did, in its early days, borrow much from its transatlantic counterpart in 
the United States (Pressman & Wildavsky 1984; deLeon 1999; Hill & Hupe 2002). In 
doing so, the European community reproduced quite a few shortcomings characteristic 
of the U.S. literature, in particular its tendency to generate endless lists of potential 
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causal factors. To recall, O'Toole Jr. (1986) counted more than 300 variables discussed 
in the literature. Since then, much progress has been made. We discuss three leading 
approaches in Europeanisation research: the goodness-of-fit approach, the actor-based 
approaches, and the worlds-of-compliance approach. 
Goodness-of-fit approach: Relying on historical institutionalism, this approach argues 
that existing paths are resistant to change. EU policy implementation will be smooth if 
European requirements can be accommodated within current domestic paths, yet will be 
delayed or incorrectly implemented if they require substantive changes. To assess the 
degree of suitability and to predict compliance patterns, scholars compare European 
requirements and domestic policies. Often, authors distinguish policy fit, emphasising 
the compatibility of domestic and European policies, from institutional fit, highlighting 
the congruity between domestic institutions and institutional requirements of EU 
directives (Börzel 1999). 
Increasingly, however, empirical work disconfirms the argument (Haverland 2000; 
Falkner et al. 2005). This is because the hypothesis is “rather static in nature” 
(Mastenbroek 2005, p.1110). Plausibly, domestic actors are not necessarily interested in 
preserving the status quo. Instead, they may want to change existing policies and 
institutions and thus utilise the EU for domestic purposes. In response to these 
criticisms, proponents of the goodness-of-fit perspective added a number of auxiliary 
variables to the initial argument (Risse et al. 2001; Thomson 2007; Hartlapp 2009). 
However, these amendments lead to a theoretically elegant, though empirically 
inconclusive, hypothesis that makes the notion of goodness of fit overly complex and, 
because of its ad hoc character, does not allow for ex ante hypothesising. 
Actor-based approaches: Other scholars, in contrast, abandoned the structuralist core of 
the goodness-of-fit argument entirely and suggested examining actors, interests, and 
beliefs directly. From a rational-choice perspective, this includes exchange, bargaining, 
and principal-agent models (Haverland & Romeijn 2007; Kaeding 2008). Sociological-
institutionalist accounts instead theorise compliance with EU directives as a result of 
socialisation, persuasion, and learning processes (Checkel 2001). 
Worlds-of-compliance approach: Falkner et al. (2005) and Falkner and Treib (2008) 
argue that the substance of a particular EU policy is of little relevance for EU policy 
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implementation. Instead, the authors focus on national compliance cultures, i.e. general 
attitudes toward the rule of law and compliance with legally binding rules. To this end, 
they distinguish four worlds of compliance in Europe, i.e. clusters of countries that 
share a common sense of obligation towards implementation duties. 
As of now, the empirical evidence is inconclusive, and a number of approaches are 
available combining elements from each perspective (Knill 2001). However, the above-
mentioned approaches may serve as a source of inspiration for those whose research is 
chiefly concerned with understanding and explaining WFD implementation. We will 
return to this scholarship when we discuss the use of theory in extant research. 
 
 2.4 Methods and data 
This article reviews social science scholarship, published in English-language academic 
journals, that explores empirically the implementation of the WFD in EU member 
states. To identify articles matching our criteria, we searched the Web of Science, 
Science Direct, and Google Scholar databases, using the terms “Water Framework 
Directive”, “WFD”, “Integrated Water Resources Management”, or “IWRM” in the 
title, abstract, key words, or topic. We also screened the lists of references of relevant 
publications and located further work by particular authors through their list of 
publications. In line with our search criteria, we excluded non-academic publications 
such as policy documents and reports prepared by non-governmental organisations and 
consultancy firms. Likewise, we did not consider academic research published in book 
sections, conference papers, and doctoral dissertations, plus otherwise-relevant journal 
articles published in languages other than English. 
We then examined the remaining set of papers and excluded those that did not meet our 
key search criterion: to report empirically on WFD implementation. This way we 
discarded articles describing the prehistory (Kaika & Page 2003) and content and 
ambition (Adshead 2004) of the Directive; scholarship offering legal interpretations 
(Grimeaud 2001) or normative critiques, for instance, as to whether the WFD is 
compatible with concepts such as Integrated Water Resources Management (Rahaman 
et al. 2004); and works anticipating rather than studying implementation patterns 
(Hedelin & Lindh 2008). Among the empirical studies left, we did not consider articles 
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reflecting physical and natural science research (de Toffol et al. 2005), discussing 
models based on WFD inputs (Crabtree et al. 2009), or studying phenomena not directly 
linked to the actual implementation of the Directive in a member state. These would 
include, for instance, researcher-led experiments with public participation (Newig et al. 
2008) or economic analysis (Martin-Ortega 2012), which may have informed WFD 
implementation but were not part of a country’s official implementation schedule. We 
also excluded articles if the empirical parts were shorter than three pages (Carter 2007). 
As a consequence, the findings reported in this article are based on 89 journal articles 
(see Table 1). 
Table 1: Our sample 
Source articles considered Countries studied Key themes 
Adshead 2006 Germany, United Kingdom Participation 
Albrecht 2013 Germany Planning process 
Allan 2012 United Kingdom Ecological status and goals, 
Planning process 
Andersson et al. 2012 Sweden Planning process 
Baaner 2011 Denmark, Sweden Planning process 
Behagel & Arts 2014 Netherlands Participation 
Behagel & Turnhout 2011 Netherlands Participation 
Benson et al. 2014 United Kingdom Participation 
Beunen et al. 2009 Netherlands Policy integration 
Bithas et al. 2014 Greece Economic analysis 
Blackstock et al. 2009 United Kingdom Policy integration 
Blackstock et al. 2012 United Kingdom Participation 
Blackstock et al. 2014 United Kingdom Participation 
Blackstock 2009 United Kingdom Ecological goals and status, 
Participation, Policy 
integration 
Borowski et al. 2008 Germany Participation 
Bourblanc et al. 2013 Denmark, France, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom 
Ecological goals and status, 
Participation, River basin 
management 
Carter & Howe 2006 United Kingdom Participation 
De Stefano et al. 2013 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Ecological goals and status 
Dehnhardt 2013 Germany Economic analysis 
Dehnhardt 2014 Germany Economic analysis 
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Demetropoulou et al. 2010 Greece Participation 
Dieperink et al. 2012 Netherlands Ecological goals and status 
Drazkiewicz et al. 2015 Germany Participation 
Earle & Blacklocke 2008 Ireland Ecological goals and status 
Estrela 2011 Spain Planning process 
Feuillette et al. 2016 France Economic analysis 
Flynn & Kröger 2003 Ireland Participation, River basin 
management 
Franzén et al. 2015 Sweden Participation 
Fritsch & Benson 2013 United Kingdom Participation, River basin 
management 
Gómez-Limón & Martin-
Ortega 2013 
Spain Economic analysis 
Gooch & Baggett 2013 Sweden Participation, River basin 
management 
Hammer et al. 2011 Sweden Planning process 
Hanley & Black 2006 United Kingdom Economic analysis 
Hernández-Mora & 
Ballester 2011 
Spain Participation 
Hophmayer-Tokich & 
Krozer 2008 
Germany, United Kingdom Participation 
Howarth 2009 United Kingdom Ecological goals and status, 
Participation 
Hüesker & Moss 2015 Germany River basin management 
Ioris 2012 Portugal WFD in general 
Ioris 2015 Portugal WFD in general 
Irvine and O’Brien 2009 Ireland Participation 
Jonsson 2005 Sweden Participation 
Junier & Mostert 2012 Netherlands Planning process, River basin 
management 
Kanakoudis & Tsitsifli 
2010 
EU27 WFD in general 
Kanakoudis et al. 2015 EU27, Greece Planning process 
Kastens & Newig 2007 Germany Ecological goals and status, 
Participation 
Kastens & Newig 2008 Germany Participation 
Keessen et al. 2010 Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 
Spain, United Kingdom 
Ecological goals and status, 
Policy integration 
Keskitalo & Pettersson 
2012 
Sweden Policy integration 
Kirk et al. 2007 United Kingdom Planning process 
Koontz & Newig 2014a Germany Participation 
Koontz & Newig 2014b Germany Participation 
Kouw 2014 Netherlands Participation 
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Kowalczak et al. 2013 Czech Republic, Poland Participation 
Larsen 2011 Denmark Policy integration 
Laurenceau et al. 2009 Belgium, France, Netherlands Economic analysis 
Liefferink et al. 2011 Denmark, France, Netherlands Ecological goals and status, 
Participation, Policy 
integration, River basin 
management 
Lundmark & Jonsson 2013 Sweden Participation 
Lundqvist 2004 Sweden Ecological goals and status, 
Participation 
Maganda 2013 Luxembourg Participation, River basin 
management 
Medd & Marvin 2007 United Kingdom Planning process 
Meyer & Thiel 2012 Germany Participation, Planning 
process 
Moren-Abat & Rodriguez-
Roldan 2012 
Spain Ecological goals and status, 
River basin management 
Moss 2004 Germany River basin management 
Moss 2008 United Kingdom Ecological goals and status 
Moss 2012 Germany River basin management 
Mylopoulos & Kolokytha 
2008 
 
Greece River basin management 
Neef 2008 Germany Participation 
Newson 2011 United Kingdom Participation 
Nielsen et al. 2013 Denmark, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Sweden 
River basin management 
Parés 2011 Spain Participation 
Parés et al. 2015 Spain Participation 
Raadgever et al. 2011 Netherlands Planning process 
Richter et al. 2013 Germany Ecological goals and status 
Slavíková & Jílková 2011 Czech Republic Participation 
Spiller et al. 2012 United Kingdom WFD in general 
Thaler et al. 2013 Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Economic analysis 
Theesfeld & Schleyer 2013 Germany Participation, River basin 
management 
Thiel & Egerton 2011 Portugal River basin management 
Thiel 2014 Spain River basin management 
Thiel 2015 Germany, Portugal, Spain River basin management 
van der Arend & Behagel 
2011 
Netherlands Participation 
van der Heijden & ten 
Heuvelhof 2012 
Netherlands Participation 
van der Heijden & ten 
Heuvelhof 2013 
Netherlands Participation 
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van der Heijden et al. 2014 Netherlands Participation, River basin 
management 
van der Veeren 2010 Netherlands Economic analysis 
Watson et al. 2009 United Kingdom Participation 
Watson & Howe 2006 United Kingdom Participation 
Waylen et al. 2015 United Kingdom Participation 
Woods 2008 United Kingdom Participation 
 
To analyse the research reported in each source article, we relied on a codebook based 
on more than 35 items covering author affiliations and countries, research priorities and 
questions, implementation requirements (for instance, river basin management, public 
participation, or economic analysis), and levels of analysis (national, RBD, or 
catchment), as well as the ambition of a study (descriptive, causal, or evaluative) and 
related theoretical and methodological choices. These items were chosen so as to draw a 
complete picture of the thematic, geographic, and temporal scales of the research 
undertaken so far. Because of the small sample size, we do not go beyond basic 
statistics when we present our findings. Appendix C provides a complete list of our 
codebook items. 
We then used categorical, dichotomous, and ordinal variables to code our findings; 
manually written comments served to justify decisions and to provide additional 
material for the subsequent analysis and interpretation. The two authors of this article 
coded, independently from each other, all 89 source papers and resolved disagreements 
through deliberation. 
 
2.5 Publication patterns: who publishes when and where? 
We examined 89 journal articles studying, from various disciplinary, theoretical and 
methodological angles, WFD implementation in Europe. The number as such is 
impressive. Academic scholarship on the Directive is booming, probably being the most 
widely studied EU Directive, and definitely the most widely studied piece of EU 
legislation in the field of environment. However, those 89 studies have not been 
published evenly across the years. The academic community began to pay attention to 
the empirical study of WFD implementation more systematically in 2007, followed by a 
remarkable increase in publications after 2010 (Figure 1). In fact, more than 66 per cent 
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of all articles were published in the last five years. Furthermore, we are aware of more 
manuscripts being under way; in other words, the trend is likely to continue. 
Figure 1: Number of publications over time 
 
Not surprisingly, those figures reflect WFD implementation patterns in many EU 
member states. In compliance with EU legislation, many countries had transposed the 
Directive into national law by 2003 before defining RBDs, setting up the necessary 
institutions and characterising water bodies. Early research largely reflects those 
priorities, mainly focusing on the establishment of RBDs (Moss 2004), the 
characterisation process (Kirk et al. 2007), or pilot projects carried out in the context of 
the Common Implementation Strategy (Carter & Howe 2006; Watson & Howe 2006). 
However, as we will show further below, it is mainly the institutional novelties in the 
Directive that intrigued the scholarly community, in particular the involvement of non-
state actors in water planning and river basin management. Obviously, those processes 
could only be described, theorised, and evaluated when they were already under way, 
i.e. when River Basin Management Plans were adopted in 2009-2010. Consequently, 
studies analysing the actual planning process mushroomed in 2011, and figures have 
remained at high levels since. 
What do we know about the authors of those studies? We looked into three dimensions: 
the country of origin of the first author, their professional background, and if the author 
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is an academic, the departmental affiliation. First, we recorded the country of origin for 
the lead author of each article. Those authors work in institutions in 13 different 
member states (Figure 2). Countries in northwestern Europe dominated; in fact, more 
than 61 per cent of all studies were first-authored by scholars based in the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. Scholars working in the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and outside 
Europe published the remaining 39 per cent. We were unable to identify publications 
authored by scholars in the remaining 15 member states. In fairness, we only talk about 
lead authors here. However, the overall pattern did not look significantly different when 
we took into account all authors of a submission; the figures for authors based at 
institutions in southern and eastern Europe remained significantly low. 
Figure 2: Number of publications by country of origin (first author) 
 
These figures are not counterintuitive. Ultimately, they may simply reflect general 
patterns of academic productivity. There is no doubt that scholars in southern and 
eastern Europe carry out high-quality research across the board. Still, academics from 
northwestern Europe tend to publish in international peer-reviewed journals more often 
than their colleagues in other parts of Europe. We may speculate as to why this is so, 
but whatever the causes are they say little about WFD research as such. However, it is 
plausible to argue that the Directive is generally more widely studied in the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. This may be because the WFD, as a water 
quality Directive, addresses issues of more fundamental importance in northwestern 
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Europe, setting in motion policy makers, civil society, national funding bodies, and the 
scholarly community. Although troubled by water quality problems too, many regions 
in southern Europe put a higher premium on the question of water quantity and supply, 
a preference that may bind scarce research resources. Nevertheless, the observed pattern 
may have a significant influence on case selection, resulting in a noticeable imbalance 
as to the countries studied by the WFD community. 
Second, a majority of our first authors, some 77 out of 89 articles in the sample, are 
academics from universities or national research institutes. Ten authors are 
practitioners, for instance, from government departments, environmental regulators, or 
charities; two authors have a double affiliation. We were not surprised to see a majority 
of academics here. Still, we believe that the 11 per cent non-academics in our sample is 
above average, highlighting the importance of WFD-related research for environmental 
practitioners in Europe. Third, the WFD community in Europe largely consists of 
scholars working at interdisciplinary environmental social science departments or, in a 
few cases, at natural science or engineering schools, in total 59 out of 79 in our sample. 
Only 17 scholars work at social science departments with a clear disciplinary focus: 6 in 
politics, 5 in law, and 6 in economics. To be clear, this says nothing about their 
disciplinary background. However, it suggests that many authors operate in an 
interdisciplinary environment, often with a sympathy for applied research. As we argue 
below, this is likely to shape theoretical and methodological choices when studying 
WFD implementation in Europe. 
Our analysis of target journals also highlights the interdisciplinary ambition of many 
scholars. Figure 3 summarises the Web of Science subject categories of those journals 
that have published articles in our sample. There are two caveats. First, some journals 
are listed in several subject categories, so the absolute number of entries is higher than 
the number of articles in our sample. Second, a few journals are not listed in the Web of 
Science, and we manually assigned plausible subject categories to those outlets, based 
on editorial mission statements and other information found on the journal website. 
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Figure 3: Number of publications by Web of Science subject categories 
 
Accordingly, manuscripts about the implementation of the WFD usually find their home 
in interdisciplinary journals, particularly in those specialising in environmental social 
science and water resources. Authors rarely target journals in social science 
subdisciplines such as political science (van der Arend & Behagel 2011; Koontz & 
Newig 2014b), public administration (Behagel & Arts 2014), economics (Bithas et al. 
2014; Dehnhardt 2013), or legal studies (Adshead 2006; Keessen et al. 2010). At first 
sight, this is somewhat counterintuitive. After all, many authors explore topics such as 
public participation or the use of cost-benefit analysis in water planning. Arguably, their 
findings may be of great interest for a wider audience in political science or economics, 
for instance, for scholars working on deliberative democracy or evidence-based policy 
making. However, the approaches taken to study such phenomena, specifically the 
interdisciplinary and often applied nature of WFD-related research, make such work 
less appropriate for narrow disciplinary debates and more suitable for an 
interdisciplinary audience and their journals. Still, we are somewhat concerned that 
scholarly communities may talk past each other; in other words, interdisciplinary outlets 
may have become another niche for a community of experts rather than an arena of 
exchange across disciplines. Two journals have become particularly important for 
scholars specialising in European water management: Land Use Policy, with 11 out of 
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89 articles in our sample, and Environmental Policy & Governance (including its 
predecessor European Environment) with 10 articles. Local Environment, Water Policy 
and the International Journal of Water Governance constitute another group of 
preferred target journals. 
 
 2.6 Mapping scholarly interest: countries, policy levels, themes  
Now that we have established who publishes when and where, let us take a closer look 
at the object of those studies: the what. To this end, we organised our review around 
five dimensions: countries, policy levels, transboundary water management, the 
temporal stage of WFD implementation, and if the Directive has not been studied in its 
entirety, the aspects of the Directive that attracted scholarly attention. In other words, 
we map scholarly interest across a range of spatial, temporal, and substantial 
dimensions. 
We begin with dimension one, i.e. countries studied. Figure 4 displays the number of 
publications per country. The absolute number of entries is higher than the number of 
articles in our sample; this is because some papers report on more than one country. 
Generally, our sample is characterised by an unhealthy imbalance. Five countries were 
studied quite thoroughly in the past: the United Kingdom (24 studies), Germany (19 
studies), the Netherlands (16 studies), and Spain and Sweden (11 studies each). Another 
group of countries is covered by between three to six articles, including Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. However, a majority of EU member 
states have received little or no scholarly attention at all. These include many countries 
that have joined the EU in 2004 or thereafter, for instance, Hungary, Romania, and 
Slovakia, but also the Baltic states. What should be clear from this brief survey is that 
much is known about WFD implementation in northern and western Europe, but 
relatively little about WFD implementation in Mediterranean countries, including 
founding members and heavyweights such as France and Italy, and in eastern Europe. 
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Figure 4: Number of studies per case study country 
 
We offer two explanations. On the one hand, the above pattern simply reflects patterns 
of authorship. We have in our sample, for various reasons, a higher number of scholars 
based at British, Dutch, and German institutions, and this may influence case selection. 
There are good reasons for that: they speak the language, they have the contacts, they 
know the context, and they respond to requirements of national funding bodies. On the 
other hand, there may be an enlargement effect: the 2004, 2007, and 2013 accessions 
came with important transitory provisions and may have delayed WFD implementation 
in those countries. 
Is all this a problem? Yes and no at the same time. Case selection is not random. 
Academics choose cases to make a specific argument, to test an established theoretical 
proposition, or to develop a new one. This argument may result in a specific 
interpretation or critique that remains valid and plausible beyond the case studied. 
Scholars in our sample sometimes study the WFD, or specific provisions of the 
Directive, to make a claim that is entirely decoupled from the Directive. For instance, 
Drazkiewicz et al. (2015) used WFD cases to test the hypothesis that participatory 
arrangements enhance the ecological quality of environmental decisions and their 
implementation. There is little reason to study Austria, Bulgaria, or Malta if there was 
no participation in those countries that could have had an effect on environmental 
outcomes. However, as we show further below, when we talk about research design 
choices, an overwhelming majority of studies in our sample are descriptive, sometimes 
with evaluative undertones. Authors report what is going on and sometimes use ad hoc 
or theory-informed benchmarks to assess what they observe, often, so it seems, with a 
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view to supporting the implementation of WFD provisions in their country. From this 
perspective, the above-mentioned imbalance is unfortunate because it provides an 
incomplete picture. This is no trivial observation: many evaluations suggest that WFD 
provisions were implemented in an incomplete or suboptimal way. That may be true or 
not, but it would certainly be helpful to put such assessments into context by studying 
countries whose implementation record is, if we trust EU reports and media coverage, 
less than ideal too. In other words, selective cases may highlight deficits that are 
negligible if compared against other cases and may direct our attention away from more 
serious problems. 
We now turn to dimension two: the policy level studied. We distinguish three levels: the 
national level, relevant for the domestic transposition of the WFD and sometimes for 
the general organisation of WFD water planning in a EU member state; the RBD level, 
i.e. the reference level envisaged in the Directive for the preparation of management 
plans; and the sub-RBD level, in this article conveniently called the catchment level, 
although we do not associate any specific ecological definition to this term. Table 2 
below summarises our findings. 
Table 2: Number of studies per policy level 
 
Accordingly, we have 30 articles in our sample that strictly analyse the national level. 
These are followed by research looking into processes at catchment level. There is a 
relatively low number of 16 articles studying the WFD at the RBD level. A further set 
of 18 articles study combinations of, and sometimes the interactions between, several 
levels. We were surprised about the minor importance of RBDs and the larger number 
of studies focusing on catchments, given the prominence of RBDs in the Directive. We 
offer three explanations. First, some member states may have found the RBD level 
somewhat impractical and organised important management activities at lower levels 
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instead. This may be the case when RBDs conflict with administrative boundaries in a 
federal system such as Germany, where important planning activities are carried out at 
catchment level (Koontz & Newig 2014a). Obviously, this may direct scholarly 
attention away from RBDs. Second, some RBDs are inconveniently large to be studied 
in-depth through qualitative methods. In other words, the study of catchments is a 
methodological choice although, as we will argue below, such choices have not always 
been made explicit. Third, when the actual policy level does not matter, scholars go 
where the data are. For instance, when Borowski et al. (2008) decided to study the 
effects of participatory arrangements on social learning, they chose the level where such 
involvement processes take place. Case selection follows theory. Still, in light of the 
fact that many studies in this field have no causal ambition and remain descriptive, it is 
fair to argue that such descriptions then tend to show an incomplete picture. Incomplete 
in the sense that the reader does not always know how representative a catchment is vis-
à-vis other catchments. Furthermore, extensive knowledge about one particular policy 
level does not necessarily enhance our knowledge of other levels and their interactions. 
For instance, we possess an in-depth understanding of German WFD water planning at 
the catchment level and of important initiatives at the federal level. However, despite a 
wealth of publications on Germany we are still in the dark as to the coordinative 
mechanisms between federal states, i.e. mechanisms in place to integrate river basin 
planning and catchment level activities in various states. Future research will definitely 
benefit from perspectives that integrate various policy levels to provide a more 
complete picture of WFD water planning. 
Dimension three looks into the transboundary aspect of river basin management. 
Almost all countries in continental Europe share at least one river basin with their 
neighbours. So far, no powerful mechanisms are in place to encourage river basin 
management beyond national borders. International commissions exist for each 
transboundary basin, but important parts of the planning process are excluded from such 
coordination, not least because countries implemented WFD provisions at a very 
different pace. At the time of writing, the scholarly community has not taken many 
steps to look into the transboundary aspect of WFD implementation. We have 33 
studies studying RBDs, a vast majority of those RBDs being transboundary, but only 
one study (Mylopoulos & Kolokytha 2008) addresses this issue by studying both sides 
of a Greek-Bulgarian basin. All other studies remain on ‘their’ side of the river; Meyer 
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and Thiel (2012), for instance, study the German part of the Odra basin and ignore the 
Polish part. Likewise, the largest river basin in Europe, the Danube, has been managed 
for more than 150 years in the spirit of transboundary water management, through 
various international commissions established by international agreements. However, 
this has rarely attracted scholarly attention, and never in a WFD context. We believe 
this is a fundamental research gap. We acknowledge that there are limits to such a 
research programme, exactly because river basin management beyond national borders 
currently meets various political, administrative, and perhaps, ideological obstacles. 
Still, scholarship on WFD implementation would greatly benefit from studies 
establishing the presence or absence of transboundary mechanisms. 
We now move from spatial and scalar aspects to the temporal dimension of 
implementing the Directive. This is dimension four: what stages of the WFD planning 
process have been studied so far? Member states were supposed to implement the 
Directive in various steps. This involves transposing the WFD into national law, 
identifying RBDs, nominating a competent authority, designating water bodies, 
assessing pressures on aquatic environments and evaluating the risk of missing 
environmental targets (characterisation process), and the drafting of River Basin 
Management Plans and Programmes of Measures. The early stages of the 
implementation process were accompanied by pilot measures. They were carried out in 
the context of the common strategy of implementation with a view to supporting the 
implementation of ‘tricky measures’, such as the involvement of non-state actors or the 
use of economic analysis in water planning. 
Our sample includes three articles that analyse pilot projects: two of them on 
participation and one on cost-benefit analysis. All three report on the United Kingdom. 
Nine papers address, among other issues, the process of transposing the WFD into 
national law. A vast majority of papers in our sample, 86 out of 89, cover the 
preparation phase from 2003 to 2009 (and in some countries, 2010). This is not very 
counterintuitive per se. After all, many exciting innovations, from a social science 
perspective, could be observed only during or after the preparation phase. These include 
the establishment of RBDs, the involvement of stakeholders in the planning process, 
and the application of various economic decision-making tools. However, there is a 
caveat here: many studies provide a snapshot, i.e. report about a specific moment in 
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time or a particular step in implementing the Directive. A few studies present a bigger 
picture or compare WFD implementation efforts over time. For example, we identified 
only three articles explicitly studying the first implementation cycle from 2009 to 2015 
or systematically comparing the experience gained in different sectors and countries in 
the preparation phase and the first cycle. 
Finally, in dimension five, we analysed the various themes and requirements, usually 
institutional innovations, that can be found in the WFD and that may have attracted 
scholarly attention. We distinguished seven themes: the ecological goals of the 
Directive and how achievement of those goals has been encouraged or enforced in EU 
member states, including the designation of water bodies; the use of economic 
principles as reflected in tools such as cost-benefit analysis in water planning; the 
establishment of RBDs and problems that arise as a consequence of rescaling; the 
involvement of non-state actors in water planning; the integration of other policy areas 
in WFD water management, for instance, climate, forestry, flooding, and biodiversity; 
the planning process, if not specifically focused on participation, economic tools, policy 
integration, or river basin management; and a residual category: WFD in general. This 
last category is particularly useful for studies looking into the overall transposition of 
the Directive into national law. However, the category also covers quantitative research 
aggregating several WFD themes across a large number of EU member states such that 
important lessons can be drawn regarding the general implementation of the Directive 
in Europe, although at the same time, because of the step of aggregating information, 
little can be said in detail about, for example, participation, economic analysis, or policy 
integration. Figure 5 below reports our findings. Quite a few articles discuss more than 
one theme; the absolute number of entries is therefore higher than the number of articles 
in our sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
	 60	
Figure 5: Number of studies per WFD theme 
 
What do the data tell us? We observed a great imbalance as to the institutional novelties 
promoted by the WFD. The involvement of non-state actors in water planning has 
inspired a rich literature. In fact, 52 per cent of all articles and (the figures differ here 
because articles often report on more than one theme) 41 per cent of all themes are 
related to public participation in WFD water management. To be clear, it is beyond the 
scope of this article to discuss the achievements made in this field. However, what can 
be said is that previous work centres on three themes. First, we have a number of 
publications taking a Europeanisation perspective, i.e. they ask why specific domestic 
arrangements have come into place and what role the EU plays therein (Liefferink et al. 
2011). Second, authors explore the effects of participation, typically on social learning 
processes (Borowski et al. 2008), ecological outcomes and implementation 
(Drazkiewicz et al. 2015), or legitimacy (Behagel & Turnhout 2011). Third, we found a 
series of articles comparing instances of participation against legal or normative 
benchmarks, i.e. evaluative exercises (Watson & Howe 2006; Slavíková & Jílková 
2011; Benson et al. 2014). With the exception of works focusing on ecological 
outcomes, an aspect still treated with neglect, the above questions represent strands of 
research that speak to a wider and already well-established literature. 
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Certainly, this enthusiasm for participation within the WFD research community calls 
for an explanation. We offer three. First, research interviews with national water 
managers and European Commission officials, carried out in the context of other 
projects, suggest that of all institutional novelties proposed by the WFD, public 
participation perhaps represents the greatest challenge to national administrative 
cultures and established water management traditions. Exploring public and stakeholder 
engagement therefore constitutes an excellent opportunity to study administrative 
reform, institutional change, and learning in contested settings. Second, these challenges 
resulted, in our mind, in an exceptionally high number of funded projects at national 
and EU levels, consultancy opportunities, and other incentives for researchers to 
collaborate with policy makers and stakeholders on participation. Third, participation 
resonates with a wide variety of literature, much more than other institutional novelties 
in the Directive do. This includes communities working on EU policy implementation, 
on participatory and deliberative democracy, on regulatory reform, on policy 
effectiveness of participatory governance, on social learning, and many others. 
We found less work, 20 per cent of all articles, on water management at ecological 
scales. Once again, scholars study questions related to the Europeanisation of domestic 
arrangements, i.e. of policy implementation. When authors identify misfits between EU 
requirements and domestic practice, and in this context this means between ecological 
and administrative scales, a link is usually made to the literature on spatial fit and 
institutional interplay (Moss 2004; 2012). This literature is even more prominent in 
works investigating economic rationales for specific scalar arrangements (Thiel & 
Egerton 2011; Thiel 2014). 
However, regulatory tools such as cost-benefit analysis remain understudied (but see 
Dehnhardt 2013; 2014). In other words, scholarship investigating the identification of 
environmental benefits and costs, approaches toward cost recovery of water services 
and incentive pricing, and the link between participation and economic analysis, in 
particular how they complement each other, is still in great demand. We also believe 
that the politics of exemptions is neglected so far, i.e. political strategies that often result 
in less stringent water quality objectives. Finally, policy integration is rarely considered 
in prior work, in particular with regard to climate policy - our sample includes two 
articles that exclusively analyse this relationship in Denmark and Scotland (Blackstock 
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2009; Larsen 2011) - and to EU policies based on similar management philosophies. 
These include, for instance, the Birds and Habitats Directives, the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive, and the Floods Directive; we hypothesise they could be a source 
of both mutual reinforcement and conflict (Beunen et al. 2009). In fairness, the 
literature on institutional interplay (Young 2002; in a WFD context see, e.g. Moss 2004; 
Newig & Fritsch 2009; Hüesker & Moss 2015) has addressed such questions. However, 
we still see the promise of linking spatial approaches to the integration of different 
policy fields in WFD research more than in the past. 
 
 2.7 Studying WFD implementation: theory and methods  
In this section we discuss how previous scholarship has approached the study of WFD 
implementation. To this end, we focus on three aspects. The first is the ambition of the 
research project; we hereby distinguish descriptive, causal, and evaluative work. The 
second is questions of research design and methodology. The third is choices made in 
terms of concepts and theory. 
In terms of ambition, we identified three ideal types: (1) papers with a causal ambition 
that try, supported by theory and conceptual frameworks, to establish a causal link 
between two or more independent and dependent variables; (2) evaluative papers that 
compare patterns of WFD implementation against legal requirements or normative 
frameworks; and (3) descriptive papers that portray and detail a phenomenon without 
embedding it in an explanatory or normative framework. We complemented those ideal 
types with two additional categories: causal papers without theory, i.e. based on ad hoc 
explanations; and evaluative papers without normative framework, i.e. providing ad hoc 
evaluations. 
We observed a large number of descriptive work in our sample. About 55 per cent of all 
articles, 49 out of 89, describe the implementation of the Directive, or of a specific 
WFD theme, in Europe. However, those authors do not use their empirical material to 
build, explore, or test theories or to appraise their subject of analysis using a normative 
framework. Furthermore, 13 articles in our sample are descriptive in nature, but come 
with ad hoc causal explanations. Likewise, 3 papers present ad hoc evaluations. Only 18 
articles display a distinct causal ambition, relying on theory and hypotheses, and 6 
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papers offer a normative critique based on a previously defined framework against 
which authors compare their observations. In other words, only 24 per cent of all 
articles go beyond descriptive or ad hoc ambitions. 
According to our data, journal articles display a descriptive research interest more often 
if they appear in physical science, engineering, or interdisciplinary journals. Figure 6 
below summarises the type of ambition across the Web of Science journal subject 
categories in which the journals in our sample are listed. 
Figure 6: Research ambition across Web of Science subject categories 
 
Our sample of 89 articles includes quite a few articles published in physical science 
journals or outlets with a technical orientation, i.e. in journals belonging to Web of 
Science subject categories such as chemical engineering, civil engineering, 
environmental sciences, limnology, or meteorology. Figure 6 suggests that those 
journals have a particularly strong preference for descriptive submissions. The picture is 
mixed with regard to interdisciplinary journals. We have many descriptive pieces in 
periodicals specialising in water resources, whereas the environmental Studies category 
is more balanced. Finally, journals in classic social science subdisciplines such as 
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economics, political science, or public administration as well as in geography and urban 
studies tend to publish more research with causal or evaluative ambitions. Our analyses 
also suggest that practitioners are more likely to publish descriptive work, and they 
prefer to do so in physical science, engineering, or interdisciplinary journals. 
All studies with an evaluative ambition have one thing in common: they focus on public 
participation, including research on Ireland (Irvine and O’Brien 2009), the Czech 
Republic (Slavíková & Jílková 2011), Spain (Parés 2011), and the United Kingdom 
(Blackstock et al. 2012; Fritsch & Benson 2013; Benson et al. 2014). None of those 
countries had well-established participatory mechanisms in place prior to the adoption 
of the Directive. It is therefore not surprising to see authors evaluating the progress 
made after the WFD was transposed into national law. 
We observed more heterogeneity when we looked at causal projects in our sample. 
Articles cover areas as diverse as public participation, river basin management, and 
economic analysis, but also the Directive as a whole. The majority of articles use WFD 
implementation as the dependent variable, i.e. they try to shed light on the political, 
economic, or societal causes of specific implementation patterns. To this end, authors 
either refer to the Europeanisation literature (Liefferink et al. 2011; Moss 2004) or use 
public policy approaches, including institutional theories (Thiel & Egerton 2011; 
Nielsen et al. 2013; Thiel 2014), policy change models (Bourblanc et al. 2013), and the 
advocacy coalition framework (Dehnhardt 2014). Another set of work uses WFD 
implementation as the independent variable. Such studies explore, for instance, the 
effects of participatory exercises whereby social learning (Borowski et al. 2008; 
Lundmark & Jonsson 2013) or policy implementation and environmental outcomes 
(Koontz & Newig 2014b; Drazkiewicz et al. 2015) constitute the dependent variables. 
The Europeanisation literature has developed a number of fruitful approaches to explain 
EU policy implementation. We distinguished earlier the goodness-of-fit, actor-based, 
and worlds-of-compliance approaches, plus theories combining the goodness-of-fit 
approach with additional variables. The WFD community has, to date, made only 
limited use of this literature. In fairness, this may be because authors never meant to 
explain implementation patterns in the first place; instead, they may have selected the 
Directive as an independent variable. However, only two papers in our sample analyse 
the implementation of the WFD as dependent variable and utilise the Europeanisation 
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literature systematically (Liefferink et al. 2011; Moss 2004); both papers employ a 
variant of the goodness-of-fit approach with additional variables. Although Albrecht 
(2013) mentions the term “Europeanisation” in the title of her paper, no further 
reference to this literature is made in the remainder of the article. There is certainly 
potential to employ a wider array of approaches in a WFD context, ideally in a 
comparative setting with competing theories. 
The overall dominance of descriptive projects in this literature is, in our estimation, 
problematic. To be clear, we recognise that explanation and evaluation are not 
necessarily key priorities for many authors studying the WFD. We also appreciate the 
fact that many interdisciplinary scholars seek impact outside rather than inside the 
academy. Finally, we agree that “mere description” (Gerring 2012, p.721) has its merits. 
To illustrate, descriptive research may constitute a springboard for subsequent 
evaluative or causal projects, including meta-analyses and comparative studies. 
Unfortunately, however, empirical documentation of such uses in a WFD context is 
minimal. So far we are left with a pile of articles that describe in more or less detail 
important features of WFD implementation in Europe. However, we as readers are 
somewhat left in the dark as to what the purpose, mission, or function of those articles 
is. After all, their observations cannot easily be translated across cases or disciplines; 
these articles often contain rich materials shy of a research question. To enhance the 
echo of such research beyond the community of WFD scholars, we think authors are 
well advised to carry the empirical torch slightly farther than to the nearest descriptive 
pit stop. 
This is where theory kicks in. Essentially, WFD implementation research is theory-free 
territory. Almost 50 articles out of 89 do not mention theory at all. Others mention 
concepts and theories in between the empirical material, but those references do not 
really enhance our understanding of the overall argument; name dropping seems to 
outplay systematic utilisation. There are a small number of theory-guided studies in our 
sample where conceptual considerations inform hypothesis building or normative 
frameworks. However, by and large, theory falls by the wayside. This is a direct 
corollary of the descriptive or ad hoc direction taken by many studies. If somebody 
prioritises description or is content with ad hoc conclusions, there is little necessity for 
abstract reasoning. We find this lack of theory stunning. Theories are extremely useful 
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vehicles to translate ideas across cases and disciplines, and we are convinced that the 
WFD community would benefit from a more systematic recourse to concepts, 
hypotheses, systematic classifications, and theory. 
In terms of methodology, the WFD implementation literature is still in its infancy. We 
initially planned to map methodological choices made in this literature against classic 
approaches in social science. However, we failed to do so: more than 30 per cent, 27 out 
of 89 articles in our sample, provide virtually no information on research design, 
methods, and data. We can sometimes infer from the list of references that policy 
documents have informed the analysis; we may make the educated guess that some 
conclusions must be based on interview data or direct observation. However, the sheer 
absence of any methodological statement in almost one third of all publications casts a 
shadow over the entire subfield. Transparency and openness with regard to data sources 
and analysis are prerequisites for critical debate and enable the confirmation and 
refutation of claims. It is a professional standard that should not be given up lightly, and 
we do not see the merits of downplaying methodological precision. According to our 
data, authors operating in physical science or engineering schools are more likely to 
take a relaxed approach to methodology when they report on WFD implementation; 
likewise, such articles tend to be published in natural science or engineering journals. 
Another set of 18 articles report on data and research design. However, this information 
does not form a coherent methodological section, but is presented as part of the 
introduction, in the empirical sections, or simply in a footnote. The average word count 
is 138; in 9 papers it is 75 words or fewer, which is, upon sober reflection, definitely 
insufficient to inform adequately about the methodological choices made. Finally, 44 
out of 89 articles, fewer than half of the sample, provide a separate section dedicated to 
data and methods, with an average length of 579 words. Those studies usually rely on 
qualitative methods, particularly interview data, policy documents, participatory 
observation, and media analyses. Because of the overall lack of theory, there is little 
dialogue between theory and methods. In other words, methodological choices are 
rarely motivated by theory. Consequently, justifications for specific research designs 
and data analysis methods are very practical in nature. 
With regard to research design, our sample looks very uniform. First, our knowledge 
about WFD implementation in Europe primarily relies on single case studies or small-n 
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comparisons within one country. Our sample includes 74 single country studies, 2 
comparisons between EU countries and jurisdictions overseas, as well as 11 
comparative studies within Europe (between 2 and 11 countries each). There is a 
striking lack of large-n quantitative research: we only identified 2 studies (Kanakoudis 
& Tsitsifli 2010; Kanakoudis et al. 2015). Second, those 11 small-n studies are not 
always comparative in methodological terms. This is because they frequently fail to sort 
cases into comparable sets, and cases are rarely chosen because of their properties. In 
other words, there are few attempts to use only most-similar, most-different, or related 
strategies so as to maximise the benefits of a comparative research design. In this sense, 
many multicountry studies resemble case collections rather than theoretically and 
methodologically justified case comparisons. Not surprisingly then, 6 of those 11 
studies are descriptive; 4 others have a causal ambition, and the remaining study offers 
an ad hoc explanation. 
We argued before that the WFD community has submitted their research to a diverse 
range of journals, from economics and political science outlets to interdisciplinary 
journals and physical science periodicals. We now explore whether publication choices 
are linked to research ambition and methodological transparency. The underlying 
intuition is that articles characterised by less ambitious research programmes or weaker 
methodology parts are likely to be published in lower-ranked journals. 
We first used the Web of Science to establish the relative position of a journal in its 
respective subject category ranking, based on the two-year impact factor at the time of 
publication of each article in our sample. To this end, we classified those journals as 
belonging to one of the following seven categories: top 5 per cent, top 10 per cent, top 
25 per cent, top 50 per cent, top 75 per cent, or top 100 per cent of its respective Web of 
Science journal subject category; journals not listed at all form the last category. This 
way we are able to compare journals across Web of Science subject categories, although 
those categories differ as to their average impact factor and the number of journals 
listed. In other words, we argue that a journal on position 6 in a subject category with 
138 journals enjoys, within its disciplinary community, a greater reputation than a 
journal on position 4 in a subject category of 59 journals. If a journal was listed in 
several categories, we used the best measure of this journal. The approach also enabled 
us to control for publication years, i.e. we considered the possibility that journals move 
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up and down in the rankings over time. 
We are aware that this approach has limits. On the one hand, we used the publication 
year of an article although the time of submission would be a more precise measure; this 
information, however, was not available to us. On the other hand, the position of a 
journal in a subject category ranking reflects its impact factor, a metric that has attracted 
widespread criticisms (Giles & Garand 2007; Plümper 2007; Garand et al. 2009; Eyre-
Walker & Stoletzki 2013). The impact factor is statistically vulnerable because of the 
small sample size in many subject categories. Citation patterns often reflect journal 
availability rather than journal quality; authors cannot use a specific article if their 
institution provides no access. The impact factor is influenced by self-citations. Finally, 
the impact factor counts citations, but does not consider whether authors cite papers in a 
supporting or in a critical fashion. This implies that the impact factor says less about 
quality and more about reputation. However, we still believe that the relative position of 
a journal in the rankings provides the most useful metric in the context of this article. 
Our findings are straightforward: although there is no linear trend, our analysis suggests 
that theory-based causal and evaluative projects are more likely to be published in 
higher-ranked journals. Descriptive papers and those relying on ad hoc analyses, in 
contrast, tend to be published in outlets at the bottom of their subject category ranking 
or in outlets not listed in the Web of Science at all (Figure 7). Figure 8 displays the 
relationship between methodological transparency and position in the rankings. 
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Figure 7: Research ambition across journal ranking positions 
 
Figure 8: Methodological transparency across journal ranking positions 
 
Our findings suggest that, although there is one outlier category at 75 per cent, higher-
ranked journals tend to prefer submissions with a separate and, as we have shown 
earlier, longer methods section. Lower-ranked journals or outlets not listed at all are 
more likely to publish papers where information on data, cases and research design 
forms a shorter part of the introduction or empirical section, or papers with no 
methodological information at all. 
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 2.8 Conclusion 
We set out to systematically review studies dedicated to the implementation of the WFD 
in Europe. Based on a meta-analysis of 89 journal articles, we explored more than 35 
dimensions in each study to report on authors and journals, countries, policy levels, and 
WFD themes, as well as on theory, methods, and research design. 
Returning to our thought experiment described earlier, Table 3 below displays research 
priorities with regards to countries and WFD requirements, thereby ignoring the 
temporal dimension. The chart stresses that quite a few areas of research are well 
documented, whereas others appear as blind spots. We discuss them in turn below. 
Table 3: Number of studies per country and WFD theme 
 
We found, first, that there is a cluster of very well-researched countries, including the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany. However, member states that joined 
the EU in 2004 and 2007 as well as Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Greece 
are under-represented. These are gaps to be filled. However, we envisage two more 
promising research programmes: on the one hand, we encourage scholars to compare 
groups of countries. EU policy implementation research talks about ‘worlds of 
compliance’ (Falkner et al. 2005), and the WFD would lend itself well to an empirical 
test of this claim. Furthermore, we believe a more systematic comparison of northern 
and southern EU member states will help understand the role of water quality and water 
quantity problems in EU environmental policy implementation. On the other hand, we 
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suggest taking a closer look at candidate states, countries addressed by the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, and associated countries such as Switzerland and Norway (but 
see Baaner 2011). 
Second, there is a certain imbalance as to the institutional novelties promoted by the 
WFD. Although the involvement of non-state actors in water management has inspired 
a rich literature, there is less in-depth research on river basin planning and management 
at ecological scales. Most importantly, economic principles, as reflected in tools such as 
cost-benefit analysis, have not been studied in depth. This includes cost-effectiveness 
analysis, incentive tarification, adequate levels of cost recovery, and designation of 
heavily modified water bodies, all of them challenging in terms of knowledge, 
uncertainty, legitimacy, and social acceptability. The politics of exemptions, which 
often results in less stringent water quality objectives, also remains understudied. We 
identified three additional areas for future research. On the one hand, the Directive and 
early guidance documents made no reference to measures supporting adaptation to 
climate change. However, the topic has become more prominent at the EU level 
(European Commission 2009a), and we suggest more systematic research exploring the 
link between WFD management activities and climate change adaptation. On the other 
hand, EU policy documents increasingly make reference to ecosystem services as a key 
concept to support WFD implementation (European Commission 2012a). Future 
research could take the cue and analyse whether, and if so how, this plays out on the 
ground. Furthermore, we encourage more empirical research on the interaction between 
the WFD, the Floods Directive, and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, and with 
legislation unrelated to water, for instance the Birds and Habitats Directives. Intuitively, 
we would expect the potential for mutual reinforcement, for instance, when it comes to 
promoting a culture of participation in environmental management, but also for conflict 
and contestation in other areas (but see Newig et al. 2014). 
Third, there is a lot of research on the preparation phase of WFD implementation, more 
specifically on the process of drafting the first set of River Basin Management Plans. 
However, we know little about continuity and change from the preparation phase to the 
first cycle, and there is little comparative work over time. Further research priorities 
may include the achievement of the 2015 water quality goals and the role of governance 
innovations such as participation therein, and comparisons of the preparation phase, the 
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first management cycle, and the on-going second management cycle. The latter may 
relate to a number of literatures, including those on policy learning and the role of 
guidelines, training, and capacity building in policy making (May 1992). 
Fourth, there is a conspicuous lack of theory in WFD scholarship. Authors tend to 
describe implementation patterns and, at times, to apply normative frameworks, but 
only a minority of studies refer to theory when explaining compliance with the WFD 
and embed observations in their social, economic, or political contexts. In this paper we 
outline a number of approaches and refer to others. All of them may be useful to help 
explain patterns of WFD implementation. We are convinced that theory deserves a more 
prominent place in future research on the WFD and its implementation in Europe. 
Fifth, methods and research design are patently neglected and a serious cause of 
concern. Authors accord little attention to methodological questions, and papers mostly 
have a descriptive orientation. Overall, 21 out of 89 articles are descriptive and provide 
no information on data and methods. Moreover, our current knowledge about the 
implementation of the WFD in Europe relies mainly on single case studies or small-n 
comparative studies within one country. Cross-country comparisons are a minority, and 
there is a striking lack of large-n quantitative research. We believe future research 
would benefit from a departure from single-country studies. 
An update of this meta-analysis on 1/11/2017 is provided in Appendix D. 
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Chapter 3: Undermining European Environmental Policy 
Goals? The EU Water Framework Directive and the Politics 
of Exemptions 
B. Boeuf, O. Fritsch and J. Martin-Ortega 
Abstract 
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is the core legislative instrument in the 
European Union for the protection of water resources. Adopted in 2000, its objectives 
were to achieve ‘good status’ for water bodies by 2015 and prevent any further 
deterioration. However, the European Commission and some stakeholders are rather 
dissatisfied with the implementation of the Directive so far, in particular with the use of 
exemptions to the environmental objectives. Exemptions are of paramount importance: 
they may constitute a significant obstacle to the achievement of the WFD’s objectives 
as they enable member states to lower the ambition of the Directive and to delay the 
achievement of good status, thereby undermining the environmental goal of the WFD. 
Critical voices observe an excessive reliance on exemptions, poor justifications, and 
great variations in their use. Based on an analysis of 120 policy documents and 15 semi-
structured interviews, this article provides explanations for the politics of exemptions in 
EU water management. It shows that different viewpoints and interpretations on the 
WFD’s objectives and exemptions were already present in the negotiation phase of the 
Directive, but remained undefined on purpose. Moreover, dysfunctional decision-
making procedures in the Common Implementation Strategy and the lack of political 
support in WFD implementation were significant obstacles to an agreement on this 
important issue. Finally, decisions on WFD implementation in member states were 
often driven by pragmatism. The article explains how the negotiations of the WFD and 
the EU-level discussion on the implementation of the Directive undermined 
environmental goals in EU governance; its findings are also relevant for policy fields 
other than water. 
 
Keywords 
Water Framework Directive; Governance; Exemptions; Economic analysis 
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 3.1 Introduction 
The Water Framework Directive (WFD, 2000/60/EC) is the principal legislative 
instrument for protecting water resources in the European Union (EU). Adopted in 
2000, it aims to achieve a ‘good status’ for all water bodies in Europe and to prevent 
any further deterioration. In order to reach this ambitious goal, the WFD requires EU 
member states to manage water at hydrological units, to prepare strategic River Basin 
Management Plans (RBMP) and more operational Programmes of Measures (PoM) and, 
while doing so, to engage with stakeholders and the wider public. This article explores a 
widely understudied aspect of the Directive: the politics of exemptions in EU water 
planning. 
Exemptions are the thorn in the side of the WFD. Exemption clauses are present in the 
WFD alongside environmental objectives. They enable member states to delay the 
achievement of good water status up to twelve years (Article 4.4 WFD), to abandon the 
overall accomplishment of good status and aim at ‘less stringent objectives’ instead 
(Article 4.5 WFD), and to deteriorate water quality even further for projects of 
‘overriding public interest’ (Article 4.7 WFD). At the same time, exemptions are a 
major source of concern for many. Although they may seem desirable in specific cases, 
exemptions may, if overused, torpedo the WFD’s water quality goals and a number of 
other ambitious European policies such as the EU’s Environmental Action Programme 
to 2020. 
The European Commission, stakeholders and academics have all expressed their 
disappointment with the progress made in Europe so far (Kanakoudis & Tsitsifli 2010; 
European Commission 2012a; 	 World	 Wildlife	 Fund 2015; Richter et al. 2013). 
According to the Commission (2012b, p.174), in 2012 only 53 per cent of all water 
bodies were expected to be in good status by 2015 (more up-to-date projections are not 
available at the time of writing). While the causes for the dire performance are complex, 
exemptions certainly play a role: “The extensive use of exemptions may reflect the low 
level of ambition in many of the plans as regards achieving the environmental 
objectives” (European Commission 2012b, p.181). 
Up to 2012, deadline extensions were granted for 40 per cent of all surface water bodies 
and eleven per cent of all groundwater bodies. Furthermore, member states authorised 
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the achievement of ‘less stringent objectives’ for 19 per cent of all surface waters and 
one per cent of all groundwater bodies (European Commission 2012b). What is more, 
the number of exemptions is likely to be higher in the current planning cycle (WRc 
2015). The European Commission assessment reports from 2012 on river basin 
management plans for each member state reveal a great degree of variance between EU 
countries and type of exemption. While the UK granted deadline extensions in 8914 
cases, the Czech Republic did so 974 times and Slovenia only 19 times. At the same 
time, member states authorised many more deadline extensions than exemptions related 
to ‘less stringent objectives’ and ‘further deterioration due to projects of overriding 
public interest’. 
Problematically, member states poorly justify the use of exemptions. Applications for 
exemptions usually lack information on methods, decision criteria, and underlying 
assumptions as well as economic data and analyses. When information is provided, 
Europe-wide comparisons suffer from the fact that countries seem to use very different 
techniques to establish cases for exemptions. For example, exemptions granted due to 
disproportionate costs rely on methods as diverse as cost–benefit analysis (CBA), 
ability-to-pay, financial impacts or distributional effects (European Commission 2012b; 
2015).  
The politics of exemptions has, surprisingly, rarely been addressed in the literature. The 
Directive enjoys wide scholarly attention (for a systematic review, see Boeuf & Fritsch 
2016), yet a majority of studies focus on river basin management and public 
participation in WFD water planning (Blackstock 2009; Jager et al. 2016). Studies on 
the other economic elements of the Directive such as cost-recovery and cost-
effectiveness are scarce as well (Boeuf & Fritsch 2016). Previous works discuss 
exemptions in three ways. 
First, a few studies have analysed in depth the negotiations and the early days of the 
Directive (Aubin & Varone 2002; Kaika 2003; Kaika & Page 2003; Page & Kaika 
2003). Exemptions are mentioned but do not fare very prominently. Second, others 
explore empirically the actual use of exemptions, disproportionality assessments - a 
possible economic justification for exemptions - and economic tools in WFD 
implementation (Brouwer 2008; van der Veeren 2010; Dehnhardt 2013; Gómez-Limón 
& Martin-Ortega 2013; Feuillette et al. 2016). The message this literature sends out is 
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that exemptions are used and justified in very different ways, and that the role of the EU 
is somewhat opaque here. Third, another strand of research takes the insight that 
“objective criteria” for the use of exemptions are missing in the WFD (Görlach & 
Pielen 2007, p.1) as a starting point and combines case studies with normative 
considerations, providing interpretations, justifications and guidance, often with 
reference to the concept of ‘disproportionality’. This concept describes the possibility 
that the monetary costs of achieving a good ecological status may be disproportionately 
high when compared to the economic and social benefits (Martin-Ortega et al. 2014; 
Klauer et al. 2016). 
Building on the above, this article seeks to trace the EU level debate on exemptions in 
WFD water planning since the beginning of negotiations to the present day, with a 
particular focus on disproportionality as a possible justification, in order to understand 
the critiques made on their use by member states. However, this article does not take a 
position in this debate; rather, we show the various viewpoints held by the different 
parties during the negotiation of the WFD. We also aim to understand how the debates 
that occurred during the process of drafting guidelines for WFD implementation failed 
to come to a common understanding on exemptions. These controversies and the 
inability to find an agreement may explain why member states use exemptions 
extensively and justify them poorly, resulting in the chequered pattern heavily criticised 
by the Commission. 
 
 3.2 Data and methods 
This article covers three important periods in the WFD life cycle: (a) the negotiations of 
the Directive, that began in 1996 with a European Commission communication on the 
future of EU water policy, followed in 1997 by a Commission proposal for a new EU 
directive in the field of water policy, and ended in 2000 with the adoption of the 
Directive; (b) the phase of working on the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS); and 
(c) the implementation in EU member states after 2009 until 2015.  
We undertook an in-depth analysis of 120 policy documents. A summary of the types of 
materials and the processes analysed is presented here and outlines the temporal logic 
used to sort and analyse the data.  
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The negotiations of the WFD: We identified 40 documents drafted in preparation of the 
Directive, including draft proposals from the Commission, and responses and position 
papers from the European Parliament (EP), the Council of Ministers, the Economic and 
Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions. 
The CIS, established in 2001 by the Commission and member state practitioners, aims 
to specify and operationalise the Directive and to resolve technical controversies 
through implementation guidelines. Our analysis, based on 41 documents, mainly 
focuses on the period 2001 to 2009 when key decisions on exemptions to WFD water 
policy goals were taken. We examined CIS strategy documents, work programmes and 
minutes of meetings held by national water directors with a view to extracting more 
high-level, political positions. We then moved on to study the more technical, 
operational level of drafting implementation guidelines, thereby examining minutes of 
workshops and meetings, inputs from non-governmental organisations as well as draft 
and final implementation guidelines. 
Finally, we analysed the post-2009 implementation phase, i.e. the period in which EU 
member states implemented the first RBMPs (a total of 39 documents). Again, we 
returned to the CIS to explore how national positions and practices influenced EU level 
debates and helped shape Europe-wide solutions. We also looked into documents 
providing insights into the more recent thinking of the European Commission and 
analysed legal proceedings. 
In addition, we conducted 16 semi-structured interviews (INT 01 to INT 16 in 
Appendix A). Interviewees included representatives of the European Commission and 
of several member states who took part in the WFD negotiation process or in the CIS. 
We also interviewed stakeholders – mainly representatives of non-governmental 
organisations – and academic experts who attended the CIS. The idea was to collect the 
viewpoint and experience of the various institutions and stakeholders involved at EU 
level over the three time periods detailed above.  
We selected interviewees through three pathways. First, we identified current or past 
members of the working group on economics in the CIS, in particular the European 
Commission staff members who steered the working group and guideline authors. 
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Second, we used our professional network, mainly academics and representatives of EU 
member states involved in the WFD implementation. Finally, interviewees helped us 
identify other relevant contacts, i.e. we used snowball sampling. This technique was 
particularly useful to get in touch with various representatives involved in the WFD 
negotiation process more than fifteen years ago.  
Interviews were transcribed and all materials analysed using the NVivo software. 
Further information on data and methods are available in Appendices A, B and E.  
 
 3.3 Negotiating the WFD: opposing views 
When the European Commission presented their first proposal in February 1997 for 
what would later become the WFD, many had already anticipated lengthy negotiations 
between the key actors at the European level. These include the Commission, the 
Parliament, and the Council of Ministers, with the latter representing the relevant 
national ministers in the field of water protection. In particular, the EP expected a major 
increase of power vis-à-vis the Council through the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was 
about to enter into force in January 1999 (Kaika & Page 2003). 
Although the Council and the Parliament were generally working towards similar aims, 
the proposal contained quite a few sensitive spots, resulting in a dispute that required a 
formal conciliation procedure and numerous concessions from either side. Amongst 
others, the protection of groundwater, the emission of various hazardous substances, 
and the cost-recovery of water services proved to be sore points (Kaika 2003; Kaika & 
Page 2003). The relationship between the Commission and the Parliament, in contrast, 
is traditionally very close in the field of environment (Burns & Carter 2010), and both 
actors largely supported each other during the WFD negotiations. 
3.3.1 Ambitions and deadlines 
The Directive aims to achieve ‘good status’ for all water bodies in Europe. The term 
‘water status’ brings together chemical, biological and hydromorphological parameters 
for surface waters, measured at a scale from ‘high’, ‘good’, ‘moderate’, ‘poor’ to ‘bad’. 
Groundwater, in contrast, may be in ‘good’ or ‘poor’ status, based on chemical and 
quantitative criteria. 
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Arguably, even the most ambitious policies are of little value if exemptions exist in 
such a way that they enable actors to endlessly delay or entirely suspend their 
implementation. Because objectives and exemptions justifying the departure from ‘good 
status’ for water bodies represent two sides of the same coin, the overall ambition of the 
WFD and the exemptions were negotiated as a package. Three aspects were of 
particular importance. 
• Degree of ambition: While a majority in the EP supported a very ambitious 
interpretation of the goals of the Directive, member state governments, and 
hence the Council, displayed concern over the effects of the Directive on 
industries and the agricultural sector (Kaika 2003; Page & Kaika 2003).  
• Legally-binding nature of ambition: The Council strongly favoured a legal text 
emphasising aspirations. The Parliament, in contrast, supported legally binding, 
measurable changes (INT13). The disagreement was never fully resolved, and 
the final text still contains slightly contradictory statements. For instance, 
member states “shall protect, enhance and restore all bodies of surface water” 
(rather than “shall aim to”), “with the aim of achieving” (rather than “achieve”) 
WFD objectives (Article 4.1 a(ii) WFD). This resulted in disagreement amongst 
jurists as to the legal bindingness of those provisions (Howarth 2009; van 
Kempen 2012).  
• Time frame: Finally, the European institutions held divided viewpoints over the 
time granted to achieve the objectives. While the EP requested ten years, the 
Council suggested 16 (Council of the European Union 1999b; European 
Parliament 2000a). The final text established 15 years. However, the 
Conciliation Committee reduced the number of deadline extensions beyond the 
original 15 years period, from three (as proposed by the Council) to two six-year 
management cycles. 
The above controversies highlight a theme that characterises the WFD drafting process 
more generally: the Commission and the EP preferred to take a strict and ambitious 
viewpoint, whereas the Council sought to water down the content of the Directive.   
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3.3.2 Implementation costs   
The above debate on the ambitions of the WFD reflects a general concern over the costs 
associated with the implementation of the Directive (De Abreu 2001). This is hardly 
news: the question of expenses has always been at the heart of the conflict between 
environmental pioneer countries in the EU and those taking a more reluctant approach 
(Andersen & Liefferink 1997).   
Concerns over costs may first relate to affordability: some member states may not be in 
a position to make the necessary investments to improve water quality over a short 
time-period, independently of the long-terms gains. The costs of the WFD 
implementation were not assessed during the negotiation, since data on water status and 
necessary measures were lacking back at that time (European Commission 1997). Be it 
as it may, the very absence of reliable evidence with regards to the implementation costs 
involved was a major source of concern and resulted in conservative positions on the 
side of the member states. The latter in particular wanted to avoid experiences similar to 
the ones made with the 1991 Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive, which caused 
unexpected expenses (INT07; INT10; Aubin & Varone 2002). The Commission tried to 
calm the waters by arguing that “the probable costs of this proposal will be affordable 
over the timescale involved” (European Commission 1997, p.19). However, the Spanish 
delegation came to very different conclusions, casting doubt over the optimistic 
estimates provided by the Commission (INT07).  
 Second, concerned countries may argue that the costs of the WFD exceed the benefits, 
or that investment into policy areas other than water promises higher benefits than the 
WFD does. In other words, concerns can relate to the cost–benefit ratio. During the 
negotiations, the Council requested a CBA of the Directive. However, the Commission 
denied the request, arguing that member states should perform such an analysis during 
the elaboration of the RBMPs (De Abreu 2001). Furthermore, the merits of cost–benefit 
analysis are hotly disputed in environmental policy and management, not the least 
because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, to “pric[e] the priceless” (Ackerman & 
Heinzerling 2002, p.1553). Consequently, there was no serious attempt to assess the 
pros and cons of the WFD at this stage - and no systematic discussion of the benefits 
and costs over time. Finally, no attempt was made to compare the benefits associated 
with the WFD to those related to alternative environmental or non-environmental 
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policies. This would have required a full impact assessment, a tool that was introduced 
at EU level in 2003 only (Fritsch et al. 2013). 
In terms of strategy, the logical consequence for member states in this framework of 
uncertainty was to negotiate the WFD such that defensive measures against undue 
expenses were built directly into the Directive: reduce the overall ambition of the WFD, 
reduce the legal bindingness of its objectives, or ensure a longer implementation period 
to distribute implementation costs over time, as shown above. Another strategy was to 
negotiate a set of exemptions that, in spite of a high overall ambition of the Directive, 
would enable member states to take defensive measures in specific circumstances. 
3.3.3 Negotiating exemptions 
Although objectives and exemptions represent two sides of the same coin, the 
objectives of the WFD became a major bone of contention. Exemptions played a 
marginal role only. Plausibly, the whole idea of ‘exemptions’ presupposes that the 
overall intention of the WFD is accepted, although additional rules may be required to 
govern exceptional situations. However, the fact that the negotiating parties spent more 
time discussing the overall ambition of the Directive rather than occasional departures 
from its objectives may suggest that, in fact, not all negotiating parties actually shared 
the overall vision of the WFD. 
The positions held by the Council and the EP hereby did not differ very much from their 
views about the overall objectives: the Parliament maintained that exemptions should be 
used in exceptional circumstances only in order to avoid overuse, abuse and patterns 
that would turn the overall ambition of the Directive on its head. The EP therefore 
sought to reduce the overall scope and applicability of exemptions and to develop strict 
and unambiguous criteria for their use (European Parliament 2000a). The Council, in 
contrast, showed a more diverse picture, from environmental pioneer countries keen to 
adopt a rather strict piece of legislation to member states supporting more moderate 
positions. However, a majority was in favour of relaxed criteria for exemptions 
(INT07). Our discussion below on deadline extensions highlights this general pattern. 
3.3.4 The case of deadline extensions 
The question of deadline extensions, their length and the conditions under which they 
should be granted, was amongst the most controversial topics to be discussed during the 
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negotiations (INT12). Other exemption clauses, in particular on more relaxed policy 
objectives, were much less debated. Two themes emerge from the discussion. 
• Justifying and approving exemptions: In the original Commission proposal three 
requirements had to be met: Delay only if natural conditions do not allow rapid 
improvements, provision of evidence that all necessary measures were taken, 
and written justification in RBMPs. The Council agreed that RBMPs were the 
right place to provide such justifications yet highlighted the necessity to work 
out “appropriate, evident and transparent criteria” for deadline extensions (but 
probably to be developed in comitology committees or the CIS) (Council of the 
European Union 1999b, p.8). The Parliament, instead, held that member states 
criteria were insufficient and suggested that the Commission, as the Guardian of 
the Treaty, should approve each individual deadline extension (European 
Parliament 2000a), a proposal the Commission found to be excessive (European 
Parliament 2000b). Nevertheless, the Commission ensured that they would 
review deadline extensions and less stringent objectives ex post “to ensure a full 
and consistent implementation of the Directive” (Council of the European Union 
1999a, Annex B, p.1). The final text is based on the proposal made by the 
Council.  
• Scope of application: The Council (1999a, Annex A, p.8) took a more 
adversarial stance vis-à-vis the Commission which held that extensions of 
timescales should only apply if improvements of water status were prevented by 
unfavourable natural conditions. Instead, member states shall be able to extend 
deadlines “for the purposes of phased achievement of the objectives”, if “all 
improvements in the status of bodies of water cannot reasonably be achieved 
within the timescales set out”. In other words, the Council requested a carte 
blanche to grant deadline extensions for a variety of undefined reasons. 
Moreover, the Council added in the Preamble: “Member States may phase 
implementation of the programme of measures in order to spread the costs of 
implementation”. They thus tried to address their concerns related to costs 
through deadline extensions. The position of the Parliament helped to craft a 
compromise here. The EP identified three clearly defined justifications for 
deadline extensions: unfavourable natural conditions, technical unfeasibility and 
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disproportionate costs (European Parliament 2000a). The Conciliation 
committee partly accepted the formulation of the Council, i.e. that deadlines 
“may be extended for the purposes of phased achievement of the objectives”, 
with the addition that “no further deterioration occurs” (Article 4.4 WFD). 
3.3.5 The case of disproportionality 
During the negotiations, disproportionality of costs or expenses emerged as a possible 
justification for exemptions, along with technical feasibility and natural conditions. 
Although no debate occurred on the precise meaning of this term, it seems that 
misconceptions about its definition were widespread. This may be explained by the 
limited involvement of economists during the WFD negotiation, which often included 
engineers or water scientists (INT07; INT08). Moreover, negotiators had little incentive 
to address the issue; after all, terminological vagueness or confusion can be a useful 
thing to exploit during the implementation phase. Some members of the Parliament may 
also have purposefully kept this ambiguous wording in the proposal. Their motivation 
may have been a genuine support for subsidiarity, i.e. to take action at the European 
level only when they can be better achieved than at member state level, or a strategic 
move to downplay the environmental ambition of the WFD (for a general discussion, 
see Collier 1997). The transcript of debates that took place at the Parliament for the 
second reading indeed show that some members of the EP were concerned with the 
costs and the economic impacts of the WFD, in particular for farmers and industries. 
Having this possible strategic misuse in mind, the Economic and Social Committee 
(1997, p.85) warned that such terms would be “dangerous to interpret” and suggested a 
more precise definition, for instance a specific cost–benefit ratio that would take into 
account social and environmental benefits of improving water quality. However, those 
recommendations were not followed. Table 4 provides a summary of the different 
positions held by each institution. 
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Table 4: Position of each institution during the negotiation 
 
To sum up, despite their explosive potential the negotiating parties did not devote much 
time and attention to the intricacies of exemptions to the WFD’s water quality goals. 
Key terms qualifying the use of exemptions, such as ‘disproportionality’, remained 
undefined and, in this way, served political agreement. The next section will explore 
whether the more technical discussions surrounding the CIS were able to fill the above 
key terms with meaning or whether the lack of definition provided a basis for a 
fragmented and lacklustre implementation in member states. 
 
3.4 The Common Implementation Strategy: a technical debate over a 
political issue 
The CIS is a network of water practitioners and stakeholders, established in 2001 by the 
Commission and EU member states with a view to harmonising WFD implementation. 
To this end, CIS participants work to develop a common understanding of the Directive, 
share methods and technical knowledge, to exchange information and draft 
implementation guidelines. The CIS is organised around a number of working groups, 
which reflect key challenges to WFD implementation, such as groundwater, climate 
change and monitoring. The water directors, high-rank domestic bureaucrats in the field 
of water, steer the CIS, define working group mandates, approve guidance documents 
and take the final decisions. The informal character of the CIS was never questioned, 
and CIS outputs, in particular implementation guidelines, are legally non-binding 
(European Commission 2001). 
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3.4.1 Discussing exemptions in the CIS 
Exemptions were first mentioned in the CIS Working Group on Water and Economics, 
established to develop a guideline to support the implementation of the economic 
provisions in the Directive (European Commission 2003b). This guidance document 
mainly focuses on the role of economic instruments during the characterisation of water 
bodies, the management of heavily modified water bodies, and the application of the 
cost-recovery principle (European Commission 2003b; INT06). Consequently, 
exemptions played a minor role only; the document presented various ways to think 
about exemptions, but did not take a clear-cut position and offered few hands-on 
recommendations for practitioners (INT10). 
The debate picked up steam in 2006 when the water directors identified exemptions as a 
priority topic and, shortly thereafter, when they called for a common approach (Water 
Directors of the European Union 2006; 2007b). In 2009, a CIS guidance document was 
published focusing on exemptions (European Commission 2009b). 
The 2003 and 2009 guidelines helped to specify a number of provisions left open during 
the negotiations. First, it was acknowledged that decisions on disproportionality are 
political in nature. Economic analysis therefore may support, but never determine such 
decisions (European Commission 2009b; INT05). Second, CIS partners agreed that a 
step-wise process should be used that prioritised deadline extensions over the 
achievement of less stringent objectives (European Commission 2003b; INT08; INT15). 
Third, even if an exemption was applied, all feasible measures to improve water quality 
should be taken (European Commission 2008). 
On the other hand, no agreement was found with regards to the frequency of exemptions 
granted in WFD water planning. While the Commission emphasised once more that 
exemptions were the last resort (Water Directors 2007a; 2007b; INT15), and should not 
serve “as a wide backdoor for not taking actions” (Water Directors 2007a, p.1), some 
member states had, in the meantime, carried out an economic analysis and knew that 
they would need to rely on exemptions more often than anticipated during the 
negotiations, due to the high costs involved (INT05; INT11). 
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3.4.2 Disagreements on disproportionality assessments in the preparation 
phase 
According to the WFD, Member states have the possibility to justify exemptions if 
restoration measures imply disproportionate costs or expenses. Members of the working 
group on economics first interpreted disproportionality assessments in light of economic 
theory as a comparison of costs and benefits. The costs of implementing restoration 
measures could be defined as ‘disproportionate’ for a specific water body when the 
financial and indirect costs of the necessary measures would outweigh the 
environmental and economic benefits of achieving good status by an “appreciable” 
margin (European Commission 2003b, p.193; INT09). Much of the debate would then 
centre on the precise cost–benefit ratio, to justify disproportionality. 
However, the method used to justify disproportionate costs was increasingly debated. 
Two questions were raised: whether another approach, ‘ability to pay’ (also referred to 
as ‘affordability’) could be a valid justification for disproportionality assessments and, 
if so, how to include and apply this concept in practice (Braüer & Dworak 2008; 
European Commission 2008; INT08). The ability to pay does not take into account 
environmental benefits. It compares the costs of restoration measures with the financial 
capacity of payers to fund these measures. As such, it considers distribution issues and 
financial impacts on payers as a priority. Affordability may apply to water services 
users (e.g., households and their ability to pay for their water bills) or to the PoM payers 
(e.g., private funding, polluters or the public budget) (European Commission 2014a; 
2014b). 
The debate between advocates of CBA and the affordability principle for the assessment 
of disproportionate costs had in fact four dimensions: methodology, the ambition of the 
WFD, water management principles, and wider political concerns. 
Methodology: The methodological debate did not focus on the threshold to define 
disproportionality. There was a fair consensus that this had to be defined by member 
states, on a case-by-case basis. The discussion centred on against what costs should be 
compared: benefits or financial capacities. Although both praised and criticised in the 
academic realm, academics have developed numerous methods to calculate costs and 
assess environmental benefits. Affordability in contrast does not take a prominent role 
in the policy appraisal literature (Dunlop & Radaelli 2016). In particular, few criteria 
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exist in the literature to assess affordability. There is one exception: water bills that 
amounted to three per cent of a households’ income are generally considered as a 
poverty threshold (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2009). 
This methodological difference, i.e. the presence of widely shared methods and criteria 
for CBA and their absence for affordability, may explain why the European 
Commission and some member states favoured CBA as a method. First, they supported 
CBA as a ‘good practice’, although affordability proponents questioned the robustness 
of the method (INT05; INT06). Second, if CBA was used, the Commission could more 
easily review justifications and check or re-do the analysis (INT01; INT10). The 
Commission perceived CBA as a guarantee that member states would not ‘tweak’ 
economic analyses so as to downplay the objectives (INT05). 
WFD ambition: Methodological choices influence the overall goals of the WFD and the 
financial resources made available to achieve them. The Commission and a few member 
states feared that ability to pay could “water down the ambition of the Directive” (Water 
Directors 2007a, p.1; INT05). This concern was greatest for justifications based on 
constraints to the public budget that would restrict the scope of the PoMs (European 
Commission 2008): the Commission feared that member states would simply not make 
available the necessary financial resources to achieve good status. Still, some member 
states preferred the affordability principle, because it serves to distribute 
implementation costs over the three management cycles, based on the resources actually 
available (Water Directors 2007b). As a consequence, some of the member states that 
were first in favour of CBA assessments increasingly considered the ability to pay as a 
possible justification, due to constraints to the public budget or the economic crisis 
(INT09; INT10). The Commission (2012a), in contrast, strongly supported cost–benefit 
assessments. An explanation could be that the Commission hoped to see the WFD 
ambition rise as a result of this assessment. However, this strategy is arguable: there is 
no guarantee that, for a given water body, a CBA would less likely lead to an exemption 
than an affordability assessment. Moreover, when costs are higher than benefits, a CBA 
could lead member states to divest money away from water policy towards other policy 
areas with a better cost–benefit ratio. 
The polluter pays and cost recovery principles: The opponents of the ability-to-pay 
principle raised another argument. Affordability may conflict with the polluter-pays 
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principle, which should be at work to fund PoMs, and the cost-recovery principle, in 
particular water tariffs that should incentivise water users to consume or pollute less 
(Article 9 WFD; INT09; INT11). The discussions that took place during the WFD 
negotiations on cost-recovery (Page & Kaika 2003) show how contentious this issue 
was between member states and the Commission. 
Economic efficiency versus social concerns: Finally, this debate went beyond a mere 
expert argument over the most rigorous economic method to use to justify 
disproportionality. In fact, it mirrored deeper socio-political discrepancies between 
member states and with the Commission. Affordability, because of its focus on 
distribution issues and financial impacts can be considered as a “social-minded” 
approach (Görlach & Pielen 2007, p.5; Kanakoudis & Tsitsifli 2015). Conventional 
CBAs instead focus on efficiency, on maximising human welfare, and although 
distribution effects can be theoretically incorporated (Pearce et al. 2006), analysis of 
affordability does not enter the equation (Martin-Ortega et al. 2014). 
Therefore, the debate on the right method to assess disproportionality may reflect a 
deeper political conflict: while some countries and the Commission strongly support the 
use of economic tools and principles for environmental protection, other member states 
were more concerned with the distribution of costs to other stakeholders and social 
consequences. 
The agreements finally reached were: CBA or ability to pay may be used for deadline 
extensions. When affordability is considered, the consequences of non-action (i.e. 
forgone benefits) should be assessed and alternative financing taken into account, for 
instance the public budget or European funds. The idea was to not only take into 
account budgetary or financial considerations, but also to consider the environmental 
consequences of not achieving good status. No agreement was reached on the method to 
use to justify exemptions related to less stringent objectives (European Commission 
2005; 2008). In the end, the CIS only agreed to advocate water management based on 
data and methodologies, transparency and some degree of public participation in 
decisions on exemptions (European Commission 2005; 2007; 2009b; Water Directors 
2007a). In particular, decisions, criteria and methods used to take the decision should be 
explained and justified (European Commission 2008; INT15). 
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3.4.3 Reasons for the failure to come to an agreement on exemptions 
Failure to reconcile different positions on exemptions in the framework of the CIS may 
be attributed to the inability of the CIS, through its structure and functioning, to tackle 
political issues. 
First of all, as it has been shown, the topic is highly political. The WFD provisions on 
exemptions leave a door open for member states to prioritise social, economic or other 
environmental policy goals over the WFD objectives. The argument of disproportionate 
costs may be used so as to adapt the ambition of the Directive to political priorities 
identified at the national level. These political choices cannot be settled in decision-
making contexts such as the CIS: participants are experts in specific areas and develop 
technical solutions to practical issues. Consequently, debates remain on the technical 
level, which does not necessarily consider the WFD ambition. 
Second, the CIS was designed to adopt technical non-legally binding implementation 
guidelines. As a consequence, members of working groups, in general academics and 
representatives from member states administrations (INT09), did not have the mandate 
to negotiate political issues. 
Third, even if CIS working groups came to an agreement on political issues, water 
directors were able to veto unwelcome decisions. This situation weakened the ambition 
of the agreements taken in working groups (European Commission 2003a; World 
Wildlife Fund & Euopean Environmental Bureau 2004) and was a substantial obstacle 
to highly political decisions. 
However, it was not only the structure of the CIS that prevented agreements on 
exemptions. The Commission and member states increasingly adopted a defensive 
strategy that impeded the crafting of a compromise (INT08; INT10; INT11). 
On the one hand, the Commission strongly opposed provisions it did not agree with 
(INT06; INT10): for example, when the first cycle started in 2009 the water directors 
raised the issue of ability to pay once again (European Commission 2014a). Five years 
later, the Working Group on Economics agreed to produce a guidance document on 
ability to pay for the PoMs in order to gather experiences from member states and to 
define a common method (European Commission 2014b). However, the Commission 
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was dissatisfied, and the document was abandoned and never released (INT10). This 
behaviour can be explained by the uneven distribution of power within the CIS: the 
common strategy included Commission officials and member state representatives. The 
EP was not involved. Due to the absence of the Parliament, whose positions were close 
to the viewpoints held by the Commission, member states had more weight to shape 
implementation guidelines in a preferred direction. The Commission thus had 
difficulties steering CIS decisions and had to take a strong defensive position. 
On the other hand, there was a lack of political support from member states to define 
common criteria and thresholds for disproportionality: within CIS working groups, 
representatives from France and the Netherlands proposed common criteria for the use 
of the affordability principle (e.g. in terms of percentage of GDP, increase in water bill) 
or common practices (e.g. focus on macroeconomic costs), but they did not gain 
political support from the water directors (INT14). Member states may have preferred to 
invoke the subsidiarity principle when it came to disproportionality assessments. 
Alternatively, EU countries may have been wary “because once there is a specific 
definition […] you can make member states accountable” (INT14). After all, an 
agreement on specific methods or criteria at EU level would have greatly limited the 
scope of action for member states to depart from those criteria, to adapt them at the 
local level or to take into account more political considerations, without risking an 
infringement procedure. This fear of infringement procedures and financial penalties 
may explain an apparent contradiction: while member states asked for guidance on 
exemptions to anticipate possible infringement cases, they refused to come to an 
agreement that would make them accountable. Another explanation could be that 
countries had increasing difficulties implementing the WFD within the given 
timeframe. Consequently, they may have become less inclined to come to an ambitious 
consensus. 
 
 3.5 Beyond policy: the pragmatism of the WFD implementation 
In 2009, EU member states began to put RBMPs into practice and hence to engage 
more directly with exemptions and their justification. For this reason, the debate on 
exemptions largely moved to the national level, and discussions at EU level became less 
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intense. 
However, the implementation on the ground triggered a new controversy: “a battle 
between pragmatism and idealism with respect to achieving objectiveness and applying 
exemptions” (European Commission 2009a, p.33). The Commission supported an 
‘idealistic’ position whereby justifications rely on a defined method, transparent criteria 
and ‘proper economic analysis’ based on a CBA to inform the political decision and the 
public (INT01; INT02; INT10; INT15). 
In this framework, the Commission requested better justifications, in particular more 
data, to understand challenges to WFD implementation, to discuss future strategies, and 
to ensure accountability (INT01). This includes data related to the costs of PoMs, the 
costs of not achieving WFD objectives, and the benefits of reaching good status 
(European Commission 2012a). The Commission launched a call for research proposals 
to help member states produce more and better data. The project finally commissioned, 
AquaMoney, aimed to provide technical guidance to help practitioners assess the costs 
and benefits of the WFD (Brouwer et al. 2009). 
Member states, in contrast, preferred ‘pragmatic’ approaches (INT03), e.g. approaches 
that limit the monetisation of benefits (Water Directors of the European Union 2012), 
keep the analysis simple whenever possible (European Commission 2007) or apply a 
screening procedure to reduce the level of detail of the analysis (INT08). 
In particular, there was some scepticism about CBA and, more precisely, methods that 
aim to valuate benefits monetarily, due to the costs and time involved, the lack of 
skilled human resources to perform such methods, and their methodological limitations 
(European Commission 2010; Martin-Ortega 2012; INT03; INT08). Moreover, some 
member states questioned their usefulness in achieving transparency and informing 
public participation exercises; furthermore, their intelligibility for non-experts was 
queried (Görlach & Pielen 2007). Consequently, CBA was used to a limited extent 
only: “There is no point, there was no time, there was no money” (INT03). 
Affordability was perceived as a more feasible and pragmatic approach than CBA 
(Water Directors 2007b; Braüer & Dworak 2008). Apparently, member states 
informally agreed to use ability-to-pay as a tool to screen measures. If they could be 
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paid for, then they should be implemented; if not, then a more in-depth analysis should 
be performed (INT08). 
In addition, many water managers had a background in engineering and found it 
difficult to collect data and design and implement economic methodologies, in 
particular to justify exemptions (European Commission 2010; Mattheiß et al. 2012; 
Gómez-Limón & Martin-Ortega 2013; INT11; INT14). 
Consequently, the Commission expected a certain standard for the justification of 
exemptions, i.e. an extensive and detailed economic analysis. This made sense if 
exemptions were rarely used. However, countries planning to rely more extensively on 
exemptions had to face time, budgetary and skills-related constraints to comply with 
this standard. This gap between the Commission’s expectations and domestic 
implementation fed the critiques of some stakeholders on the justification of 
exemptions. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
While the WFD sets ambitious goals for water protection in Europe, the existence of 
several exemption clauses, if overused, can seriously undermine the environmental 
goals of EU policy. The European Commission and stakeholders are thus worried to see 
exemptions used extensively, justified poorly, and implemented in very different ways 
across Europe. This article offers an explanation of this situation so that insights can be 
gained regarding the lowering of EU’s environmental goals, in relation to the WFD and 
environmental legislation more broadly. It traces the history of the negotiations (1995–
2000), the discussions that took place in the framework of the CIS following the 
negotiations (2003–2009) and the implementation of the Directive (post-2009). 
Our findings show that member states and the European Commission had very different 
perceptions about the use and justification of exemptions. First, during the WFD 
negotiation, member states were concerned with the implementation costs involved. In 
the absence of data on costs, they tried to lower the objectives and include exemption 
provisions, not for exceptional cases, but so as to spread costs over time. Second, the 
CIS failed to find a common agreement on ambiguous terms such as ‘disproportionate 
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costs/expenses’, since participants rarely had the mandate to negotiate this topic and 
lacked the political support, not least due to fears of infringement procedures that could 
be initiated in response to failure to comply with ambitious methods and goals. Third, 
pragmatic considerations often led member states to justify exemptions in their own 
ways or not to justify them at all. 
Future research could complement this work with further in-depth national and cross-
country comparisons of the implementation of exemptions, in order to better understand 
on a case-by-case basis how exemptions are implemented and justified across the EU. 
Also, if academics sought to further develop methodologies to justify disproportionate 
costs in member states, they should do so in a rigorous but pragmatic way which would 
be as little time and resource consuming as possible (but see Klauer et al. 2016). 
This research has suggested that exemptions and the ambiguity of terms related to 
exemptions partly resulted from the uncertainty about the costs and benefits of the WFD 
during the negotiations. Therefore, if the WFD will be revised in 2019 as planned, an 
impact assessment could help establish a common frame of reference and data basis for 
all negotiating parties with a view to reducing the desire to resort to exemption clauses. 
Moreover, all negotiating parties, in particular the European Commission, should be 
aware of the potential danger of exemption clauses in EU directives. Ideally, key terms 
should be well defined during the negotiations in order to reduce or even avoid any 
sense of ambiguity, since a common understanding is very difficult to settle later. 
Another option would be to change the CIS framework and take it to a higher level, so 
as to enable political decisions to be taken, e.g. by involving the Council of Ministers or 
the European Parliament. Discussions on exemptions should leave the expert sphere and 
consider political implications in open debate. Finally, such discussions should address 
what is at the heart of the debate on exemptions: whether and how the protection of 
water resources can be prioritised vis-à-vis other environmental or even non-
environmental policies. In times in which the EU is increasingly questioned, it is 
important to wave the flag for one of its core pillars, i.e. to develop and maintain 
ambitious environmental policies with a view to ensuring the well-being of EU citizens 
and future generations. 
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Chapter 4: Justifying exemptions through policy appraisal: 
ecological ambitions and water policy in France and the 
United Kingdom 
B. Boeuf, O. Fritsch, J. Martin-Ortega 
Abstract 
The Water Framework Directive aims to achieve ‘good status’ for all water bodies in 
the European Union. However, exemption clauses enable member states to delay 
protective measures and to lower water quality objectives. The ambiguity of exemption 
clauses has lead to a plurality of approaches across the continent. They differ as to their 
political objectives, i.e. the overall ambition displayed in implementing the Directive, 
and to their methodological choices, i.e. the analytical tools used to justify exemptions. 
This article argues that those political and methodological dimensions influence each 
other. Relying on a framework of analysis that integrates key recommendations from 
the literature, we explore the usage and justification of exemptions in two countries, the 
United Kingdom and France. Our analysis suggests that analytical methods were often 
decided so as to reflect the ecological ambitions of a country, and some methodological 
choices seem to have had unintended consequences for water quality objectives. We 
conclude that economic methods should be adapted so that they take into account, rather 
than ignore, the political ambitions of a country in the field of water.   
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 4.1 Introduction 
The Water Framework Directive (WFD, 2000/60/EC) represents a major shift in EU 
water policy from isolated attempts to reduce pollution from various specific sources 
and clearly defined types of water usage towards a more holistic approach. The 
Directive recommends or makes compulsory water management principles such as river 
basin management, public participation and economic analysis, with a view to 
preventing any further deterioration and achieving ‘good status’ for all surface and 
groundwater bodies.  
Specifically, the WFD obliges EU member states to draft River Basin Management 
Plans (RBMP), which specify water quality objectives for individual water bodies and 
justify exemptions. Programmes of Measures, published at the same time, identify the 
actions required to achieve these objectives. Water authorities operate within six-year 
management cycles; this includes the initial drafting, update and implementation of 
RBMPs and Programmes of Measures. The first cycle started in 2009 when the first 
RBMPs were published. The second cycle began in 2015 with the update of the plans. 
The third cycle will last from 2021 to 2027. 
However, exemption clauses enable EU member states to delay protective measures for 
up to twelve years (Art 4.4 WFD) or to lower water quality objectives for individual 
water bodies, i.e. to reach ‘less stringent objectives’ (Art 4.5 WFD). Member states may 
resort to these exemptions under three circumstances: if natural conditions are 
unfavourable, if the achievement of good status is technically infeasible, or if the 
associated costs are disproportionately high. They may also deteriorate water body 
quality to pursue projects of major general interest (Art 4.7 WFD).  
This article focuses on exemptions related to deadline extensions and less stringent 
objectives based on disproportionate costs only. Exemption clauses were widely used 
across Europe: for instance, up until 2009, deadline extensions were granted for 40 per 
cent of all surface water bodies and for 11 per cent of all groundwater bodies (European 
Commission 2012b). Obviously, the use of exemptions has a major impact on the 
degree to which the overall aim of the WFD will be achieved. At the time of writing, 
more than 15 years after the WFD entered into force, many EU countries are still a far 
cry away from achieving good water status. Back in 2012 the European Commission 
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(2012b) had estimated that only 53 per cent of all water bodies would reach a good 
status by 2015. More up-to-date data is not yet available, but we have little reason to 
assume that these estimates were wrong. There are many reasons for that, including 
technical (e.g. lack of knowledge), political (e.g. lack of incentive pricing) and 
economic difficulties (e.g. financial restraints) (European Commission 2012a; Stanley et 
al. 2012; Levraut 2013). Yet, exemptions certainly play a role here.  
The term ‘disproportionate costs’ is somewhat ambiguous and the process of justifying 
exemptions not very well defined (Görlach & Pielen 2007). This can be traced back to 
political disagreements during the negotiation phase of the Directive, almost 20 years 
ago. Even today, the legal status of the overall aim of ‘good status’, the extent to which 
exemptions should be relied on, and the economic tools used to justify 
disproportionality are still in dispute (Boeuf et al. 2016). This has resulted in a plurality 
of approaches: on the one hand, member states differ greatly as to the overall ambition 
displayed in WFD implementation, i.e. the degree to which they would make use of 
exemption clauses (Bourblanc et al. 2013). In other words, we observe diversity as to 
the political aspects of WFD implementation. On the other hand, EU member states rely 
on very different analytical tools to justify the presence of ‘disproportionate costs’, one 
of the conditions for an exemption clause (van der Veeren 2010; Gómez-Limón & 
Martin-Ortega 2013; Dehnhardt 2014; Martin-Ortega et al. 2014; Feuillette et al. 2016). 
This suggests a high degree of diversity with regards to the methodological aspects of 
WFD implementation. 
This article argues that political and methodological aspects are interrelated and cannot 
be separated from each other. Political ambitions may influence which analytical tools 
are used - and how; and tools, far from being purely technical and neutral, may have 
intended and unintended consequences for the political ambitions on the ground 
(Lascoumes & Le Gales 2007). We will show that the ambitions of EU member states 
related to WFD implementation have shaped the analytical tools used and that these 
choices have influenced the protection standards of individual water bodies. Based on 
original data and extensive fieldwork in two EU member states, the United Kingdom 
(UK) and France, this article explores a widely understudied phenomenon: the politics 
of exemptions in WFD implementation and the role of ‘disproportionate costs’ therein. 
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This way we introduce a novel argument to the literature on WFD implementation. So 
far, in-depth studies on the actual use and justification of exemptions and their 
relationship to the political ambitions displayed by a country remain scarce (Boeuf & 
Fritsch 2016). Existing research tends to provide broad overviews across Europe (e.g. 
Görlach & Pielen 2007; Klauer et al. 2007; Martin-Ortega et al. 2014; Maia 2017). 
Some of them are already outdated. WFD management activities are organised in six-
year cycles, and works such as Gómez-Limón & Martin-Ortega (2013) explored the 
first management cycle from 2009 to 2015 only (and even here mainly the first two or 
three years). We know little about the second cycle and how water managers took into 
account feedback from the first management cycle. In fact, we are not aware of any 
study that has already looked into the second WFD cycle (i.e. 2015 to 2021). Other 
works offer recommendations based on academic experiments (e.g. Del Saz-Salazar et 
al. 2009; Vinten et al. 2012; Galioto et al. 2013; Perni & Martínez-Paz 2013; Martin-
Ortega et al. 2015; Klauer et al. 2016; Machac & Slavikova 2016; Klauer et al. 2017). 
Obviously, these works may provide great benefits to practitioners and researchers, but 
they say little about what is happening on the ground. 
 
 4.2 Analytical framework 
The WFD does not properly define what ‘disproportionate costs’ are and how 
disproportionality should be established. Two methods - and thus two interpretations of 
this term - emerged from discussions at EU level. The costs of protective measures 
could be compared to the benefits provided to society through the improvement in water 
quality: disproportionality as a result of a cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Alternatively, 
costs could be compared to the ability of stakeholders to pay for protective measures: 
disproportionality as the inability of various sectors or polluters to afford the measures 
(Boeuf et al. 2016).  
There is a rich academic literature making recommendations on how to undertake 
disproportionality analyses (Brouwer 2008; Del Saz-Salazar et al. 2009; Martin-Ortega 
2012; Galioto et al. 2013; Gómez-Limón & Martin-Ortega 2013; Martin-Ortega et al. 
2014; Feuillette et al. 2016; Klauer et al. 2016; Klauer et al. 2017). While these studies 
differ in important ways, they have one thing in common: they acknowledge that CBA 
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and affordability tests are multi-dimensional. Essentially, the comparison of benefits 
and costs lies at the heart of every CBA, and so does the juxtaposition of costs and 
available resources in affordability tests. In order to carry out those tests, however, 
environmental economists are required to consider a range of decisions which govern 
how precisely the method shall be put into practice (Pearce et al. 2006; Davidson 2014). 
Our argument is that these decisions not only define the operationalisation of the 
method, but may also influence analytical outcomes. The contents of these decisions 
form what we call here the ‘dimensions’ of CBA and affordability tests. 
We select five dimensions from the literature: scale, screening, costs and benefits data, 
uncertainty, and additional parameters. They were selected for three reasons: first, they 
are comprehensive, i.e. taken together, they cover all the technical aspects related to 
CBA, to affordability tests, or to both. Second, they may be applied globally and enable 
cross-country comparisons. Third, they all depend on the degree of ambition displayed 
by an EU member state for implementing the WFD, and their precise operationalisation 
may influence the process of setting objectives.  
The overall function of these dimensions in this research therefore is to unpack two 
complex analytical tools – CBA and affordability tests – and to provide the signposts 
needed to understand the application of these tools in diverse empirical settings. The 
above dimensions have no normative meaning here, i.e. we use them to anatomise, 
dissect and examine rather than to assess and evaluate. In doing so, these dimensions 
provide a structure for our case study analysis and lay the foundation for the argument 
that we wish to make: first, we compare the choices that water managers in England and 
France have made with regards to each dimension. Second, we explore the relationship 
between these choices and the political ambition displayed by each country. We 
describe these five dimensions below.  
4.2.1 Scale 
Both CBA and affordability tests are performed on a specific geographical perimeter. In 
the case of WFD implementation, at least four hydrographical units could be 
considered: the water body, the catchment or sub-catchment, the river basin, or the 
national scale. 
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4.2.3 Screening 
CBA and affordability tests could be performed systematically and consistently for each 
hydrographical unit. Alternatively, one may attempt to limit the number of units 
analysed or to reduce the depth of the analyses. Preliminary screenings support a 
decision here and, in doing so, save resources. For example, water managers may want 
to identify hydrographical units where implementation costs are likely to be 
disproportionately high. 
4.2.4 Costs and benefits data 
Data are a necessary input to both CBA and affordability tests. Here, we focus on costs 
and benefits data. They may be assessed qualitatively, quantitatively (but not 
monetised) or monetarily. Costs include investment, operating, administrative and 
environmental costs as well as income reductions. Benefits involve market and non-
market benefits and typically inform CBA only. Finally, we examine whether benefit 
transfers were used. Benefit transfers apply benefit values estimated from a particular 
location to another location with similar characteristics. This method is often used when 
local data are unavailable, but it comes with obvious methodological weaknesses 
(Klauer et al. 2016). 
4.2.5 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a common feature of environmental policy-making processes. In WFD 
water management, this may refer to the status of water bodies (and therefore to the 
nature and costs of measures that should be implemented), the effectiveness and 
efficiency of measures, input data, the monetisation of benefits and costs, and 
methodological limitations related to the use of benefit transfers. Here, we consider 
whether and how these uncertainties have been taken into account when assessing 
disproportionality.  
4.2.6 Additional parameters 
We consider here various methodological decisions to operationalise CBA and 
affordability tests. For CBA, this includes the cost-benefit ratio, i.e. the threshold 
distinguishing proportionally and disproportionally high costs. Economic theory 
suggests that the cost-benefit ratio should be one. We also consider the rate used to 
discount future benefits and costs. Discount rates respond, amongst others, to the insight 
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that many people prefer short-term over long-term gains and long-term over short-term 
costs. A high discount rate gives more weight to current expenses while a low discount 
rate favours long-term benefits. Therefore, the discount rate has an ethical dimension 
because it determines the extent to which the interests of future generations are taken 
into account (Martin-Ortega et al. 2014; Martin-Ortega et al. 2015). We also study 
which categories of users, criteria and thresholds were used in affordability tests. 
 
 4.3 Data and methods 
This article compares the UK (specifically England) and France, two countries that have 
relied extensively on disproportionate costs to justify exemptions (Levraut 2013; 
Environment Agency 2015).  
In England, economic analyses were performed consistently across the country, up until 
2015 at national and after 2015 at catchment level. We therefore explore the national 
level, one representative river basin and one equally representative catchment: the 
Humber basin and the Aire and Calder catchment, respectively. 
Economic analyses in France, on the other hand, differed significantly from one river 
basin to another. Consequently, this research focuses on the national and the river basin 
level whereby all river basins in mainland France and Corsica were investigated, 
namely Adour-Garonne, Corsica, Loire-Brittany, Meuse, Rhine, Rhone and Coastal 
Mediterranean, Sambre, Scheldt, and Seine-Normandy. We do not take into account the 
French overseas territories. 
This research examines the first and the second WFD management cycle, i.e. economic 
analyses carried out to support the 2009 and 2015 RBMPs. To this end, we analysed 77 
policy documents drafted between 2003 and 2016 by policy makers at the local, 
regional and national level in the UK and France as well as at EU level. Appendix B 
provides a complete list of policy documents studied.  
Furthermore, we conducted, transcribed and analysed 48 semi-structured interviews 
with actors directly involved in the implementation of the WFD in the UK and France. 
Interviewees include state - central government, departments or agencies- and non-state 
actors - environmental non-governmental organisations and stakeholders. We chose 
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participants so as to get a representative picture of the objective-setting process in both 
countries, in the first and second WFD management cycle. We first identified 
interviewees through our professional network. This includes representatives of water 
agencies involved in the working groups on economics and WFD planning at national 
level in France, members of the CIS and consultants in the UK. We also found through 
Internet searches contacts in non-governmental organisations and river trusts, as well as 
members of the national and the Humber river basin liaison panels. Finally, 
interviewees directed us through other relevant contacts, i.e. we used snowball 
sampling. The 48 interviews conducted were used to obtain results for both Chapter 4 
and 5. However, only 32 interviewees provided relevant data for Chapter 4. All 
interviewees are listed in Appendix A (INT-EN and INT-FR). 
 
 4.4 Political ambitions and objective setting in England and France 
This section discusses the general ambition displayed by England and France during the 
implementation of the WFD. RBMPs and Programmes of Measures are ‘ambitious’ 
when they set objectives that are significantly higher than the initial situation – and 
‘cautious’ when this is not the case. We use the terms ‘ambitious’ and ‘cautious’ 
neutrally, with no positive or negative connotations. 
4.4.1 England 
In each constituent part of the UK – England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales – a 
designated non-departmental public body manages the water environment and, 
therefore, produces RBMPs and performs economic analyses. In England this is the 
Environment Agency (EA), which carried out this task from six regional offices until 
2014 and, since then, from 14 area offices. The Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra) is legally responsible for the timely and correct implementation of 
the WFD. Defra’s Secretary of State approves the final RBMPs, including the WFD 
water quality objectives (INT-EN01). This suggests that the preparation of RBMPs in 
England is very much centralised. 
Water managers in England take a cautious and pragmatic approach to WFD 
implementation. In the first management cycle, 26 per cent of all surface water bodies 
were monitored to have a good or high ecological status or potential. The aim was to 
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reach good ecological status in 30 per cent of all water bodies by 2015. In the second 
cycle, however, the EA aimed to increase the proportion of surface water bodies with a 
good ecological status from 17 per cent monitored in 2015 to 21 per cent in 2021, and to 
reach a less stringent objective for ecological status in 25 per cent of all cases 
(Environment Agency 2015). This could suggest that water quality deteriorated between 
2009 and 2015. However, the changed figures are mainly due to a re-designation of 
water bodies, resulting in a decrease in the overall number of water bodies, and to more 
comprehensive monitoring data from further investigations. Moreover, if water 
managers were uncertain whether necessary measures could really be implemented, 
they resorted more systematically to exemptions in the second cycle, specifically 
deadline extensions (INT-EN01).  
This suggests that water managers in England interpret the WFD as an obligation to aim 
to achieve good status (except for exemptions), i.e. a “best effort approach” (Bourblanc 
et al. 2013, p.1457). In other words, the English approach to the WFD aims to avoid 
over-implementing the Directive – also known as ‘gold-plating’ (Jans et al. 2009). This 
stands in contrast to the politically motivated ambition to implement the WFD beyond 
minimum requirements in France, as we will explain later.  
According to Bourblanc et al. (2013, p.1465), “the more politicians and policy makers 
feel they are held accountable by EU institutions, the more the level of ambition will be 
adjusted to the perceived adequate implementation process in front of the EU”. Water 
managers in England see the implementation of the Programmes of Measures, rather 
than the achievement of good water status, as a legally binding requirement. They 
therefore prefer to adopt Programmes of Measures that are likely to be implemented 
even if  – or better, exactly because – they display a certain lack of ambition (Dieperink 
et al. 2012; INT-EN04). 
The degree of caution expressed here is well compatible with the reluctant position that 
the UK has generally taken towards European integration and the level of scepticism 
shown as to the benefits the EU can provide to member states. The UK government has 
always sought to avoid ‘gold-plating’ during the transposition and implementation of 
EU law and, to this end, encouraged ministries, departments and independent regulatory 
agencies to apply EU standards to the minimum so as to minimise costs and efforts 
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where they are not justified in terms of benefits (Knill 2001; Wurzel 2002; Fritsch 2011; 
UK Government 2015).  
4.4.2 France 
Water management in France is decentralised, which is why the river basin level 
deserves particular attention. In each basin, a River Basin Committee brings together 
elected policy makers at the local level (40 per cent of all seats), water users (industry 
and commerce, agriculture, recreation, environmental movements, water consumers - 
also 40 per cent) and non-elected officials from local authorities (20 per cent). 
Supported by one of the six water agencies - public bodies operating at regional level 
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment - each Committee defines the 
water management priorities in their basin, establishes the overall aim (i.e. the 
percentage of water bodies that should reach good status by the next deadline) and 
recommends the budget available to implement the Programme of Measures (INT-
FR07, INT-FR10, INT-FR18, INT-FR23, INT-FR25, INT-FR27). The water agencies 
determine the water quality objectives for individual water bodies. The River Basin 
Coordinating Prefect, a state representative at the regional level, then approves the 
RBMP (Levraut 2013). The Ministry of Environment coordinates this work, being 
legally responsible for the implementation of the WFD (Levraut 2013).  
In contrast to water managers in England, authorities in France generally set ambitious 
water quality goals which were more difficult to achieve (Levraut 2013). The Grenelle 
de l’environnement, a political convention that included members of civil society and 
took place in 2007, decided that two thirds (in practice 64 per cent) of all surface water 
bodies should be in good ecological status by 2015. This effectively translates into a 
legally-binding commitment to restrict the use of exemptions to one third of all surface 
water bodies or less – an ambitious, symbolic target that had a major influence on the 
planning process at river basin level (INT-FR12). In 2009, 41 per cent of all surface 
water bodies were already in good ecological status (Levraut 2013). France aimed to 
increase this figure by another 23 per cent. In 2015, only 44 per cent of all surface water 
bodies were in good ecological status, and the new aim was to improve this figure to 66 
per cent by 2021 (INT-FR17). However, figures of water bodies in good status are not 
quite comparable between the first and second cycles. This is because the guidelines to 
assess the status of water bodies have changed in between. Both in the first and the 
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second cycle, water managers preferred deadline extensions over less stringent 
objectives to justify exemptions (INT-FR17). 
Bourblanc et al. (2013, p.1449) offer several reasons for the different approaches taken 
in England and France. The “visibility of the policy process” (Bourblanc et al. 2013, 
p.1449), not the least thanks to the highly political, public role played by the Grenelle 
de l’environnement, is of particular importance when it comes to understanding the high 
ambitions pursued in France. Another factor is “the division of responsibilities” 
(Bourblanc et al. 2013, p.1449). Although the River Basin Committees, supported by 
the water agencies, set the objectives, the Committees are not responsible for their 
achievement and funding. Usually, local authorities are in charge of implementing the 
measures. River Basin Committees therefore do not necessarily feel accountable for the 
objectives they set. The authors also argue that accountability towards the European 
Commission matters. In contrast to the UK, pro-European sentiments are a defining 
element of France’s international identity, and the country is genuinely committed to 
achieve policy goals set at EU level. It should be noted, though, that its performance has 
always been somewhat less impressive in the field of environment. The European 
Commission repeatedly initiated infringement procedures against France, and it is 
plausible to assume that the high ambitions pursued by France in the water sector were 
and are an attempt to improve its reputation (Bourblanc et al. 2013).  
In short, the UK and French approaches to the WFD stem from two different policy and 
administrative stances. We will now show how the economic analyses performed to 
justify exemptions reflect these differences. 
 
 4.5 Operationalising disproportionality analyses 
In our two case studies, the logic behind exemptions and their justification differed 
substantially. We also observe evolution over time, i.e. between the two management 
cycles. 
In England, water managers primarily referred to the uncertain status of water bodies to 
justify exemptions in the first cycle (Environment Agency 2009). Uncertainty comes 
with the risk that costs would outweigh benefits and that public investments be misspent 
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for unnecessary or ineffective measures. Water managers thus favoured deadline 
extensions to collect more data on the status of water bodies and spread the costs of 
measures over time (Defra 2009). In the first cycle, economic analyses therefore played 
a minor role only in exemption-related decisions. The European Commission and 
environmental movements criticised this extensive reliance on uncertainty as a basis for 
exemptions (INT-EN10; INT-EN18). Defra responded by publishing a statement of 
position which, amongst others, committed to enhance their water quality data so as to 
avoid legal action from the World Wildlife Fund and the Angling Trust (INT-EN10; 
INT-EN15; INT-EN18). In the second management cycle, economic analyses played a 
more prominent role. The EA trained their area staff to perform CBA on each catchment 
and used these analyses to define the level of ambition (good status or less stringent). 
When funding was not readily available for necessary measures, Defra would apply for 
a deadline extension (INT-EN01). 
In France, River Basin Committees were constrained in so far as they were obliged to 
pursue the national target set by the Grenelle de l’Environnement, according to which 
two thirds of all surface water bodies were to be in good ecological status by 2015 
(INT-FR12). Economic analyses therefore were not only designed to identify and justify 
cases of exemptions, but also to limit their number. However, we observe a 
considerable degree of variation across river basins as to the methods used to justify the 
use of exemptions. Analysts performed over 700 CBA in total (Feuillette et al. 2016). 
Water managers largely preferred deadline extensions over less stringent objectives in 
order to stick to higher ambitions. At the end of the first cycle, the European 
Commission criticised France for the lack of available justification for exemptions 
(Levraut 2013). In the second management cycle, the Ministry attempted to harmonise 
methods across river basins and requested to make economic analyses publicly available 
(INT-FR17). However, not all water agencies complied.  
We now apply our framework of analysis to each country. We offer a summary of our 
findings in Table 5 below and provide additional information in Appendix F. 
4.5.1 Scale 
Water managers in England and France operated at different scales to perform 
economic analyses and set water quality objectives. In the first management cycle, 
analysts in England mainly performed economic appraisals at the national or river basin 
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scale as part of an impact assessment of the RBMPs (INT-EN01). In the second cycle, 
EA staff performed CBA at sub-catchment scale (the number of water bodies within 
these sub-catchments varied), close to each other or with similar activities impacting 
them (INT-EN05). In France, the water agencies conducted CBA and affordability 
assessments at the water body, catchment (groups of around ten water bodies) or river 
basin scale (INT-FR02; INT-FR09; INT-FR14; INT-FR22; INT-FR23; INT-FR27). 
While the EA tried to optimise the scale used for the analysis in the second cycle in 
order to balance the level of detail with the number of analyses, authorities in France 
were less concerned about this aspect.  
However, scale matters. On the one hand, authorities operating at larger scales reduce 
the number of analyses and therefore save time and resources. Moreover, analyses at 
larger scales reduce the risks of double counting costs and benefits that apply to several 
water bodies (INT-EN05). To illustrate, let us consider a factory that is located at a 
particular water body and that pollutes another water body as well. Reducing the 
pollution load, for example by building a treatment plant, will incur costs for the 
factory. These costs would be considered for the water body where the factory is 
located. However, the benefits accrue to both water bodies. The overall analysis would 
be faulty if the analyst took into account these costs in CBA for both water bodies: this 
would be double counting. On the other hand, analyses at smaller scales may consider 
more robust local data. The catchment scale thus seems to be ideal if one wants to 
increase the robustness of the analysis and avoid an overestimation of costs or benefits. 
At the same time, this practical problem raises legal questions: Article 4.4 and Article 
4.5 (WFD) require decision making and reporting at the water body scale. However, 
there is disagreement as to whether the underlying analysis must be performed at the 
water body scale as well. So far, this ambiguity has not yet been resolved legally. 
4.5.2 Screening procedure  
In order to assess whether measures to improve the quality of each water body would 
incur disproportionate costs, economists have the choice between detailed 
disproportionality analyses on each hydrological unit or screening procedures. The latter 
enable analysts to sort and group cases, but also to select the water bodies on which a 
detailed assessment should be undertaken. Due to time and resource constraints, both 
	 127	
countries used screening procedures; however, their screening processes differed 
substantially.  
In England, in the first cycle, water managers used decision trees to sort cases and 
decide upon exemptions and their justification: unfavourable natural conditions, 
technical infeasibility, or disproportionate costs (see Figure 9 below). Analyses related 
to disproportionate costs were usually performed at national level, i.e. showed little 
context sensitivity, and were generally not very detailed (Defra & Environment Agency 
2009). 
Figure 9: Summary of the main steps used by the EA in decision trees to decide on 
exemptions in the first management cycle, Source: authors 
 
In the second management cycle, area EA offices applied a step-wise procedure or 
‘triage approach’ so as to perform in-depth analyses only if they were absolutely 
necessary and the expected impacts high (Environment Agency 2014, p.8). In a first 
step, analysts would identify and describe the potential impacts of different bundles of 
measures; no monetisation was envisaged at this stage. They estimated the expected 
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(dis)benefits using a scale from ‘significant’ to ‘noticeable’ and ‘no net change’ and 
compared them to the ‘do-nothing option’. The second step, a ‘stage 1’ valuation, took 
into account a range of monetised benefits and explored which bundles of measures 
were particularly cost-beneficial or not. If necessary, a ‘stage 1+’ valuation was 
performed. This analysis included a more comprehensive range of monetised benefits 
identified during the qualitative description. Finally, analysts could perform a ‘stage 2’ 
site-specific valuation if the previous results were inconclusive (Environment Agency 
2014) (see Figure 10). This advanced appraisal method was rarely used in practice, 
since stage 1+ analyses were usually satisfactory (INT-EN01).  
Figure 10: Main steps used by the EA to decide on exemptions in the second 
management cycle, Source: authors 
 
The water agencies in France used different screening criteria. This included 
stakeholder ability to pay, the costs of measures compared to past expenditures, 
particularly high costs incurred by a specific type of measure, and cost thresholds (INT-
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FR09; INT-FR23, INT-FR27). In the second management cycle, national guidance 
recommended CBA when measures were not a priority and where affordability tests 
produced negative results (Commissariat Général au Développement Durable 2014). 
Screening procedures may have a profound impact on management decisions. In 
England, the EA used a staged approach to determine the depth of the analysis. Analysts 
thus undertook a more or less comprehensive CBA for most water bodies. Because 
‘stage 1’ valuations did not take into account the full range of benefits, this process 
could lead to the exemption of water bodies where protective measures would actually 
come with a positive cost-benefit ratio. In other words, the EA’s staged procedure, 
relying on a subset of potentially available data, resulted in a more cautious approach 
when it came to objectives and exemptions. That said, a preliminary study published by 
the EA (2013) concluded that the results of ‘stage 1’ valuations did not significantly 
differ from more in-depth assessments. Consequently, the relevance of this factor 
should not be overestimated.  
In France, however, analysts used screening criteria to select water bodies on which to 
perform a CBA. This approach had the advantage of reducing the number of analyses to 
be performed. However, it also limited the potential number of exemptions. As such, it 
favoured a more ambitious interpretation of the WFD. For example, applying a cost 
threshold means that measures with low costs, but also potentially low benefits, were 
not eligible to an exemption. The diversity of screening criteria used in France also 
shows that they are more relevant if tailored to local characteristics. In the Rhone and 
Coastal Mediterranean basin a cost threshold was used due to the geography of the river 
basin. While protective measures were inexpensive in mountainous areas with low 
human pressures on water bodies, actions were costly in densely populated and 
industrialised cities (INT-FR27). Another example is Loire-Brittany where water 
pollution through agriculture is a major problem, which was therefore explicitly flagged 
up for an economic appraisal (INT-FR23). 
4.5.3 Costs and benefits data 
Costs and benefits data constitute a crucial input to economic analysis. They may differ 
as to their nature (qualitative, quantitative or monetary), their source, their quality and 
their scale. All these characteristics may influence water management decisions. 
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In the first management cycle, the EA extracted cost-related data from water company 
business plans (INT-EN03; INT-EN06), earlier impact assessments and in-house 
sources, for instance data collected through permits. However, analysts did not consider 
all costs (Defra 2009). In the second cycle, the Agency tried to broaden the data 
available to the analyses (INT-EN03) based on in-house sources and used a database on 
agricultural activities and pollutants that would subsequently inform CBA (INT-EN08). 
Although EA staff was encouraged to use local costs (INT-EN05), analysts often relied 
on national databases that did not always accurately reflect local realities (INT-EN21). 
With regards to benefits, the EA relied on the National Water Environment Benefits 
Survey (NWEBS), which elicited preference values from 1,487 people in 50 locations 
and valued aesthetic, biodiversity and recreational benefits of water status improvement. 
In the first management cycle, EA economists used these values to prepare national and 
regional impact assessments (Metcalfe et al. 2012; Environment Agency 2013). In the 
second cycle, EA staff integrated an updated version of these benefit values into the 
stage 1 valuation process (Environment Agency 2014). Furthermore, a qualitative 
assessment was made to better take into account non-monetised and non-market 
benefits. As a cogent example, the concept of ecosystem services, which informed 
valuations, was used to frame this plurality of benefits in assessments (INT-EN05; INT-
EN09).  
In France, economists calculated investment and maintenance costs based on databases 
developed by the water agencies, experts assessments, in-house and external studies and 
local data (INT-FR06; INT-FR09; INT-FR23). In the second management cycle, water 
agencies enhanced the quality and quantity of their data on costs, in particular through 
additional studies, e.g. on hydromorphological measures (INT-FR27; INT-FR25). When 
it comes to benefits, the Ministry prepared a systematic review of valuation studies so 
as to build a national database of non-market benefits (angling, kayaking, bathing, 
windsurfing, hiking, observing, boating) and non-use values (property values). Market 
benefits mainly refer to the costs saved on drinking water treatment and generally 
weighted for more than 50 per cent of the total benefits (Feuillette et al. 2016). 
Unfortunately, the Ministry only found about 40 studies and was unable to assess many 
categories of benefits. It then saved those benefit values that could be extracted from the 
academic literature, as incomplete as they were, in a Microsoft Excel tool designed to 
perform the CBA (Feuillette et al. 2016; INT-FR13). Consequently, some benefit 
	 131	
categories, in particular non-market benefits, were not systematically considered during 
the CBA although they constitute, in an ideal world, an important element of 
disproportionality analyses. In order to establish the benefits of protective measures in a 
specific water body, the analyst would then select the most relevant non-market benefit 
values and multiply the Ministry’s default value by the number of water users. The 
Ministry suggested to use local data sources to establish the number of water users, for 
instance surveys on site visits. In practice, however, analysts relied on generic figures of 
the population near a water body (Feuillette et al. 2016). Some water agencies also 
prepared local studies to improve the data (INT-FR09; INT-FR23; INT-FR27). In the 
second management cycle, the Ministry updated its systematic review through the 
inclusion of new publications, although not numerous (Commissariat Général au 
Développement Durable 2014).  
The approach followed in England seems to have favoured more ambitious water 
quality objectives than the one pursued in France. This is because EA staff did not take 
into account all the costs related to the achievement of good water status while the 
parallel usage of NWEBS and additional qualitative analyses provided a 
comprehensive overview of all the benefits. Unsurprisingly, this approach increased the 
cost-benefit ratio. In France, in contrast, the database on benefits was patchy, and non-
market benefits were rarely taken into account, favouring a less ambitious 
implementation of the WFD. This factor may partly explain why only 25 per cent of all 
CBA had a negative cost-benefit ratio in England (Environment Agency 2015), as 
compared to 75 per cent in France. Obviously, this conflicted with the high ambitions 
associated with WFD implementation in France. Water economists therefore criticised 
the method used for the valuation of benefits and promoted a more qualitative approach 
(Feuillette et al. 2016).  
Using benefit transfers seems to be unavoidable if one faces a large number of water 
bodies. However, analysts in England appear to apply this method in a more accurate 
way than in France. This may explain why economists in the French water agencies 
criticised the use of benefit transfers. The basis on which authorities in France applied 
benefit values was particularly problematic. Analysts would use the number of residents 
near a water body, so that areas with a smaller population density were heavily 
penalised (Feuillette et al. 2016). This approach favoured a less ambitious 
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implementation of the WFD. We do not make similar observations in England where 
analyses were carried out at the catchment rather than the water body scale. This is 
because average population densities are generally more homogenous at larger 
hydrographic scales. Moreover, analysts at the local level included upper bound benefits 
values and looked at wider benefits for scarcely populated areas with a high non-use 
value. Finally, EA staff did not only consider upstream-downstream issues in their 
economic analyses, but also during the planning process (monitoring and determination 
of the water status and subsequent measures) (INT-EN05). The use of benefit transfers 
was thus less problematic in England than in France. 
4.5.4 Uncertainty 
Both countries considered uncertainties during the whole planning process. This 
includes uncertainties related to the status of water bodies, to activities impacting the 
aquatic environment and to the efficiency of measures. However, England and France 
responded very differently to their presence, and these responses reflect the different 
ambitions of these countries associated with WFD implementation. 
In the first cycle, the inability to accurately assess the current status of water bodies, the 
reasons for a degraded status and the necessary measures were a key reason for water 
managers in England to request exemptions based on disproportionate costs. Obviously, 
uncertainties related to the water status may result in uncertainties as to the nature, 
effectiveness and efficiency of measures taken to improve water bodies (Environment 
Agency 2009). Accordingly, analysts were trying to avoid the possibility that the costs 
outweigh the benefits if inappropriate and inefficient measures were to be taken. In 
order to win time for additional research, regulators preferred deadline extensions to 
less stringent objectives (Defra 2009). Although in the second management cycle 
uncertainty was less central to disproportionality analysis, EA staff continued to take 
into account uncertainties when they prepared the 2015 RBMPs. For example, they 
discounted benefit values based on their level of confidence in the data describing the 
water status (INT-EN08). Consequently, EA analysts took uncertainties into account to 
avoid misspending (Defra & Environment Agency 2009), resulting in a cautious 
approach to setting water quality objectives. 
In line with the French commitment to implement the WFD to a high standard, the 
overall approach was to avoid exemptions towards less stringent objectives unless the 
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impossibility of reaching good status by 2027 had been proven (Ministère de L'Ecologie 
de l'Energie du Développement Durable et de la Mer 2009). Consequently, a majority of 
exemptions requested were deadline extensions. Like in England, the idea was to gain 
time to increase the scientific knowledge base. Water agencies even pursued the 
objective of good status for several water bodies characterised by high degrees of 
uncertainty (Levraut 2013; INT-FR10). Moreover, analysts used a cost-benefit ratio of 
0.8 to account for the possibility that benefit values were underestimated, resulting in 
rather ambitious objectives in case of uncertainty (Ministère de L'Ecologie de l'Energie 
du Développement Durable et de la Mer 2009).  
4.5.5 Additional parameters 
Several additional parameters were used in both countries to operationalise the CBA 
and the affordability tests. This includes the discount rate and the cost-benefit ratio in 
CBA and various indicators and thresholds in affordability tests. 
In England, analysts used a discount rate of 3.5 per cent for the first 30 years and 3 per 
cent for any subsequent years, in accordance with guidance from the Treasury (HM 
Treasury 2003). The cost-benefit ratio was primarily used in stage 1 valuations in 
screening procedures: if the cost-benefit ratio was between 0.5 and 1.5, economists 
would perform a stage 1+ valuation (Environment Agency 2014). In France, analysts 
used a cost-benefit ratio of 0.8 and a discount rate of 4 per cent over 30 years in the first 
management cycle and of 2.5 per cent in the second (Commissariat Général au 
Développement Durable 2014).  
The discount rate used in France in the first management cycle was thus higher than in 
England. This resulted in a higher number of exemptions in France, because it valued 
future benefits less. However, France changed the discount rate in the second cycle; in 
fact, it is lower than in England now. This change favoured more ambitious water 
quality objectives and is well in line with the ambitious take on WFD implementation in 
France. In England, the discount rate was medium, remained stable over time and 
therefore had a moderate impact only on the result of the analyses. In doing so, England 
followed the conventional approach, taken from welfare economics, of determining 
economic efficiency when the benefit-cost ratio is greater than 1, i.e. when discounted 
benefits outweigh discounted costs. In contrast, water managers in France chose a cost-
benefit ratio below one, which favoured benefits over costs, i.e. more ambitious targets.  
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Regulators in England interpreted the inability to pay as a “disproportionate burden” 
(Defra & Environment Agency 2009, p.8). In the first management cycle, EA analysts 
used this argument to justify exemptions in two cases only. The first one concerns water 
bodies polluted by abandoned mines. Analysts decided to spread costs over time so that 
expenditures would match available public funding. The second case relates to water 
bodies awaiting the installation of fish passes. Deadline extensions then served to gain 
time with a view to identifying additional sources of funding in the public and private 
sector (Defra & Environment Agency 2009).  
Water managers relied much more extensively on disproportionate burdens in the 
second cycle. They set the 2021 objectives on the basis of Programmes of Measures that 
could be delivered with budgets and policies that were already in place. Measures with 
no reliable and credible funding were not presumed to be deliverable. The authorities 
did not consider other, insecure funding sources at this stage. This practice is at variance 
with previous agreements at EU level. So far, the European Commission has not 
commented on its lawfulness yet. For example, the financial amount that the water 
industry may spend on environmental protection measures is agreed together with 
Ofwat, the regulating body of the privatised water and sewerage industry, in so-called 
periodic reviews. These processes take place every five years and are disconnected from 
the WFD management cycle (INT-EN07; INT-EN16; INT-EN18). Consequently, it is 
difficult to anticipate how much the water industry will be able to spend on WFD 
measures in the future. Likewise, achieving good water status may require additional 
legislative activities, budgetary reallocations, funding applications to the Treasury, and 
decisions taken by other ministries and government departments, all having uncertain 
outcomes. While exemptions based on less stringent objectives relied on economic 
analyses, exemptions requesting an extension of deadlines were based on affordability 
tests (INT-EN01). The question of who would pay for those measures was, first and 
foremost, explored in impact assessments (INT-EN09). Our analysis suggests that a 
majority of the costs would be borne by the water industry and national government. 
Consequently, the English approach to affordability was extremely cautious, in line 
with the British take on WFD implementation. The 2021 objectives set were based on 
secure funds and existing policies. 
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In France, water agencies assessed the ability to pay thanks to a set of indicators for 
each sector and defined thresholds in order to determine when costs would be seen as 
disproportionate. To illustrate, costs were considered unaffordable for households if the 
water bill exceeded 3 per cent of their income (Ministère de L'Ecologie de l'Energie du 
Développement Durable et de la Mer 2009). The Water Agency Rhine-Meuse used a 
particularly elaborate method to assess affordability: for each sector, economists would 
assess the costs of protective measures. Several indicators would then be calculated and 
thresholds applied. Those had been agreed prior to the assessment with the River Basin 
Committee and affected stakeholders (INT-FR14). A more detailed assessment of the 
indicators and thresholds used in Rhine-Meuse is available in Appendix F.  
Authorities in France assessed affordability in very different ways. Affordability tests 
did not refer to the availability of funding, but to indicators developed for each sector or 
stakeholder. This approach was much more ambitious than the British one, particularly 
in river basins where affordability tests were used in combination with CBA results. In 
such cases, action would be taken even if the costs were higher than the benefits, as 
long as there was evidence that stakeholders could afford protective measures. Some 
water agencies however were not fully convinced by the indicators and thresholds used 
(see Appendix F for an example on the gross operating surplus of farmers). Those 
thresholds were often considered to be non-discriminating, i.e. almost all measures 
would then be above or below the threshold (INT-FR22; INT-FR23; INT-FR27). The 
case of Rhine-Meuse is thus particularly interesting because the Agency chose 
indicators and thresholds that were specifically tailored to local circumstances and the 
stakeholders concerned. Thanks to this analysis, economists in France took into account 
distributional effects and the impacts of the costs of measures on each sector. 
4.5.6 Summary of our findings 
Table 5 below summarises our findings for England and France and indicates whether 
methodological choices resulted in more ambitious (+), more cautious (-) or neutral (0) 
water quality objectives. 
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Table 5: Synthesis of findings 
Dimension England France 
Approach Cautious (-) Ambitious (+) 
Scale 1st cycle: national and river basin 
(potentially -) 
2nd cycle: sub-catchments (0) 
Both 1st and 2nd cycle: water body, 
catchment and river basin level (+/-) 
Screening 1st cycle: decision trees, no in-depth 
analysis 
2nd cycle: ‘triage’ approach 
consisting of a qualitative description 
of measures that impact on 
ecosystem services, stage 1: CBA 
with NWEBS benefit values, stage 
1+: CBA with wider benefits, stage 
2: site-specific valuation 
(overall: potentially -) 
Both 1st and 2nd cycle: various criteria 
used including the ability to pay, cost 
thresholds, past expenditures and non-
priority measure (+) 
Costs and 
benefits 
data 
1st cycle: range of costs not 
monetised (+), NWEBS benefit 
values (+) 
2nd cycle: more costs assessed (0), 
NWEBS and qualitative assessment 
of ecosystem services (+) 
Both 1st and 2nd cycle: incomplete 
database of benefits  (-), use of benefit 
transfers (-), benefit values applied to 
population densities (-) 
 
Uncertainty Both 1st and 2nd cycle: uncertainty in 
favour of deadline extensions (-) 
Both 1st and 2nd cycle: uncertainty in 
favour of good status (+) 
Additional 
parameters 
CBA used to justify less stringent 
objectives 
 
Both 1st and 2nd cycle: discount rate 
3,5% over 30 years, then 3%; if 
0,5<cost-benefit ratio<1,5 in stage 1, 
perform stage 1+ (2nd cycle) (0) 
 
Affordability: disproportionate 
burdens, 2nd cycle: deadline 
extensions set when no secure 
funding was available (-) 
CBA used to justify deadline 
extensions and in a few cases less 
stringent objectives 
Both 1st and 2nd cycle: cost-benefit 
ratio=0,8 (+). Discount rate: 1st cycle: 
4% (-), 2nd cycle: 2,5% (+) 
 
 
Affordability: Both 1st and 2nd cycle: 
criteria and thresholds used (+ when 
used in addition to CBA to set deadline 
extensions, in this case, both analyses 
had to show negative results, 0 when 
affordability was a sufficient criteria to 
set a deadline extension) 
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To sum up, our analysis shows that the above five dimensions do affect the results of 
disproportionality analyses and may serve to set more or less exemptions: 
• Scale influences the number of analyses performed, the risk of double-counting 
benefits and costs and the robustness of data used in the analysis. In our view, 
the catchment scale is preferable here.  
• Screening procedures determine the depth of the analysis performed and, in 
doing so, the degree of precision of costs or benefits data. Furthermore, 
screening procedures, if strictly used, reduce the number of analyses and 
therefore of potential exemptions.  
• The quality and quantity of data related to benefits and costs has, according to 
our analysis, the greatest impact on the result of CBA. The lack of benefits data 
and the sensitivity of the analyses to the population living near a water body 
largely explain the numerous negative CBA results in France. This is 
independent from the discount rate and the cost-benefit ratio. 
• Uncertainties are used in two contradictory ways: as an argument to justify 
exemptions, with a view to avoiding disproportionally costly measures, or to set 
ambitious aims for individual water bodies because an exemption cannot be 
justified on basis of the data available.  
• Finally, inability to pay can either be used alone to support deadline extensions, 
thus making the justification easier, or on the contrary in addition to CBA to 
diminish the number of possible exemptions.  
As argued above, data related to costs and benefits appeared to have the greatest impact 
on the results of economic analyses. Surprisingly, it is the only dimension where 
England generally displayed greater ambition than France. Nevertheless, in England, 
benefits are more likely to be higher than the costs. Because the outcomes of those 
analyses were not in line with the general approach towards WFD implementation 
dominant in France, French regulators, favouring ambitious water quality targets, 
complemented CBA with additional criteria to tilt the scale against the use of 
exemptions. This includes requirements to identify additional arguments for 
exemptions, for instance unfavourable natural conditions or technical infeasibility, the 
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use of thresholds to limit the overall number of water bodies associated with 
disproportionate costs, and combinations of CBA and affordability tests. Overall, the 
high number of CBA displaying higher costs than benefits in France has certainly been 
a cause for distrust towards the use of CBA in WFD implementation in France. 
Obviously, decisions taken with regards to the above five dimensions were also subject 
to more general constraints, i.e. factors unrelated to the WFD. Three factors play a role 
here and deserve more attention in future studies: first, resource constraints, explaining 
the poor method used on benefits valuation in France; second, the presence of statutory 
guidelines on economic analyses in general; and finally, attitudes about the usefulness 
of economic appraisal methods in public policy more broadly. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Our article has explored the use of economic analysis to justify exemptions during the 
implementation of the WFD in England and France. Relying on an analytical 
framework consisting of five dimensions – scale, screening, benefit and costs data, 
uncertainty, and additional parameters – we show that the two countries rely on 
economic analysis, that their operationalisation differs, that these differences reflect, to 
some extent at least, political ambitions in the field of water policy and, finally, that the 
usage of economic analysis influences the process of setting water quality objectives. 
All this suggests that policy appraisal tools have a political dimension and are not, and 
cannot be, neutral when it comes to aiding decision makers. 
This argument departs from the mainstream narrative put forward in environmental 
economics according to which analytical tools such as CBA are politically neutral, if 
applied correctly by the textbook (Owens et al. 2004). Economic analyses lose this 
neutrality only as a result of inaccurate and flawed usages by practitioners. Instead, this 
article builds on an emerging research agenda in public policy and political science 
exploring the political dimension of policy appraisal in legislation and programme 
implementation (McGarity 1991; Turnpenny et al. 2008; Cashmore et al. 2010; Coletti 
& Radaelli 2013; Fritsch et al. 2017). The specific usage of policy appraisal tools can, 
intentionally or unintentionally, shape the outputs of political decision-making 
processes (Dunlop et al. 2012) and, in fact, support almost contradictory political aims. 
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However, this argument has rarely been spelt out in detail in an interdisciplinary water 
policy context.  
We contribute to extant scholarship by suggesting three pathways – related to input, 
process, and output - through which economic analyses may influence water policy 
decisions, thereby bringing in another degree of sophistication to previous work on 
policy appraisal. First, screening processes are useful examples to highlight the 
importance of data inclusion rules in economic analysis – they basically alter the range 
of materials defining the input of the analysis, thereby answering the question of what is 
actually analysed. Second, we provide evidence for variance in the interpretation of 
uncertainties, the choice of the cost-benefit ratio, the discount rate, thresholds in 
affordability tests, and other process-related features of economic analysis. The way 
data is processed, decisions are taken and key concepts interpreted may tip the scale in 
one way or another – referring to the how question of economic analysis. Finally, tools 
come with different degrees of precision and soundness of analysis. Consequently, 
methodological choices influence the output of water policy decisions. This includes 
various aspects, but most importantly the degree of ambition and the affected parties – 
the to what end and who. Examples include the challenges related to benefit transfers 
and the scale at which analyses are performed. Future research could address these 
questions in more detail and reflect in more depth upon factors explaining specific 
methodological choices in economic analyses, both in the water sector and beyond. 
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Chapter 5: Theorising different uses of policy appraisal: 
water regulation in the UK and France 
B. Boeuf and O. Fritsch  
Abstract 
Policy appraisal is typically associated with four functions in public policy making: to 
control the bureaucracy, to support evidence-based decisions, to help enhance policy 
coordination and stakeholder consultations, and finally symbolic uses. However, while 
such classifications provide convincing explanations for individual cases, little attempts 
are made to link those uses to established theories of the policy process. This article 
aims to address this gap. Specifically, we rely on theoretical thinking that brings 
together ideas from the Multiple Streams Approach and the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework. Our findings suggest that the role reserved for policy appraisal in the 
politics stream explains any further use in the policy process, in particular in problem 
definition and policy formulation. To illustrate, our findings we focus on a comparative 
case study in water regulation: the European Union Water Framework Directive and its 
implementation in the United Kingdom and France.  
 
Keywords 
Policy Appraisal; Impact Assessment; Multiple Streams Approach; Advocacy 
Coalitions Framework; Environmental Regulation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This article aims to theorise the different uses of policy appraisal. Commonly 
understood as a “family of ex ante techniques and procedures … that seek to inform 
decision makers by predicting and evaluating the consequences of various activities 
according to certain conventions” (Owens et al. 2004, p.1944), policy appraisal has 
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become an indispensable, and often mandatory, tool in the arsenal of public policy 
makers across the globe (Radaelli 2005; Renda 2011; De Francesco 2012). Policy 
appraisal belongs to the formulation stage of the policy-making process. 
Policy appraisal is typically associated with four functions in public policy making. 
First, it is a key instrument in the toolbox of elected policy makers to control the 
bureaucracy. As one of several administrative procedures, policy appraisal obliges 
regulators to justify their aims and forms of political intervention (McCubbins et al. 
1987; Damonte et al. 2014). Second, policy appraisal integrates, in an ideal world, a 
range of data, evidence and preferences into the policy-making process (Rissi and Sager 
2012; Cairney 2015). Manipulated analyses that support decisions already being made 
also belong here. After all, these analyses still rely on the idea that policy appraisal is an 
authoritative tool to structure and inform policy choices (Hertin et al. 2009). Third, 
policy appraisal represents a useful venue to coordinate intra- and interdepartmental 
communication and to manage stakeholder consultations (Dunlop et al. 2012; Bozzini 
and Smismans 2016; Smismans and Minto 2017). Finally, policy appraisal may be used 
merely perfunctorily and symbolically. In this case, it is not the individual policy 
appraisal that matters, but the presence of a policy appraisal or impact assessment (IA) 
system that is able to impress international donor organisations, globally operating 
auditors or the business community (Radaelli 2010). 
While the above four functions of policy appraisal are useful to illustrate its role in 
public policy making, we know little about when and why policy makers take recourse 
to policy appraisal – and how such uses can be conceptualised within established 
theories of the policy process. Previous works emphasise the importance of legal 
frameworks and regulations (Radaelli 2005; 2010), political parameters such as 
ministerial directives and party-political commitments (Hertin et al. 2009; Atkinson 
2015), organisational factors, for instance time, human resources, expertise and culture 
as well as institutions (Turnpenny et al. 2008; Dunlop et al. 2012). This includes the 
relative strength of the executive and the degree of centralisation in a country (Radaelli 
2010).  
However, what all these works have in common is that they are relatively theory-free. 
They provide extensive and convincing explanations for their respective cases, but little 
attempts are made to link those findings back to theory or to offer new conceptual 
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frameworks that help us understand the role of appraisal in public policy. 
This article aims to address this gap. Specifically, we rely on theoretical thinking that 
brings together ideas from the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) and the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF). While attempts to bring these approaches together have 
been around for a while, the contribution of this article is to conceptualise the role of 
policy appraisal here. 
To this end, we use a comparative case study in water regulation: the European Union 
(EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD) and its implementation in two selected 
countries: the United Kingdom (UK) and France. The WFD aims to improve the ‘status’ 
(i.e. the quality) of water resources in Europe and offers a number of procedural tools to 
achieve this goal. Policy appraisal, and CBA specifically, plays a critical role in the 
WFD. This is because the Directive comes with several exemption clauses enabling 
member states to delay the achievement of good water status or to lower the overall 
level of protection, in particular if protective measures come with disproportionately 
high costs. Appraisal tools serve to justify such exemptions to the European 
Commission (Boeuf et al. 2016). France and the UK represent two contrasting cases 
when it comes to their use in water policy and therefore enable us to explore and 
theorise the use of policy appraisal more broadly (Boeuf et al. 2018). 
 
5.2 Theory 
The MSA first and foremost seeks to understand the political agenda-setting process 
(Kingdon 1984). The approach is built on the assumption that three ‘streams’ co-exist. 
First, the problem stream: policy makers acknowledge that an issue should be 
addressed. Second, the policy stream: actors propose solutions to problems. In reference 
to the Garbage Can Model (Cohen et al. 1972), Kingdon (1984, p.19) refers to all 
proposed solutions as the “policy primeval soup”. Policy communities develop ideas 
that “float around” (Kingdon 1984, p.19), waiting to be identified as solutions for 
specific problems. Third, the politics stream: this refers to the political context, such as 
elections or major changes in public opinion. Policies appear on the political agenda 
when these three streams converge, creating a “policy window” (Kingdon 1984, p.88). 
	 148	
Whether the MSA may be used to understand parts of the policy process other than 
agenda setting is disputed (Howlett et al. 2017). 
The ACF aims to explain policy change (Sabatier and Weible 2008). It relies on the 
assumption that stakeholders, for instance government agencies, non-governmental 
organisations, the business community or the media, form coalitions in order to 
influence political decisions. These coalitions are built around shared beliefs and 
compete with other coalitions. However, they also utilise various resources, including a 
favourable public opinion, policy entrepreneurs, expertise or legal authority, to support 
their cause. The resulting policy largely represents the beliefs of the winning coalition. 
Over the past few years, scholars have been trying to combine these theories. The idea 
is to use the explanatory power of each and to expand the MSA and the ACF to all 
stages of the policy cycle. Howlett and colleagues (2015; 2017) thus suggested using a 
five-streams framework: a process stream joins in at the policy formulation phase and a 
programme stream during policy implementation. The process stream designates the 
actual process of tackling the problem, while the programme stream focuses on the 
details of a particular solution (e.g. instruments). Policy stages progress when “critical 
junctures” occur or “windows” open, i.e. when several streams meet. Within this 
framework, stakeholders form coalitions to push their own ideas to the forefront 
(Howlett et al. 2017, p.8).  
Originally, the MSA did not apply to the formulation stage and therefore remains 
somewhat quiet on the role of policy appraisal. That said, Nilsson et al. (2008) argue 
that the Garbage Can Model, including its ‘policy primeval soup’ analogy later 
borrowed by Kingdon, suggests a rather incidental decision-making process. They 
inferred that the choice of appraisal tools did not result from a rational procedure, but 
rather from coupled problems, solutions, and tools thrown in the garbage can by various 
stakeholders, and from the eventual opening of a policy window. Consequently, one 
could simply argue that choices related to the design and function of policy appraisal 
merely reflect the evolution of the three streams, how and when they meet. 
Likewise, the ACF does not systematically consider policy appraisal. However, the 
framework pays a great attention to the role of knowledge in the policy process. For 
example, as a result of scientific information, perhaps provided through policy 
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appraisal, individuals may change their beliefs (Ellison and Newmark 2010). In fact, 
advocacy coalitions use knowledge instrumentally to influence decision makers and the 
public; this includes the use of manipulated information. Generally, information in the 
ACF tends to reinforce prior beliefs, due to perceptual filters that may influence data 
selection and interpretation (Sabatier and Weible 2008). Overall, however, the precise 
location and role of policy appraisal has not yet been theorised adequately in the ACF. 
Approaches merging the MSA and the ACF would then imply that the streams 
identified by Howlett et al. (2017) determine the design and functions of policy 
appraisal. We will explain in the remainder of the article how this process takes place 
using the example of the EU’s WFD. Before we do so, we will take a short detour to 
introduce into the cases, data and methods. Once we have presented our empirical 
material, we will return to theory. 
 
5.3 Cases, data and methods 
Adopted in 2000, the WFD aims to achieve good status for all water bodies in the EU 
and to avoid any further deterioration. The Directive introduced a number of procedural 
changes to water regulation. It requires member states to draft River Basin Management 
Plans (RBMPs), outlining general priorities for water protection and setting specific 
water quality objectives for individual water bodies. Regulatory agencies are then 
requested to adopt Programmes of Measures, which specify actions likely to result in 
improved water quality. These two documents are updated every six years. The first 
RBMPs were published in 2009, the second in 2015. The third and last will be released 
in 2021. The six-year period during which RBMPs are valid is usually referred to as a 
management cycle. The WFD is organised around three management cycles, ending in 
2015, 2021 and 2027, after which the Directive is supposed to have achieved its goals. 
Our analysis focuses on the first two cycles.  
Exemption clauses, however, enable member states to lower the WFD’s ambitious 
water quality goals. Countries may delay the achievement of good status or lower the 
ambition of protective measures due to adverse natural conditions, technical 
infeasibility or disproportionately high costs. In this article, we focus on the latter 
because the concept of disproportionality requires the use of analytical tools. 
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Unfortunately, there is no agreement in the EU on how exactly disproportionately high 
costs may be identified and justified, i.e. where the fine line between proportionately 
and disproportionately high costs can be drawn (Görlach and Pielen 2007; Dehnhardt 
2014; Martin-Ortega et al. 2014). EU guidelines recommend policy appraisal here, and 
usually member states either resort to CBA, i.e. a comparison of benefits and costs, or 
the affordability principle, i.e. a comparison of costs with stakeholders’ ability to pay 
(Boeuf et al. 2016).  
Using two contrasting case studies, this article compares the implementation of the 
WFD, and the determination of exemptions, in two EU countries, the UK (more 
specifically England) and France. In England, the Environment Agency drafts RBMPs, 
suggests water quality objectives for each water body, and performs policy appraisals. 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) oversees this process 
and issues guidelines to aid regulators. Defra’s Secretary of State approved the final 
plans. The definition of RBMPs therefore tends to be a rather centralised process in 
England (Boeuf et al. 2018). We analyse the English case at the national, the river basin 
(Humber), and the catchment (Aire & Calder) level. CBAs were performed consistently 
across the country, and the Humber and Aire & Calder are largely representative of the 
rest of England. 
In France, water planning is decentralised at the river basin level. River basin 
committees, i.e. local water parliaments bringing together elected local officials, water 
users and non-elected local officials, determine the overall level of ambition and adopt 
RBMPs, which would then be approved by the respective local authorities. Six regional 
water agencies perform policy appraisals and set the water quality objectives for 
individual water bodies. Although the Ministry of the Environment issued national 
guidance for the appraisals, water agencies used them to different degrees, resulting in 
methodological diversity (Boeuf et al. 2018). We therefore studied all river basins 
(excluding the overseas territories).  
In terms of data sources, we analysed more than 40 policy documents, including 
RBMPs, official and consultancy reports, guidelines and policy appraisals. A complete 
list of policy documents is available in Appendix B. Furthermore, we interviewed 48 
officials involved in policy implementation or appraisal in England and France - e.g. 
representatives of central government, departments, and agencies -, as well as 
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stakeholders. These include representatives of the business community, agriculture, 
environmental organisations, and water user associations. The 48 interviews conducted 
were used to obtain results for both Chapter 4 and 5. However, only 34 interviewees 
provided relevant data for Chapter 5. We identified interviewees through our 
professional network, Internet searches and snowball sampling. A complete list of 
interviewees is available in Appendix A (INT-EN and INT-FR). 
 
5.4 Water regulation in England 
We will now look into the case of water regulation in England and, in doing so, explore 
the politics, problem, policy and process streams therein, the role of advocacy coalitions 
and what all this says about the role of appraisal tools in public policy. 
5.4.1 The politics stream: the political context 
Generally, public policy making in the UK relies on a basic assumption: that the public 
interest would be served best if policies maximise the benefits to society and minimise 
the costs (HM Treasury 2018). The language of Better Regulation is of particular 
importance here. Adopted in the late 1990s by the first Blair government (Gibbons and 
Parker 2013), this initiative obliges government departments to prioritise the role of 
evidence in the decision-making process, to foster economic efficiency in rulemaking, 
and to display sensitivity towards regulatory burdens for businesses (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills 2015). Conservative governments later reinforced this 
agenda, introducing the ‘one in, one out’ and then ‘one in, two out’ rules, i.e. attempts 
to offset new cost-increasing regulations through the dismantling of existing regulatory 
measures. Regular consultations enable businesses to identify unnecessary regulatory 
burdens (Gibbons and Parker 2013; Lodge and Wegrich 2015). 
According to the Better Regulation paradigm, new legislative and regulatory proposals 
should be financially affordable and prove that benefits justify the costs (HM Treasury 
2003; Radaelli 2009). Policy appraisal plays a key role here (Turnpenny et al. 2008). 
The UK may look back at a long history of assessing the impacts of political 
interventions, dating back to the early 1980s when compliance cost assessment were 
used to reduce regulatory burdens for businesses (Renda 2011; Adelle and Weiland 
2015). However, policy appraisal was also useful for the Conservatives back then to 
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break the power of ‘club government’ in the UK and to open up the policy-making 
process through meta-regulatory measures (Levi-Faur and Gilad 2004, p.107; Moran 
2003). New Labour adopted this line of thinking in 1997 and made policy appraisal 
mandatory for all new regulations and, since 2007, for almost any type of government 
intervention, including primary and secondary legislation and the transposition of EU 
directives (Parker 2016). 
As a major element of every policy appraisal, CBA in particular points decision makers 
to the most efficient policy solution, thereby potentially side-lining other social issues 
such as fairness or equity (McGarity 1991). Numerous government guidelines issued by 
the Better Regulation Executive support government departments in preparing IAs, and 
the Regulatory Policy Committee oversees the quality of IAs in the UK (Adelle and 
Weiland 2015). 
5.4.2 The problem stream: squaring the circle 
Kingdon’s problem stream relates to an undesirable state or condition. In the case of the 
WFD, this seems to refer to the poor quality of water in Europe, that the Directive aims 
to improve. However, the situation may be slightly more complicated. Practically, EU 
policies impose problem definitions onto member states, but there is no guarantee that a 
country actually shares that definition. This implies that member states may navigate 
between honest attempts to address a specific policy problem and a minimum approach 
only to the implementation of EU law. 
Historically, the UK’s approach towards environmental policy making relied on 
consensual relations between regulators and regulatees (Vogel 1986). Inspectors and 
regulated industries negotiated informally the precise terms of policy implementation, 
and voluntary measures were mainstream. This reflected the UK’s policy style, 
emphasising club-like interactions between political and economic elites at the expense 
of civil-societal actors (Moran 2003). However, it also responded to the fact that 
regulatory agencies usually did not possess the staff and resources to enforce regulatory 
standards thoroughly. With rules being interpreted in flexible ways and judicial 
procedures only being used as a last resort, the environmental record of the UK was 
mediocre at best (Fritsch 2011). While the above-mentioned attempts to open up the 
policy-making process, from specifically targeted compliance cost assessments to a 
fully-fledged Better Regulation policy, helped make the policy process more 
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transparent, things did not become easier for advocates of environmental protection. 
This is because, after all, environmental policies would now require a positive benefit-
cost ratio in order to receive the whole-hearted support of government, a hurdle that is 
difficult to take as Ackerman and Heinzerling (2002) remind us. 
It is these developments that have made, for a long time, the UK an awkward partner in 
EU environmental policy making. The UK’s policy style – club-like and secretive, or 
rational and technocratic – rarely resonated well with their counterparts in the rest of 
Europe, resulting in incompatibilities between EU policies and domestic conditions. On 
the other hand, the level of ambition displayed by environmental policy makers in the 
UK did not reflect all too well the aspirations at EU level, resulting in the ill-famed, 
although exaggerated label of ‘the dirty man of Europe’ (Jordan 2002, p.10). 
In the last two decades the UK has adopted a much more positive and, so to speak, pro-
active approach to EU environmental policy making. Initially a ‘foot-dragger’, 
“blocking or delaying costly policies in order to prevent them altogether or achieve at 
least some compensation for implementation costs”, the UK became a leader in various 
ways, not the least in order to reduce implementation costs through the upload of 
domestic practices to the EU level (Börzel 2002, p.194). Nevertheless, the UK still aims 
to square the circle and to achieve three objectives at once when implementing EU 
environmental law: to adopt policies they may have adopted anyway (i.e. to solve a 
specific problem, if at all), to maintain the prerogative of CBA and its underlying 
assumption of cost-beneficial decisions, and to implement EU policies such that 
infringement procedures will be avoided at all costs (Fritsch 2011). Government 
departments are therefore requested to minimise the ‘gold-plating’ of EU directives, i.e. 
to avoid overimplementation and unnecessary costs to the business community 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2015). How this will look like after 
Brexit remains to be seen. 
Regulators in the UK, and more specifically England, used this line of thinking too 
during the implementation of the WFD. They certainly aimed to achieve good water 
status and, in doing so, made sure they fulfil the minimum requirements of the Directive 
– a “best effort approach” (Bourblanc et al. 2013, p.1457). However, at the same time 
they subjected any measure to a thorough CBA, in particular as the WFD provides the 
opportunity to delay or put aside entirely measures not supported by a positive benefit-
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cost ratio – in line with the WFD’s exemption clauses explained earlier. One Defra 
official explained: “Our philosophy in other words, is based on the idea that maybe it’s 
not sensible to seek to achieve good status everywhere, it could be too expensive, and 
not worth doing, and maybe there are better things to do … So you have to make 
choices about what to do.” (INT-EN01) Water regulators hereby stroke a careful 
balance between political demands made by various interest groups. While 
environmental movements tried to achieve higher levels of protection and, through the 
Word Wide Fund for Nature and the Angling Trust, even took legal action against the 
government (INT-EN10), business representatives such as the Country Land and 
Business Association argued that Defra already went too far (INT-EN17).  
All this is to suggest that key assumptions made in the politics stream dominate the 
framing of problems. Issues related to water pollution are only framed as problems if 
they could be solved through a cost-beneficial solution – or if failure to address them 
may result in legal action on the side of the European Commission. Because of the 
importance of CBA here, policy appraisal essential becomes a tool to determine which 
issues are problems that deserve political attention – and which do not. 
5.4.3 The policy stream: finding a solution 
The policy stream identifies solutions to policy problems. The WFD already comes with 
a set of legally-binding solutions which respond to the problem defined by the 
Directive. The WFD suggests that poor water quality is a problem in Europe and obliges 
member states to adopt, in six-year cycles, RBMPs and Programmes of Measures to 
address it. RBMPs are strategic documents outlining specific environmental objectives 
for individual water bodies; this includes the possibility of doing nothing, if justified. 
Programmes of Measures then provide detailed lists of actions to achieve those 
objectives. However, all this is purely procedural: the Directive provides few 
indications as to how ambitious the objectives should be and what measures should be 
taken to achieve them. The overall goal of the WFD is of little help here: the Directive 
requires member states to “aim to achieve good status”, but not to “achieve good status” 
(2000/60/EC) – something that may be relatively easier to do. 
It is therefore up to environmental regulators to decide which water bodies should be 
subject to protective measures – and which not. Although the law did not require the use 
of policy appraisal here, the Environment Agency produced CBAs for two reasons: to 
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distinguish ‘problematic’ (receiving full regulatory attention), ‘less problematic’ 
(receiving partial regulatory attention, characterised by the adoption of less ambitious 
water quality objectives) and ‘unproblematic’ ones (no regulatory attention) – and to 
justify their decisions to the Minister, Parliament, the public, and important 
organisations and businesses (INT-EN01; INT-EN09). ‘Problematic‘ water bodies are 
characterised by a positive benefit-cost ratio, would receive a water status objective in 
the RMBP and be associated with various activities in the Programmes of Measures 
(INT-EN05); ‘unproblematic’ ones would be subject to exemptions, i.e. would be 
ignored for the duration of the six-year cycle. Later, however, water regulators also 
exempted water bodies if their benefit-cost ratio was positive, but no funding available 
to kick off the necessary measures (INT-EN01).  
So far, the ambition displayed in England is low. Since 2009 water regulators aimed to 
increase the number of water bodies in good ecological status by only 4 per cent from 
17 per cent to 21 per cent, if we use the latest figures. More than 79 per cent of all water 
bodies were subject to exemptions (Environment Agency 2015). 
5.4.4 The process stream: justifying water policy decisions 
The process stream describes formal aspects, as opposed to substantive ones, of 
measures taken to address the policy problem. As we have argued above, implementing 
the WFD in England means squaring the circle: improve water quality wherever 
justifiable; comply with key domestic policy-making principles and budgetary 
constraints, including the efficiency paradigm and requirements to take political action 
only if the benefits outweigh the costs; and to implement EU law to the minimum. 
Policy appraisal plays a major role here. It helps achieve these three goals, and it helps 
communicating their achievement to domestic and European stakeholders. 
First, policy appraisal is necessary to distinguish ‘problematic’, ‘less problematic’ and 
‘unproblematic’ water bodies and, once this is out of the way, to set the budget and 
justify to the Treasury actions necessary to improve ‘problematic’ water bodies. The 
Treasury is a powerful ministry that tends to restrict public spending, especially in the 
absence of visible yields. Therefore, many projects aiming to protect or improve the 
environment have been rejected over the years, especially since environmental benefits 
were difficult to establish (Weale 1997). The government considers the outcome of 
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CBA as the main criteria for judging whether new measures justify the costs (HM 
Treasury 2003; INT-EN01; INT-EN08).  
Second, policy appraisals served to justify the selected measures and, more importantly, 
their absence, i.e. if the benefit-cost ratio was negative and no protective measures were 
taken. English water regulators targeted two audiences here. On the one hand, they were 
used to report water status objectives and exemptions to the European Commission. 
Essentially, these reports confirmed the correct implementation of the WFD with a view 
to avoiding an infringement procedure (INT-EN08). The English water authorities were 
quite successful here: some domestic stakeholders even felt that the RBMPs were 
reporting devices for the Commission rather than roadmaps for action (INT-EN07; INT-
EN21). On the other hand, policy appraisals were meant to pacify domestic opposition, 
not the least from environmental movements, and to avoid legal action at the home 
front. After all, environmental organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund and the 
Angling Trust have already threatened Defra with lawsuits, among others due to the 
extensive, and in their view unjustified, use of exemptions (INT-EN18). 
CBA was generally widely accepted. Although support for this tool varied, complete 
opposition was scarce. Defra was particularly in favour of CBA: it is a tool commonly 
used within government (INT-EN04), enjoys particular support within the Treasury 
(INT-EN03; INT-EN06), and is mandatory to justify new political interventions (INT-
EN01). Likewise, representatives from environmental movements and consumer 
associations showed little hostility. They agreed that public funds should be invested 
efficiently (INT-EN10; INT-EN12), and environmental groups were pleased to see that 
protective measures could be proved to be cost-beneficial in 75 per cent of all cases. 
They were however disappointed with the more political use of affordability to justify 
exemptions (INT-EN10; INT-EN 18). 
 
5.5 Water regulation in France 
We now apply our framework to the case of WFD implementation in France. Once 
again we look at four streams, related to politics, problems, policies and process. 
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5.5.1 The politics stream: the political context 
Shortly after his election in 2007, President Nicolas Sarkozy initiated a major public 
event in Paris: the Grenelle de l’environnement, a roundtable bringing together 
representatives from local and national authorities, environmental movements, trade 
unions, and the business community to discuss environmental policy priorities for the 
next five years. Although originally designed to respond to the concerns of the 
environmentalist electorate, the Grenelle became an effective consultation device and 
adopted a number of ambitious environmental targets that would later become national 
law (INT-FR12).  
The resolutions passed by the Grenelle had a major impact on the way policy makers 
and stakeholders thought about future water policy in France (Boeuf et al. 2018). 
Moreover, they highlight an important feature of French policy making: the prerogative 
of politics over economic considerations, including questions of efficiency. This is not 
to say that French politics is free of budgetary concerns - in the contrary. Over the 
following years, local and national governments systematically reduced the funding 
available for environmental protection (and many other issues) in response to the 
economic crisis and subsequent austerity policies (INT-FR02). Consequently, public 
officials often side-lined environmental issues in favour of problems perceived to be 
more urgent (INT-FR02). Since 2014, the national government also diverts money away 
from the water agencies towards the national budget, thereby reducing the amount of 
funding available for water protection measures (INT-FR17). However, this merely 
suggests that political prerogatives may find their limit in the national budget. It does 
not mean that, contrary to the UK, political priorities in France are defined and 
formulated in response to, or on basis of, economic principles such as efficiency and 
benefit-cost ratios. 
Consequently, policy appraisal plays a much less prominent role in France’s water 
regulation. A late adopter, France began to use policy appraisal in the 1990s only 
(Renda 2011), probably as a result of the influence of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (De Francesco 2016). However, its application 
often remained perfunctory, if not symbolic (Radaelli 2005). Usually, decisions were 
taken mainly on political grounds and then justified ex-post by a policy appraisal 
(Wiener 2006). Things changed slowly after 2009, when policy appraisal became a 
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constitutional requirement. With a view to improving the quality of legislation, all draft 
bills must now come with an appraisal assessing the economic, financial, social and 
environmental impacts, all this supported by a CBA (Renda 2011; Lianos et al. 2016). 
However, the degree of economic literacy is limited within national government, in 
particular within the Ministry of Environment, which tends to recruit engineers rather 
than social scientists or economists (INT-FR21). Nevertheless, a few environmental 
economists have found their niche in the regional water agencies. This is because the 
national water laws provided that expenses on water protection be covered, to a good 
extent, by water taxes. In order to establish and justify the contributions of polluting 
industries, a number of economists were appointed in the 1990s (INT-FR05). However, 
CBAs sometimes produced on top of these analyses were usually ignored and generally 
did not inform decisions (Laurans et al. 2001).  
5.5.2 The problem stream: the ambitions of French water policy 
France played a crucial role in the integration of Europe, and this had a major impact on 
the country’s self-image. France has never been an environmental pioneer and has 
regularly been described as a “fence-sitter”, i.e. “neither systematically pushing policies 
nor trying to block them at the European level” (Börzel 2002, p.194). This has much to 
do with the strong role of non-state actors during policy implementation. Environmental 
politics in France is often characterised by meso-corporatism, “a mode of interest 
intermediation in which private interest groups, operating on a basis of concentration, 
monopolisation and social closure, actively participate in both policy formulation and 
implementation” (Szarka 2000a, p.90). For instance, the field of water regulation in 
France provides plenty of opportunities for non-state actors to influence policy 
implementation, not the least through river basin committees where industries and 
farmers have long managed to defend their sectorial interests (Szarka 2000b). 
Consequently, policies often lost some of their sharpest teeth during the implementation 
phase, and the European Commission initiated a good number of infringement 
procedures against the country (Buller 2004; Bourblanc et al. 2013). 
Things were different when French policy makers faced the transposition of the WFD. 
Regulators were, on the one hand, more ambitious anyway, aiming to remain thorough 
during the implementation phase. On the other hand, the resolutions adopted by the 
Grenelle provided a powerful mandate for more ambitious environmental policy goal 
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and enabled regulators to take a harder stance vis-à-vis sectoral interest groups. The 
overall consensus therefore was to implement the WFD not only by the letter, but also 
to put into practice the spirit of the Directive (Boeuf et al. 2018).  
This not only meant to ‘aim to achieve good status’, but to really achieve good water 
quality (INT-FR01). This ambition, deeply rooted in France’s self-image as a ‘good’ 
EU member state, found support from an unexpected side: the above-mentioned 
resolutions adopted by the Grenelle de l’environnement. As argued above, this public 
roundtable acted entirely independently from any European developments; its goal was 
to define domestic priorities in the field of environment and sustainable development 
for the next five years. However, the Grenelle’s resolutions were very well compatible 
with the ambitious stance taken by French water regulators. Specifically, the Grenelle 
decided that no more than one third of all water bodies may be subject to WFD 
exemption clauses in the first implementation cycle from 2009 to 2015, thereby 
reflecting the political will to achieve one-third of the remaining effort required during 
each of the three six-year management cycles up until 2027 (INT-FR12; INT-FR24). 
These ambitions were transposed into national law, thereby mobilising state and non-
state actors stakeholders around common goals (INT-FR04; INT-FR22).  
The implication is that the French problem stream was characterised by two major 
discourses: the challenge related to the WFD’s ambitious water quality goals – and the 
challenge associated with the high-flying environmental policy resolutions adopted by 
the Grenelle. This is not to say that there was no opposition to these ambitious water 
policy goals. Various advocacy coalitions, spearheaded by farmers and the business 
community, partly stood in opposition, requesting a farther-reaching use of exemption 
clauses (INT-FR17; INT-FR24) and occasionally taking legal action (INT-FR06).  
However, efficiency and cost-benefit considerations, and therefore policy appraisal 
tools such as CBA, were largely absent from these two discourses. In other words, 
problem definitions referred to political identities and publicly made resolutions rather 
than technocratic calculations of the common good. 
5.5.3 The policy stream: a preference for a specific solution 
Despite the ambitious water policy objectives set in the first management cycle from 
2009 to 2015, under the influence of the Grenelle (INT-FR10; INT-FR12; INT-FR24; 
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Bourblanc et al. 2013), the level of ambition was somewhat lower after 2015. The 
overall level of ambition was not decided through a public roundtable. The momentum 
was gone. The enduring financial crisis, but also technical problems, made it difficult to 
achieve the levels of protection identified for individual water bodies (Levraut 2013; 
INT-FR04). Consequently, the Ministry suggested to set targets that were still 
ambitious, but slightly more ‘realistic’ – and made sure that the amount of funding for 
protective measures remained high (INT-FR03; INT-FR04; INT-FR17). 
In order to work effectively towards these targets, three strategies were used. First, 
water managers limited the use of exemptions (Levraut 2013; INT-FR01; INT-FR17). 
Second, regulators did not apply for exemptions in cases of uncertainty. In the UK, 
uncertainty as to whether good water status could be achieved at all and uncertainty as 
to the presence of a negative benefit-cost ratio was a major reason to apply for 
exemptions. Water regulators in France, in contrast, turned the burden of proof: they 
would only apply for exemptions when they were certain that measures would be 
ineffective. Overall, water regulators in France aimed to increase the proportion of 
water bodies in good ecological status from 41 to 64 per cent – a figure set politically 
which stands in sharp contrast to the UK which aimed to achieve good water status for 
30 per cent of all water bodies in the first cycle.  
Due to the political nature of the overall process, policy appraisal played a marginal role 
only. Technical criteria, financial considerations and local expertise formed the basis for 
decisions about the levels of protection for individual water bodies (INT-FR02; INT-
FR04; INT-FR05; INT-FR06; INT-FR09; INT-FR23; INT-FR24). Ministerial 
guidelines suggested using CBAs at local level, mainly in order to comply with EU 
guidelines, but they rarely informed decisions. Figures related to the costs caused by 
diffuse pollution were sometimes used to persuade polluters of the necessity to take 
action, but other than that policy appraisal played no major role (INT-FR03; INT-FR04; 
INT-FR05; INT-FR24; INT-FR25). The reason is twofold. First, water regulators 
simply had no interest in tools that could potentially encourage discussions about 
exemptions which would largely stand in contrast to the politically goals set by the 
Grenelle. Second, regulators had already received the necessary funding for protective 
measures. Using CBA to exempt water bodies from further action would leave 
regulators with a budget larger than necessary – something very unhealthy in light of 
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future budgetary negotiations. Some water regulators in France thus perceived CBA as a 
tool that could provide undesirable information (INT-FR22). 
5.5.4 The process stream: justifying water policy decisions 
We have argued that French water regulators aimed to use much less exemptions than 
their British counterparts, the political goal initially was 33 per cent of all water bodies 
maximum. Decisions upon exemptions were taken on political or technical grounds, and 
policy appraisal played no major role here. This is because water regulators were bound 
by the Grenelle and its politically set environmental resolutions anyway. 
At the same time, the political mainstream in France, and this includes officials in the 
Ministry of the Environment and regulators in water agencies, displayed a notable level 
of distrust when it comes to the use of CBA. Ministry officials were slightly more 
sympathetic towards CBA in the first management cycle, from 2009 to 2015. However, 
they always had a preference for budgetary considerations in water regulation and even 
attempted to strengthen the role of the affordability principle at EU level (INT-FR24). 
After 2015, however, the Ministry took distance from existing EU guidelines, legally 
non-binding anyway, and did not praise the potential merits of CBA (INT-FR13), not 
the least in response to the critical views held in the water agencies at regional level 
(Feuillette et al. 2016).  
Water regulators criticised CBA for two reasons. On the one hand, they identified a 
number of methodological weaknesses, in particular with regards to benefit valuation. 
Officials simply were in doubt whether the method would really provide the basis for 
sound analyses and robust results (INT-FR04; INT-FR09; INT-FR20; INT-FR24). On 
the other hand, many members of staff, in particular those with backgrounds other than 
economics, remained unconvinced of the merit of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion in CBA – 
i.e. the hypothetical assumption that winners of specific actions could compensate the 
losers (Pearce et al. 2006). Most officials preferred to think in terms of spending and 
redistribution rather than benefit-cost ratio and efficiency. One regulator explains: “If 
we conclude [on the basis of a CBA] that the action is feasible while costs are not 
financially acceptable for the payer, the fact that another stakeholder gets benefits will 
not help. This stakeholder will not give money to the payer. In other words, because the 
costs and benefits are not going to the same stakeholders, it is complicated to use [CBA] 
as a criteria to know if we should pursue [the measure] or not” (INT-EN04). Thinking 
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along the lines of ethics, social justice and distribution here comes with many 
advantages: “There are aspects of acceptability … that are locally very strong, political, 
psychological, change acceptability that have to be taken into account. … In reality, 
when you take a decision … you take into account other values, including your quality 
of life or well-being” (INT-FR06). Water regulators here respond to the simple fact that 
many important decisions in French water regulation are taken by river basin 
committees, which bring together a range of stakeholders – all of them concerned with 
‘who pays how much’ rather than ‘who gains what’.  
Nevertheless French water regulators do occasionally exempt water bodies – up to 33 
per cent as we argued above. These exemptions must be justified to the European 
Commission, and this is where CBA takes a stronger role. The European Commission 
promotes the tool in various guidance documents, and although these guidelines are 
legally non-binding, French water regulators preferred to couch their justifications for 
exemptions in the language of CBA. However, those decisions were already made 
earlier on the basis of technical, political or financial considerations. These CBAs were 
therefore often perfunctory: decisions were rarely taken on the basis of them, and their 
quality was generally questionable (Levraut 2013). 
 
5.6 Discussion 
The political environment in Britain is dominated by three key values: the efficient use 
of public funds, the desirability of cost-beneficial policy decisions, and the goal to 
minimise burdens to the business community. Policy appraisal, ideally an impact 
assessment with a CBA section, is a, if not the, tool to put these values into practice. 
Although it has no constitutional foundation, a good number of policies, practices and 
organisations, couched into the language of Better Regulation, ensure its authority in 
British policy making.  
In terms of theory, this suggests that policy appraisal takes a prime role in the British 
politics stream. Looking at water regulation in the UK, we have demonstrated that 
policy appraisal, and more importantly CBA, played a significant role in distinguishing 
‘problematic’, ‘less problematic’ and ‘unproblematic’ issues, which would then receive 
more, less or no regulatory attention. These decisions were taken on the basis of 
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calculations provided by CBAs, supported by specific assessments of how target groups 
such as small and medium enterprises or internationally trading companies are affected. 
This implies that policy appraisal contributed, first of all, to evidence-based policy 
making. In other words, problems and policy solutions were structured, if not created, 
by policy appraisal. Consequently, key ideas in the politics stream dominated 
developments in the other three streams, in particular the problem stream. The actual 
CBAs were then used to communicate decisions to various audiences. This way policy 
appraisal became, although to a lesser degree, also a tool of political control whereby 
principals, notably the Better Regulation Executive, the Treasury and Defra, but also the 
wider stakeholder community, ensured that the agent, i.e. the Environment Agency, 
complied with the predominant paradigm. 
Policy making in France, in contrast, is much more than in the UK dominated by the 
prerogative of politics. Procedurally, this gives parliament, government, interest groups 
or deliberative forums such as the Grenelle a central role. Until recently, when appraisal 
tools became a constitutional requirement for legislative proposals, these tools rarely 
made it into the dictionaries of the political mainstream. CBA, in particular, enjoys little 
legitimacy; policy makers and regulators alike question its underlying methodology as 
well as efficiency as the key value to be maximised.  
Consequently, appraisal tools in France do not possess the standing to structure the 
problem or the policy stream to the extent that we observe in England. Key water policy 
decisions, in particular with regards to overall levels of protection were taken during the 
Grenelle, a public consultation forum, supported by considerations within the Ministry 
of the Environment and environmental agencies, and in view of budgetary concerns. 
The number of exemptions was restricted by the Grenelle, and decisions on individual 
water bodies objectives usually referred to technical or budgetary arguments, scarcely to 
benefit-cost ratios. Policy appraisal, and specifically CBA, mainly entered the picture, 
first, to couch justifications for exemptions into a language preferred by EU policy 
makers and, second, to communicate to and receive the buy-in of stakeholders. In both 
cases, appraisals were mainly used in symbolic ways and usually reflected decisions 
already being made. 
In addition, appraisal tools are not mere technical “neutral devices”: they influence 
public policy making following their “own logic”, i.e. they carry social, political and 
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economic preferences (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007, p.1; Owens et al. 2004). 
Therefore, they sometimes produce unforeseen consequences. The values in England’s 
politics stream are in accordance with the efficiency goal underlying CBA. In this 
context, CBA can easily inform decisions, since the outcome of the appraisal will point 
towards the most efficient solution, a result that is sought politically. This is however 
not the case in France. The outcome of the CBA will not give a solution that is 
compatible with the beliefs in the politics stream. In this context, CBA cannot easily be 
a basis for decision-making, as opposed to affordability, financial or distributional tools. 
This situation leads to a perfunctory and symbolic use of appraisal. Consequently, when 
the underlying logic and principles of the appraisal tool used conflict with the values in 
the politics stream, policy appraisal cannot inform and support policy ex-ante. It serves 
as a political instrument to support the beliefs in the politics stream. In other words, the 
use of policy appraisal for evidence-based decision-making also depends on whether the 
beliefs in the politics stream match with the underlying principles of the appraisal tool 
used. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This article set out to theorise functions and uses of policy appraisal.  Previous work has 
come up with a number of frameworks (McCubbins et al. 1987; Hertin et al. 2009; 
Radaelli 2010; Dunlop et al. 2012; Damonte et al. 2014). Accordingly, policy appraisal 
may serve four functions: to help elected policy makers control the bureaucracy, to 
bring evidence into political decision making, to enhance coordination and manage 
stakeholder interactions during policy formulation, and to merely implement an 
important element of the better regulation or good governance discourses, thereby 
appealing to a critical domestic or international audience. However, we know little 
when and why policy makers take recourse to policy appraisal – and how such uses can 
be conceptualised within established theories of the policy process. Focusing on the 
MSA and the ACF, this article contributes to this literature. 
Our analysis of two cases, water regulation in England and France, suggests that, when 
it comes to policy appraisal, the politics stream seems to dominate the remaining 
streams. To rephrase, it is the politics stream that defines the presence and importance 
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of appraisal tools in the policy process and narrows down their specific role in the 
problem, policy and process streams. Four scenarios are possible. 
First, the politics stream assigns a major role to policy appraisal, with a particular 
emphasis on evidence-based policy making. As we have demonstrated, this may 
influence the problem stream because appraisal tools may help determine which ‘issues’ 
actually deserve the label ‘problem’ and therefore political attention. However, 
evidence may also be required to establish which policy option is most (cost-) 
beneficial, thereby taking a key role in the policy stream. No constitutional foundation 
is necessary here, the British case shows that a combination of institutions and 
organisations may be sufficient, if enforced effectively at highest government levels. 
Nevertheless, constitutional provisions such as in France may certainly contribute to the 
adoption of evidence-based policy making in countries with no established track record 
of policy appraisal. 
Second, the politics stream emphasises the importance of appraisal tools in the policy 
process, but with a particular focus on control. This scenario is not covered all too much 
in our case studies, but obviously reflects the well-known situation in the United States. 
Here policy appraisal is, first and foremost, a tool of the presidential administration 
(Kagan 2001) to hold regulatory agencies to account, whereby control tools can both 
take the role of ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ (for a classic discussion, see 
McCubbins et al. 1987). 
Third, the politics stream gives an important role to policy appraisal as a way to manage 
stakeholder consultation and coordinate policy internally. This scenario is less reflected 
in our case studies. It is however dominant within the European Commission, where 
policy appraisal primarily aims to coordinate policies across the various Directorates-
General (Bozzini and Smismans 2016; Smismans and Minto 2017). The OECD also 
recommends using policy appraisal so as to improve the consultation of stakeholders 
(Radaelli and Fritsch 2012). 
Fourth, policy appraisal does not take a major role at all in the politics stream. Politics 
may still influence the rules of the game in the problem and policy streams. However, 
these rules would then reflect discourses, ideas and values other than evidence or 
control, and would therefore not call for policy appraisal as a key tool to structure those 
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streams. It may still be that appraisal tools will be used in problem definition or policy 
formulation. However, their use is much more likely perfunctory or symbolic, i.e. in 
response to domestic or international expectations, if not pressures, and never been 
endorsed wholeheartedly at domestic level. 
Future research could explore the use of policy appraisal in non-EU countries, for 
example in the United States, where the control function is historically dominant 
(Dunlop et al. 2012). Such case studies could enrich the theoretical framework 
developed in this research. In addition, future work could focus on a policy where 
advocacy coalitions and lobbying processes are more active, thus deepening the role of 
the ACF in explaining functions of policy appraisal. 
This research also contributes to the literature on the diffusion of policy appraisal 
(Radaelli 2004; De Francesco 2012). Radaelli (2005, p.924) in particular notices that 
although appraisal tools are increasingly adopted across the EU, their implementation 
diverges significantly, i.e. a common “bottle” has produced different “wines”. 
Consequently, our work lays a new stone in this research area: the politics stream may 
account for the adoption of policy appraisal and for the differences observed in its 
implementation across countries. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The scale of environmental degradation requires urgent action from both governments 
and society. Of all natural resources, water is particularly endangered due to its 
intensive use. Sustainable public policies protecting aquatic ecosystems and ensuring an 
equitable and efficient sharing of water between conflicting uses are needed now more 
than ever (Ward 2012; European Commission 2017). However, environmental policies 
often fail to protect natural resources and ecosystems sufficiently (Jordan 1999; 
Blühdorn 2000; Newig 2007). In order to improve such policies, we first need to better 
understand the decision-making processes that lead to particular policy choices and 
designs, as well as how policy appraisal tools are used as part of those processes 
(Turnpenny et al. 2015).  
Rationality and evidence-based policy making are often presented as key to reaching 
optimal decisions (Brunsson 2007). However, environmental policy decisions are rarely 
taken on the basis of policy appraisal (Hahn 2000; Bromley & Paavola 2002; Paavola 
2002). Consequently, how and why are policy appraisal tools used in decision-making 
processes? Political scientists argue that environmental policy making is in fact complex 
and chaotic (Cairney 2011; Adelle & Weiland 2015) and that appraisal often plays a 
political and strategic role (Hertin et al. 2009). Extant scholarship discusses some 
constraints and factors that may explain uses of policy appraisal that depart from 
evidence-based policy making e.g. political impediments, legal restrictions and 
institutional frameworks (Turnpenny et al. 2008; Hertin et al. 2009; Radaelli 2010). 
This PhD builds on those works to provide, from a political science perspective, a 
broader explanatory framework for the uses of policy appraisal tools in environment 
policy making.  
In particular, this PhD has aimed to answer the following research question: How can 
we explain the different uses of policy appraisal - in particular of economic analysis – 
beyond evidence-based policy making in water decision making? To this end, I studied 
the case of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) (2000/60/EC), the most 
ambitious piece of EU legislation in the field of water. Economic principles are key 
aspects of the WFD implementation (Laurans 2006), and play a particularly important 
role in justifying exemptions.  
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In order to address the research question, I pursued several objectives. 
The first objective was to unveil the motives, beyond evidence-based policy making, of 
the various EU institutions for recommending a specific economic analysis. I thus 
aimed to explore the relationship between the political goals pursued and the support for 
a specific type of economic analysis at EU level. I studied the negotiations and 
disagreements that occurred at EU level on the policy appraisals to perform during the 
process of setting objectives and exemptions, but also on the Directive’s political 
ambition. I then explored the extent to which diverging interpretations of the WFD 
could explain the apparent lack of progress on WFD implementation at EU level. 
The second objective was to determine whether and how the choices made for the 
economic appraisal impacted the decision-making process domestically. This was 
achieved through the exploration and comparison of the economic analyses performed 
in two member states - i.e. the tools used as well as the details of their operationalisation 
- and to assess the extent to which they impacted the process of setting WFD objectives. 
I also identified potential divergence with EU guidelines or recommendations. To this 
end, I studied in-depth the situation in England and France.  
Finally, the third objective consisted in unveiling the processes underpinning decision 
making and the role of appraisal tools therein. I thus identified the various functions that 
economic analysis plays during the process of setting objectives and highlighted 
differences between England and France. Using a combination of the Multiple Streams 
Approach (MSA) and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Howlett 
et al. (2015; 2017), I explained the perfunctory and symbolic uses of economic appraisal 
observed in the case study.  
These objectives were addressed in three empirical chapters, preceded by one that set 
the academic context through a meta-analysis of the social science literature on the 
WFD implementation in EU member states. In the present chapter, I first synthesise my 
findings and explain how they responded to the objectives detailed above. Second, I 
specify the contributions of this work to the policy appraisal and WFD literatures and 
the insights it provides for policy makers. Finally, I detail its limitations and suggest 
avenues for future research. 
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 6.1 Synthesis of findings 
6.1.1 Academic context: the existing social science literature on WFD 
implementation in member states 
The WFD has motivated numerous scholarly works. However, a systematic review of 
existing scholarship on the implementation of the Directive revealed many research 
gaps. Based on a meta-analysis of 89 social-science articles studying empirically the 
WFD implementation in EU member states, Chapter 2 has provided a comprehensive 
literature review on this topic.  
Findings show first a strong imbalance in the countries analysed. While there is a cluster 
of very well-researched countries, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Germany, member states that joined the EU after 2004 and Mediterranean countries 
such as Italy, Greece and, most importantly in the context of this PhD project France, 
are under-represented. This imbalance is unfortunate; according to EU reports, WFD 
implementation is suboptimal (European Commission 2012). Current research thus 
provides an incomplete picture and can only support the improvement of the 
implementation of WFD provisions in member states to a limited extent. In addition, a 
majority of publications focused on public participation, while there is little literature on 
transboundary aspects, economic analyses (especially CBA), exemptions, and policy 
integration. Consequently, a few areas of research are well documented, whereas others 
remain blind spots. Moreover, although we observe a significant increase of WFD-
related publications since 2011, there are few works only studying the second 
management cycle or comparing management cycles over time.  
Consequently, despite an impressive number of articles published on the Directive, 
many WFD aspects and countries remain understudied. Chapter 2 was an important first 
step here that helped refine the research strategy to be used and to identify research gaps 
in the literature.  
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6.1.2 Objective 1: unveil the motives, beyond evidence-based policy making, 
of the various EU institutions for recommending a specific economic 
analysis  
Chapter 3 looked at the debates that arose at the EU level on setting objectives and 
exemptions in WFD water planning - from the negotiation of the Directive to guideline 
drafting and subsequent discussions in the CIS. Results showed that, from the very start 
of the WFD negotiation, EU institutions had diverging perceptions on the Directive’s 
ambition and on the nature of and conditions for using exemptions. Consequently, they 
failed to come to an agreement on the political aspects of the WFD – i.e. on the 
Directive’s ambition - and on the methodological aspects – that is, the economic 
analysis required to support decisions on exemptions.  
In fact, opposition on the choice of appraisal tools was not merely technical but also 
political. First, this opposition reflected the disagreements related to the overall 
ambition of the WFD: the European Commission argued that the use of CBA rather 
than the ability to pay would prevent member states from downplaying environmental 
objectives. Second, this opposition reflected political values, such as economic 
efficiency or social concerns. Consequently, methodological and political aspects are 
interrelated; the use of appraisal tools cannot be separated from the political dimension 
of setting objectives and exemptions.  
In addition, due to the lack of political consensus on WFD ambition, some countries 
have relied on exemptions to a greater extent than the European Commission or 
environmental non-governmental organisations had expected. This situation has been 
interpreted as a lack of political will to fully implement the WFD.  
6.1.3 Objective 2: determine whether and how the choices made for the 
economic appraisal impacted the decision-making process domestically 
The ambiguity of exemption clauses has led to various approaches in EU countries. 
Political objectives - i.e. the overall ambition and the degree of reliance on exemption 
clauses - differ, as well as methodological choices - i.e. the appraisal tools used - when 
setting objectives for the WFD implementation. Chapter 4 explored the economic tools 
used during the process of setting objectives in two member states: England and France.  
I found that both England and France used economic tools, mainly CBA and 
affordability tests. The analyses performed were generally consistent with European 
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requirements, although the Court of Justice could potentially challenge parts of them in 
the future. However, I identified notable differences with regards to the details of the 
economic analyses undertaken in the two countries. These differences reflect, to some 
extent, the political ambition of each country in the field of water policy: a cautious and 
pragmatic approach in England and rather ambitious water quality goals in France. 
Conversely, methodological choices have influenced the objectives developed for water 
bodies, sometimes unintentionally. In this part of my project I consequently highlighted 
the political dimension of policy appraisal tools that cannot be neutral when it comes to 
aiding decision makers. Political and methodological aspects influence each other. 
6.1.4 Objective 3: unveil the processes underpinning decision making and 
the role of appraisal tools therein 
Chapter 5 compared the uses of policy appraisal tools during the process of setting 
WFD objectives in England and France. In each country, water managers relied on 
economic analyses for very different purposes. Practitioners were rather open on their 
motives: mainly evidence-based decision making and accountability, control, or 
justification of political goals. I also identified less conscious uses of appraisal through 
a study of the role of economic analysis in the decision-making process (whether it 
supported decisions or not, at which stage of the process it was performed – in 
particular before or after objectives were already decided –, what were the criteria 
decisions were based on), the recipients of analyses (in particular whether they served 
internal or external use) and the guidelines for appraisal. 
In England, results showed that evidence-based decision making is the dominant use of 
economic appraisal. It was used to rationally inform decisions on less stringent 
objectives and to reduce costs on economic sectors. Practitioners also undertook 
economic analyses so as to increase accountability and transparency towards 
stakeholders, and to some extent for central government to exert political control over 
departments. In France, CBA mainly had a perfunctory and symbolic use. Analyses, to a 
large extent, did not inform decisions, which were often taken based on other criteria or 
considerations. They often served to provide justifications for exemptions to the 
European Commission, the main recipient of economic appraisals. Practitioners also 
used them so as to depoliticise controversial topics, in order to respond to stakeholders’ 
critiques or to increase the acceptability of measures.  
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The application of policy-making theories showed that the politics stream, which 
embodies specific values depending on the member state considered, influences the role 
of appraisal tools in the policy process. In England, main values in the politics stream 
are the efficient use of public funds, the desirability of cost-beneficial policy decisions, 
and the goal to minimise burdens to the business community. Policy appraisal is well 
suited to put these values into practice and plays a key role in the various streams. In 
France however, the politics stream is dominated by negotiation between stakeholders 
and key political events such as the Grenelle. Policy appraisal does not play a major 
role here and does not structure the various streams. Furthermore, because the values 
pursued in the politics stream are not in line with the underlying logic of the appraisal 
tools used – in this case CBA -, the outcome of the analyses can be in contradiction with 
the objectives decided politically. In this case, CBA cannot easily serve as a basis for 
evidence-based decision making and is rather used in a perfunctory and symbolic way. 
This article thus theorises the functions and uses of policy appraisal, in relying on 
theories of the policy process, more specifically the MSA and the ACF. The politics 
stream defines the presence and importance of appraisal tools in the policy process and 
narrows down their specific role in the problem, policy and process streams. As such, 
the politics stream may assign a major role to policy appraisal for evidence-based policy 
making, to control the bureaucracy or to improve coordination. Reversely, policy 
appraisal may not have a major role in the politics stream. In this case, policy appraisal, 
if used at all, rather has a symbolic or perfunctory function. 
 
6.2 Contributions of this study 
By exploring and explaining the various functions, uses and political dimensions of 
economic appraisal in water decision making, this research has contributed to the 
broader literature as follows. 
First, I clarified the relationship between political objectives and appraisal tools. 
Political objectives consist of political values (e.g. economic efficiency, social justice or 
equity), which are specific to each country. They are shaped by various cultural and 
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historical factors, such as a member state’s history of environmental policy or its 
relationship towards the EU. Political objectives are then translated into a particular 
environmental policy ambition – in this case the WFD ambition and the degree of 
reliance on exemptions. Appraisal tools may reflect those objectives and ambitions in 
two ways: firstly in the choice of the appraisal tool itself; appraisal tools are not neutral 
and follow their own logic (Lascoumes & Le Gales 2007) (e.g. maximise economic 
efficiency in the case of CBA, see McGarity 1991). Consequently, decision makers may 
choose an appraisal tool that is in line with a country’s political values – i.e. the tool 
will follow a logic that is compatible with the political objectives. Secondly, in the 
operationalisation of the tool: analysts may choose to set various parameters and other 
dimensions of the tool (e.g. the discount rate, the benefits taken into account) so as to 
reflect the country’s political ambition to some extent. In the case studied, the WFD 
ambition partly influenced the content of the economic analysis performed.  
I also identified several pathways through which appraisal influences the decision-
making process. When the logic of the tool used is compatible with the political beliefs 
or when the operationalisation of the tool is influenced by the political ambition – as 
described above - the result of the appraisal intentionally reflects political objectives, at 
least in part. However, the choices made for the appraisal may also unintentionally 
influence the result of the analysis. This situation may occur when the appraisal tool 
selected follows a logic that does not necessarily match with the political objectives, or 
when the choices made for the operationalisation of the tool depend on practical 
constraints (e.g. lack of data or resources). In this case, the output of the analysis is 
disconnected from political goals, and can even be in contradiction with them. 
The role of policy appraisal as a tool for evidence-based decision making can then be 
explained, partly at least, by the discrepancy between the output of the appraisal and the 
political objectives pursued. When both match to some extent, policy appraisal may 
then serve as a basis for decision making. The remaining divergence may be overcome 
thanks to additional criteria or analysis. When the outcome of the analysis and the 
political goals are contradictory, other uses of appraisal tools may be observed, such as 
symbolic or perfunctory uses. Why then use appraisal tools at all? First, analysts may 
conclude that their results are not in contradiction with the political objective. This 
result may be unintentional or the consequence of choices in the operationalisation of 
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the appraisal tool. In this case, the result may strategically serve as an additional 
argument to justify a policy (Hertin et al. 2009). Second, the requirement to perform an 
economic assessment may result from external pressures, the example in our case study 
being the European Commission and fear of infringement, or local stakeholders that 
have a vested interest in the outcome of a policy.  
In addition, even when the logic underlining the appraisal tool matches with the 
political beliefs, the use of the appraisal tool will still be influenced by the beliefs in the 
politics stream. In other words, appraisal seems to be always performed in pursuit of a 
political goal or strategy. As an illustration, I showed in the case studied that the 
European Commission supported the use of CBA so as to be able to better control the 
use of exemptions in member states and prevent them from downplaying water quality 
objectives, i.e. for political reasons. Moreover, water managers in England resorted to 
CBA in pursuit of efficiency and in order to avoid a ‘waste’ of public money, which are 
political objectives. Even here, budgetary considerations prevailed, as shown through 
the extensive reliance on deadline extensions justified on the basis of ‘disproportionate 
burdens’. Consequently, the politics stream explains the use of appraisal tools in the 
policy process. 
I thus built this study on an emerging research agenda in public policy and political 
science, exploring the political dimension of policy appraisal in legislation and 
programme implementation. First, I emphasised two political aspects of appraisal tools: 
the choice of the tool itself, which follows a particular logic, and the operationalisation 
of the tool selected, which may be influenced by political goals. Second, I contributed to 
the theoretical understanding of the use of policy appraisal in environmental decision 
making by innovatively relying on policy-making theories. In particular, I explored in 
this study the context in which appraisals are performed. This includes Howlett et al.’s 
streams (Howlett et al. 2017) and countries’ political beliefs and values. In doing so, I 
encompassed the various factors influencing the use of appraisal tools previously 
identified in the extant literature. In addition, I applied the combination of the ACF and 
MSA as suggested by Howlett et al. (2015; 2017) to two contrasting case studies. In 
conclusion, I contributed to a better understanding of decision-making processes and 
therefore decisions outcomes in the field of environmental policies. 
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While the aim of this thesis was to further the broader understanding of policy appraisal, 
this research also contributed to the WFD literature more specifically. 
First of all, I provided new insights into the Directive’s negotiation process and the 
functioning of the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS). In particular, I showed 
some dysfunctional elements in the CIS, and a lack of political support and trust. 
Although the CIS was specifically created for WFD implementation, it was later 
extended to other EU directives (e.g. the 2007 Flood Risk Management Directive and 
the 2008 Marine Strategy Framework Directive). Therefore, the results of this research 
are also relevant for other European environmental policies. 
In addition, I provided an empirical contribution to the knowledge on WFD 
implementation in member states. In particular, I addressed a major research gap in the 
literature: the politics of exemptions and the role of economic analysis therein. In spite 
of their fundamental importance, exemptions based on disproportionate costs have 
attracted limited scholarly attention so far. In this research, I explained the process of 
setting objectives and exemptions in two member states, and the role that economic 
analysis played in the decision-making process. I also offered explanations for the 
differences observed in these two countries. I showed that their ambitions related to the 
implementation of the WFD partly shaped the analytical tools used and that choices 
made in the operationalisation of these tools influenced to some extent the protection 
standards of individual water bodies.  
Finally, this research differed from most scholarly works on WFD implementation 
published previously, as it provided a cross-country comparison. Comparisons do not 
play a major role in WFD research which, as I have shown in a systematic review of the 
literature, mainly relies on single-country studies. However, by comparing two 
countries, it is possible to differentiate independent variables - such as the countries’ 
historic use of policy appraisal, its environmental culture, or its degree of integration in 
the EU - and analyse their impact on the object of study. Moreover, through this 
research, I strengthened the use and application of theory in the WFD body of literature, 
a feature widely neglected in most previous works – another finding of the systematic 
review. 
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 6.3 Insights for policy  
Besides its academic value, this study also provided insights to policy makers on EU 
environmental policies and on the WFD implementation more specifically. 
First, precisely because appraisal tools are not neutral and cannot be separated from 
political ambitions, one may question the relevance of seeking an agreement on the 
technical and methodological aspects of an EU directive at the European level while the 
political dimensions – ambition and costs involved - remain unaddressed. In particular, 
if subsidiarity is acknowledged as the best way to achieve a directive’s objectives, in 
particular due to the provisions on exemptions, it seems contradictory to look for 
common means and tools to reach them. 
Second, I highlighted that CBA may not be the best appraisal tool to use in all countries, 
as it might conflict with predominant political values and beliefs. If practitioners wish to 
use economic appraisal as a real support for informing decisions, instead of justifying 
them ex-post, it may seem desirable to adapt the appraisal tool to the political 
objectives. The outcome of the appraisal can then actually point to the most politically 
desirable solution, not a predefined politically chosen option but one that actually 
optimises the political beliefs and values pursued. For example, multi-criteria analysis, 
that would require negotiation and weighting within river basin committees, might well 
be best adapted to the French case. This however requires a different mindset, accepting 
that decisions might be driven by political values and processes instead of technical 
calculations of costs and benefits. This also implies that political goals be publicly 
debated rather than hidden behind technical tools. 
Likewise, there is a contradiction: while the European Commission recommended one 
specific type of economic analysis to prevent member states from downplaying the 
WFD objectives – in this case CBA – water managers in France had to use CBA 
perfunctorily and symbolically, precisely because the outcome of the CBA performed 
prevented France from being more ambitious. This paradoxical situation questions again 
the pertinence of prescribing specific tools rather than specific ambitions and objectives. 
Decision makers should thus be aware that appraisal tools and economic analysis might 
convey a false impression of neutrality and objectivity (McGarity 1991). This situation 
may lead to several issues. One risk is the depoliticisation of policy making, i.e. a 
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concealment of ethical and fundamentally political stakes behind technical judgements 
(McGarity 1991; Owens et al. 2004; Lascoumes & Le Gales 2007). Another is 
repoliticisation, i.e. the replacement of political values by those of the analyst, through 
the use of economic and appraisal tools (McGarity 1991). Finally, relying on such tools 
to reach decisions might question the legitimacy of decisional outcomes and complicate 
the achievement of consensual agreements (Owens et al. 2004). 
Finally, I underlined the issues that provisions on exemptions in EU directives may 
raise. If the European Commission wish to limit the use of such provisions and avoid 
future infringement procedures, it seems crucial to better define exemptions during the 
negotiation process, or at least to ensure that adequate means are implemented in order 
to specify them at a later stage. Discussions on exemptions should leave the expert 
sphere and consider the political implications in open debates. In particular, addressing 
whether and how the protection of the environment can be prioritised vis-à-vis other 
social or economic policies seems crucial. 
 
6.4 Research limitations  
This research had several limitations. Firstly, the findings of this work may not be fully 
generalisable. Although I chose extreme-case studies so as to provide good contrasting 
evidence and to maximise the scope of the knowledge produced, studying more 
countries would have provided a richer picture. Moreover, the research relies on a 
specific EU policy. This work nonetheless aimed to propose new theoretical suggestions 
on the reasons explaining the uses of policy appraisal tools, based on the in-depth 
comparison of two cases. Its general breadth would deserve to be further tested on other 
case studies and various environmental policies. In particular, the research undertaken is 
very much EU focused. Consequently, further work could look at the use of policy 
appraisal in water management outside Europe for a more general comparison. 
Secondly, practical considerations also had an influence on the outcome of this work. I 
limited my researches to Francophone and Anglophone sources. Therefore, I may have 
missed information that was formulated in other languages. Nevertheless, I am rather 
positive that the impact was negligible on my research: all official EU documents are 
available either in English or French, all interviewees could understand and express 
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themselves in at least one of these two languages, and the countries that I studied in 
detail were England and France. In addition, it may be argued that using the 
snowballing technique to identify interviewees might not be comprehensive. However, I 
took great care to interview representatives of all the relevant organisations involved in 
the process of setting objectives. In fact, several interviews did not directly serve data 
collection but were useful for a better understanding of the political, historical and 
governance context, e.g. on the catchment-based approach in England, or on the role of 
various state and non-state actors in France.  
 
6.5 Future research directions 
Future research could look more closely at the influence of a country’s relationship with 
the EU and its fear of infringement procedure on its use of policy appraisal. As revealed 
by my work, this factor played a particularly important role. Although England and 
France had different positions here, more extreme cases on this precise aspect would 
better enable researchers to isolate this independent variable. In this respect, non-EU 
countries such as Switzerland or Norway would be interesting to analyse. Similarly, 
future work on the use of economic appraisal in the UK in the third WFD management 
cycle would be particularly useful in order to study the influence of Brexit on the use of 
appraisal tools and the process of setting objectives.  
Future work could also explore the use of economic analysis in setting objectives and 
exemptions in other countries. Based on the European Commission’s assessment reports 
and existing literature, I discarded EU countries that did not rely extensively on 
exemptions and disproportionality assessments before 2009. Nevertheless, the reliance 
on disproportionate costs was expected to increase in the second management cycle 
(European Commission & WRc 2015). Therefore, some member states that I cast aside 
for the analysis may well have made an extensive use of exemptions based on 
disproportionate costs in 2015. Similarly, the three clusters of countries identified at the 
start of this research, based on practitioners’ attitudes towards economic analysis, may 
have changed since 2015. This might especially be true when it comes to Eastern 
European member states, on which very little research has been conducted.  
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In addition, I suggested that different tools might be desirable depending on a country’s 
political beliefs. Therefore, future research could classify member states depending on 
their political values and priorities, e.g. the greater importance given to economic 
efficiency, environmental effectiveness, political legitimacy or equity (Adger et al. 
2003). Specific appraisal tools could then be recommended for each cluster of countries. 
For example, researchers could conduct experiments on France to see which tool would 
be best suited to this member state.  
Finally, this research focused on the role of appraisal tools and economic analysis in 
decision-making processes in the field of environmental policies. What this research did 
not study is the suitability of such tools for reaching sustainable decisions. Exemptions 
based on disproportionate costs are in fact cases of trade-offs between environmental 
goals and economic constraints. The WFD encourages a sustainable use of water 
resources (European Commission 2000). The extent to which it requires sustainable 
decisions when it comes to exemptions is not explicit and would require further 
investigation. Some scholars criticize CBA for not taking into account sustainability 
aspects (Messner 2006; Steyaert & Ollivier 2007). Therefore, future research could 
focus on how appraisal tools could better be in line with the sustainability requirements 
of the WFD. This could include adapting existing CBA, developing alternative tools, 
such as multi-criteria analysis (Lahdelma et al. 2000; Buehler 2013), sustainability 
indicators (Briguglio 2003; Nardo et al. 2005; Rametsteiner et al. 2011), or human-scale 
development methods (Jolibert et al. 2009), or even considering alternative decision-
making processes. Consequently, future work could test experimentally these tools and 
see to which extent they could support more sustainable water quality goals. 
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Appendix A: List of interviewees  
 
Table 6: Interviewees 
 
Interview Code Organisation  
INT 01 European Commission (2009-2015) 
INT 02 European Commission (2009-2015) 
INT 03 Academic (2000-2009) 
INT 04 European Environmental Bureau (2009-2015) 
INT 05 Member State (FR) and European Commission (2000-2009) 
INT 06 Member State (FR) (2000-2009) 
INT 07 Member State (Spain) (1996-2000) 
INT 08 Member State (Spain) (2000-2009) 
INT 09 Academic (2009-2015) 
INT 10 European Commission and Consultant 
INT 11 Member State (2000-2009) 
INT 12 European Commission (1996-2000) 
INT 13 European Commission (1996-2000) 
INT 14 Academic (2000-2009) 
INT 15 European Commission (2009-2015) 
INT 16 European Commission (2009-2015) 
INT-EN01*,° Defra 
INT-EN02 Environment Agency 
INT-EN03*,° Formerly Environment Agency 
INT-EN04*,° Formerly Environment Agency 
INT-EN05*,° Environment Agency 
INT-EN06*,° Environment Agency 
INT-EN07*,° Aire Rivers Trust 
INT-EN08*,° Formerly Environment Agency 
INT-EN09*,° Environment Agency 
INT-EN10*,° World Wildlife Fund UK 
INT-EN11 National Farmer Union 
INT-EN12*,° Consumer Council for Water 
INT-EN13 Natural England 
INT-EN14 Catchment Based Approach Support Group 
INT-EN15* Independent Consultancy and Catchment Based Approach Support Group 
INT-EN16* Yorkshire Water 
INT-EN17° Country Landowner Association 
INT-EN18*,° Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
INT-EN19 Yorkshire Wildlife Trust 
INT-EN20 Water UK 
INT-EN21*,° Environment Agency 
INT-FR01° Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and the Sea  
INT-FR02*,° Water Agency Artois-Picardy  
INT-FR03*,° Water Agency Artois-Picardy 
INT-FR04*,° Water Agency Artois-Picardy 
INT-FR05*,° Water Agency Artois-Picardy 
INT-FR06*,° Water Agency Seine-Normandy 
INT-FR07*,° Water Agency Seine-Normandy 
INT-FR08 Water Agency Seine-Normandy 
INT-FR09*,° Water Agency Rhine-Meuse 
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INT-FR10*,° Water Agency Rhine-Meuse 
INT-FR11 Water Agency Rhine-Meuse 
INT-FR12*,° Formerly Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and the Sea  
INT-FR13*,° Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and the Sea  
INT-FR14*,° Formerly Water Agency Rhine-Meuse 
INT-FR15 ASCA 
INT-FR16 National Office for Water and Aquatic Environments, University Paris 1 
INT-FR17*,° Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and the Sea  
INT-FR18 Regional and Interdepartmental Directorate for Environment and Energy 
INT-FR19* Water Agency Rhine-Meuse 
INT-FR20° Sustainable Development Institute and International Relations 
INT-FR21° National Office for Water and Aquatic Environments / French Agency for 
Biodiversity  
INT-FR22*,° Water Agency Adour-Garonne 
INT-FR23*,° Water Agency Loire-Brittany 
INT-FR24*,° Water Agency Rhone and Coastal Mediterranean Corsica/ Formerly 
Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and the Sea 
INT-FR25*,° Water Agency Rhone and Coastal Mediterranean Corsica 
INT-FR26° Water Agency Rhone and Coastal Mediterranean Corsica 
INT-FR27*,° Water Agency Rhone and Coastal Mediterranean Corsica 
 
 
INT 01 to INT 16 were conducted for research at EU level (Chapter 3).  
 
INT-EN and INT-FR were performed for research at member states level (Chapter 4 
and 5). Interviewees marked with * provided relevant data for Chapter 4. Interviewees 
marked with ° were used in Chapter 5. Other interviewees helped to understand the 
research context (e.g. water governance in France and England, historical background, 
political framework and priorities, existing water laws).  
 
 
	 190	
Appendix B: List of policy documents 
 
Table 7: Documents used in Chapter 3 
 
Author Date Title Type of 
document 
Source 
Negotiation phase (Time period: 1997-2000) 
Committee of the 
Regions 
1997-02-01 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the ‘Communication to the Council 
and the European Parliament on European Community Water Policy’ 
Opinion EUR-Lex1 
Committee of the 
Regions 
1998-03-12 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the ‘Proposal for a Council 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of Water Policy’ 
Opinion EUR-Lex 
Conciliation Committee 2000-05-23 1997/0067(COD) – 23/05/2000 Formal meeting of conciliation committee Minutes EUR-Lex 
Conciliation Committee 2000-06-29 Parliament-Council Conciliation Committee, Agreement on Water Framework 
Directive, Conseil/00/232 
Press release EUR-Lex 
Conciliation Committee 2000-07-18 Joint text approved by the Conciliation Committee provided for in Article 251(4) 
of the EC Treaty  
Legal text EUR-Lex 
Council 1998-06-16 2106th Council meeting – ENVIRONMENT  Minutes Consilium2 
Council 1999-02-19 Amended proposal for Council Directive establishing a framework for 
Community action in the field of water policy - common position, from General 
Secretariat to Permanent Representatives Committee  
Common Position Consilium 
Council 1999-03-02 Amended proposal for Council Directive establishing a framework for 
Community action in the field of water policy - common position, from Permanent 
Representatives Committee to Council 
Common Position Consilium 
Council 1999-03-11 2165th Council meeting –ENVIRONMENT Minutes Consilium 																																																								
1 eur-lex.europa.eu 
2 consilium.europa.eu 
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Council 1999-09-30 Common Position adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework 
for Community action in the field of water policy - Draft statement of the 
Council's reasons 
Statement Consilium 
Council 1999-10-22 Common Position (EC) No… /1999 adopted by the Council on 22 October 1999 
with a view to the adoption of a Directive 1999… /EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing a framework for Community action in the field of 
water policy 
Common Position Consilium 
Council 2000-02-09 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy - 
Second reading of the European Parliament, Outcome of proceedings of the 
Environment Working Party 
Outcome of 
proceedings 
Consilium 
Council 2000-03-03 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive establishing a 
framework for a Community action in the field of water policy - examination of 
EP amendments (second reading), Introductory note from general secretariat to 
permanent representatives committee 
Note Consilium 
Council 2000-03-22 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework 
for Community action in the field of water policy - Interpretation of the second 
and fourth indent of Article 1 of the Water  Framework Directive, Opinion of 
the legal service 
Opinion of the 
legal service 
Consilium 
Council 2000-04-18 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy − 
Convening of the Conciliation Committee, from General Secretariat of the 
Council to the Council 
Note Consilium 
Council 2000-06-27 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework 
for Community action in the field of water policy (97/0067/COD)  - Article 9(4), 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE LEGAL SERVICE TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE COMMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES  
Opinion of the 
legal service 
Consilium 
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Council 2000-07-14 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy 
(97/0067/COD) – Article 4, Contribution of the legal service to the preparation of 
the conciliation committee by the representatives of the members of the council 
Opinion of the 
legal service 
Consilium 
Council 2000-08-25 Adoption by the written procedure of a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a framework for Community action in the field of 
water policy, from General Secretariat of the Council to the Permanent 
Representative Committee (Part I) / Council 
Note Consilium 
Council 2000-08-25 Adoption by the written procedure of a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a framework for Community action in the field of 
water policy – Commission statement, from General Secretariat of the Council to 
the Permanent Representative Committee / Council 
Note Consilium 
Economic and Social 
Committee 
1997-01-30 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Decision creating a network for the epidemiological 
surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the European Community' 
(97/C 30/01) 
Opinion EUR-Lex 
Economic and Social 
Committee 
1997-10-01 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a Council 
Directive establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water 
policy' (97/C 355/16)  
Opinion EUR-Lex 
European Commission 1996-02-21 
 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, European Community Water Policy 
Communication  
European Commission 1997-02-26 Proposal for a Council Directive establishing a framework for Community action 
in the field of water policy 
Proposal EUR-Lex 
European Commission 1998-02-17 
 
Amended proposal for a Council Directive establishing a framework for 
Community action in the field of water policy (COM(97) 49 final) (98/C 108/17) 
Amended 
proposal 
EUR-Lex 
European Commission 1999-06-17 Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy (COM(97) 49 final) 
(1999/C 342 E/01) 
Amended 
proposal 
EUR-Lex 
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European Commission 1999-10-26 1997/0067(COD) - 26/10/1999 Commission communication on Council's position  Communication EUR-Lex 
European Commission 2000-06-05 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION pursuant to Article 251 (2) (c) of the EC 
Treaty, on the European Parliament's amendments to the Council's common 
position regarding the Proposal for a EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE establishing a framework for Community action in the 
field of water policy (COM (97)49 final, COM(97)614 final, COM(98)76 final 
and COM(99)271 final) AMENDING THE PROPOSAL OF THE 
COMMISSION pursuant to Article 250 (2) of the EC Treaty  
Opinion EUR-Lex 
European Commission 2000-07-26 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE, Pricing policies for enhancing the sustainability of water resources  
Communication EUR-Lex 
European Commission 2000-07-26 1997/0067(COD) - 26/07/2000 Document attached to the procedure  Note EUR-Lex 
European Parliament 1998-06-24 1997/0067(COD) - 24/06/1998 Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading  
 
Minutes European 
Parliament 
website3 
European Parliament 1998-07-08 REPORT on the proposal and the amended proposals for a Council Directive on 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy 
(COM(97)0049 - C4-0192/97, COM(97)0614 - C4-0120/98 and COM(98)0076 - 
C4-0121/98 - 97/0067(SYN)), Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection 
Report European 
Parliament 
website 
European Parliament 1999-02-11 Legislative resolution embodying Parliament's opinion on the proposal and 
amended proposals for a Council Directive establishing a framework for 
Community action in the field of water policy (COM(97)0049 C4-0192/97, 
COM(97)0614 C4- 0120/98 and COM(98)0076 C4-0121/98 97/0067(SYN)) 
(Cooperation procedure: first reading) 
Legislative 
resolution 
European 
Parliament 
website 
European Parliament 1999-02-11 1997/0067(COD)-11/02/1999 Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single Minutes European 																																																								
3 europarl.europa.eu 
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reading Parliament 
website 
European Parliament 2000-01-25 1997/0067(COD) - 25/01/2000 Vote in committee, 2nd reading  
 
Minutes European 
Parliament 
website 
European Parliament 2000-02-02 RECOMMENDATION FOR SECOND READING on the common position 
adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a European Parliament and 
Council directive on establishing a framework for Community action in the field 
of water policy (9085/3/1999 – C5-0209/1999 – 1997/0067(COD))  
Recommendation European 
Parliament 
website 
European Parliament 2000-02-15 Debates - Community policy in the field of water  
 
Debates 
(transcript) 
European 
Parliament 
website 
European Parliament 2000-02-16 European Parliament legislative resolution on the common position adopted by the 
Council with a view to the adoption of a European Parliament and Council 
directive establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water 
policy (9085/3/1999 ! C5-0209/1999 ! 1997/0067(COD)) (Codecision procedure: 
second reading) 
Legislative 
resolution 
European 
Parliament 
website 
European Parliament 2000-02-16 1997/0067(COD) - 16/02/2000 Text adopted by Parliament, 2nd reading  
 
 
Minutes European 
Parliament 
website 
European Parliament 2000-08-29 REPORT on the joint text approved by the Conciliation Committee for a European 
Parliament and Council directive establishing a framework for Community action 
in the field of water policy (C5-0347/2000 – 1997/0067(COD)), European 
Parliament delegation to the Conciliation Committee 
Report European 
Parliament 
website 
European Parliament 2000-09-06 Debates – Water Policy Minutes European 
Parliament 
website 
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Preparation phase (Time period: 2000-2009) 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2001-05-02 STRATEGIC DOCUMENT AS AGREED BY THE WATER DIRECTORS 
UNDER SWEDISH PRESIDENCY  
Strategic 
Document 
CIRCABC4 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2003-06-17 Carrying forward the Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework 
Directive -Progress and Work Programme for 2003 and 2004- AS AGREED BY 
THE WATER DIRECTORS 
Work 
Programme 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2004-12-02 Moving to the next stage in  Common Implementation Strategy for the Water 
Framework Directive. Progress and work programme for 2005 and 2006 AS 
AGREED BY THE WATER DIRECTORS 
Work 
Programme 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2006-12-01 Improving the comparability and quality of the Water Framework Directive 
implementation, Progress and work programme for 2007-2009 AS AGREED BY 
THE WATER DIRECTORS 
Work 
Programme 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy, Working Group 
2.6 - WATECO 
2003 
 
Guidance document n° 1 Economics and the environment, The implementation 
challenge of the Water Framework Directive  
 
Guidance 
document 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy, Working Group 
2.2 - HMWB 
2003 Guidance document n° 4, Identification and Designation of Heavily Modified and 
Artificial Water Bodies  
 
Guidance 
document 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy, Working Group 
2B: Drafting Group 
ECO1  
2004 Information Sheet on River Basin characterization: Economic analysis of water uses 
(Art 5 Annex III)  
 
 
Information 
sheet 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy, Working Group 
2B: Drafting Group 
ECO2 
2004 Assessment of Environmental and Resource Costs in the Water Framework 
Directive  
 
 
Information 
sheet 
CIRCABC 
																																																								
4 circabc.europa.eu 
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Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2005 ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES UNDER THE WATER FRAMEWORK 
DIRECTIVE, POLICY SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND DOCUMENT  
Background 
document 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy, CEA Drafting 
Group 
2006 Cost Effectiveness Analysis document 
 
Policy Summary CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2007 Policy Paper, EXEMPTIONS TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
UNDER THE WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE, Article 4.4 (extension of 
deadlines), 4.5 (less stringent objectives) and 4.6 (temporary deterioration) 
Policy paper CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2007 Policy paper, EXEMPTIONS TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
UNDER THE WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE allowed for new 
modifications or new sustainable human development activities (WFD Article 4.7)  
Policy paper CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2009 Guidance Document No. 20, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ON EXEMPTIONS TO 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES  
Guidance 
document 
CIRCABC 
European Commission 2002 The Water Framework Directive Tap into it! Communication 
document 
CIRCABC 
European Commission 2007-03-22 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying document to the  
Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament And The 
Council, ‘Towards Sustainable Water Management in the European Union' First 
stage in the implementation of the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC  
Communication 
document 
CIRCABC 
European Commission 2007-03-22 Water Policy: Member States must do more to achieve good water quality  Synthesis CIRCABC 
Institute for Integrated 
Water Management and 
Wastewater 
Treatment/RIZA  
2004 Environmental and Resource Costs and the Water Framework Directive, An 
overview of European practices 
Workshop 
proceedings 
CIRCABC 
Bundesministerium für 
Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit 
2004-08-15 European workshop on WFD implementation – Status of IMPRESS and economic 
analysis, 16 – 18 June 2004 in Mannheim, Germany 
Workshop 
proceedings 
CIRCABC 
Bundesministerium für 2005 Water Framework Directive Objectives Workshop 26th – 27th of May 2005 in Workshop CIRCABC 
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Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit 
Berlin, Germany  proceedings 
VITO 2006 First Workshop on Cost Benefit Analysis on the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive, Brussels, 20 November 2006 
Workshop 
Minutes 
CIRCABC 
VITO 2007 Costs and Benefits associated with the implementation of the Water Framework 
Directive, with a special focus on agriculture: Final Report, Study for DG 
Environment 
Report CIRCABC 
Ecologic 2008 Input Paper for the workshop on 10/11 April 2008 in Copenhagen, DK Input paper CIRCABC 
Danish Ministry of the 
Environment 
2008 Workshop on Disproportional Costs and Exemptions to the Environmental 
Objectives under the Water Framework Directive, Article 4.4 – 4.6 , 10/11 April 
2008 in Copenhagen, DK 
Workshop 
proceedings 
CIRCABC 
European Commission 2009 Plunge Into The Debate, 2nd European Water Conference 2-3 April 2009  Conference 
Report 
CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2001-05-02 Informal meeting of water directors of the European Union 
Sweden, May 2 & 3, 2001 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2001-11-08 Informal meeting of Water Directors of the European Union 
Ghent - Belgium, November 8 & 9, 2001 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2002-06-11 Informal meeting of Water Directors of the European Union, Norway, Switzerland 
and Candidate Countries, Valencia - Spain, 11 and 12 June 2002 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2003-11-24 Informal meeting of Water Directors of the European Union, Acceding, Candidate 
and EFTA Countries, Rome - Italy, 24 and 25 November 2003 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2003 Final conclusions of the Water Directors (WD) on the agreement of the economic 
guidance documents to be included in the foreword of the guidance 
Agreement  CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2004-12-02 Informal meeting of Water Directors of the European Union, Candidate and EFTA 
Countries, Amsterdam - Netherlands, 02-03 December 2004 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2005-06-20 Informal meeting of Water Directors of the European Union, Candidate and EFTA 
Countries, Mondorf-les-Bains, Luxembourg, 20 June 2005 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2006-06-01 Informal meeting of Water Directors of the European Union, Candidate and EFTA Minutes CIRCABC 
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Countries, Salzburg, 1/2 June 2006 
Water Directors 2006-11-30 Informal Meeting of Water Directors of the European Union, Candidate and EFTA 
Countries, Inari, 30 November /1 December 2006 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2007-06-18 Informal meeting of Water Directors of the European Union, Candidate and EFTA 
Countries, Dresden, 18/19 June 2007 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2007 Towards a common understanding on disproportionate costs, Conclusions of 
discussions under on agenda item 2.3 in relation to disproportionality 
Agreement CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2008-06-17 Conclusions on Exemptions and Disproportionate Costs, Water Directors’ meeting 
under Slovenian Presidency, Brdo, 16-17 June 2008 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2008-11-24 Informal meeting of Water Directors of the European Union, Candidate and EFTA 
Countries, Paris, 24-25 November 2008 
Agreement CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2009-05-28 Informal meeting of Water and Marine Directors of the European Union, Candidate 
and EFTA Countries, Brno, 28-29 May 2009  
Minutes CIRCABC 
WWF, EEB 2004 ‘Tips And Tricks’ For Water Framework Directive Implementation  Report  
WWF, EEB 2005 EU Water Policy: Making The Water Framework Directive Work The Quality Of 
National Transposition And Implementation Of The Water Framework Directive At 
The End Of 2004  
Report  
WWF, EEB 2009 What future for EU’s Water? Indicator based assessment of the draft River Basin 
Management Plans under the EU Water Framework Directive  
Report  
 
Implementation phase (Time period: 2009-2015) 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2009 Work Programme 2010-2012 As agreed by the Water Directors – 30 November 
2009, 'Supporting the implementation of the first river basin management plans'  
Work 
Programme 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2010-10-19 Background paper to the workshop: “CIS-Workshop on WFD-economics: taking 
stock and looking ahead” 19-20 October 2010 – Palais des Congrès, Liege 
(Belgium)  
Background 
paper 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2010 Report on project to gather SCG members' views of the experience in the 
implementation of the economic aspects of the WFD – questionnaire and 
Questionnaire 
results 
CIRCABC 
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interview results 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2011-09-13 Water management, Water Framework Directive & Hydropower, Common 
Implementation Strategy Workshop Brussels, 13-14 September 2011  
Issue Paper  
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2012 Work Programme 2013-2015, 'Strengthening the implementation of EU water 
policy through the second river basin management plans'  
Work 
Programme 
CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2014-03-20 Working group WATECO- Meeting minutes Minutes CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2014-10-17 Draft document on affordability-version 2 Draft document CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2014-10-20 Working group WATECO- Meeting minutes Minutes CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2015-02-17 Draft document on affordability-version 3 Draft document CIRCABC 
Common Implementation 
Strategy 
2015-02-23 WG Economics – 3rd meeting - 23 February 2015 Minutes CIRCABC 
Council 2011-06-21 3103rd Council meeting Environment  Press Release Consilium 
European Environment 
Agency 
2012 European waters — current status and future challenges, EEA Report No 9/2012  Report European 
Agency 
Website 
European Court of Justice 2013-08-22 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) 
lodged on 22 August 2013 – Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. 
v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-461/13) 
Request CURIA5 
European Court of Justice 2014-10-23 OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JÄÄSKINEN delivered on 23 October 
2014 (1) Case C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Opinion CURIA 
European Court of Justice 2015-08-21 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 July 2015 (request for a preliminary Judgment CURIA 																																																								
5 http://curia.europa.eu 
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ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht — Germany) — Bund für Umwelt und 
Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-461/13) 
European Court of Justice 2015-09-03 CONCLUSIONS DE L’AVOCAT GÉNÉRAL Mme Juliane Kokott présentées le 
3 septembre 2015 (1) Affaire C-346/14 Commission européenne contre 
République d’Autriche  
Conclusions CURIA 
European Commission 2011 Support to Fitness Check Water Policy  Report CIRCABC 
European Commission 2012 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, A 
Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources  
Communication CIRCABC 
European Commission 2012 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, A 
Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources  
Communication CIRCABC 
European Commission 2012 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN  
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, A 
Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources  
Communication CIRCABC 
European Commission 2012 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND THE COUNCIL on the Implementation of the Water Framework Directive 
(2000/60/EC) River Basin Management Plans 
Report CIRCABC 
European Commission 2012 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT European Overview (1/2), 
Accompanying the document, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the Implementation of 
Report CIRCABC 
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the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) River Basin Management Plans  
European Commission 2012 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT European Overview (2/2), 
Accompanying the document, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the Implementation of 
the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) River Basin Management Plans  
Report CIRCABC 
European Commission 2012 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT The Fitness Check of EU 
Freshwater Policy  
Report CIRCABC 
European Commission 2015 Screening Assessment of Draft Second Cycle River Basin Management Plans Report CIRCABC 
European Commission 2015 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, Report on the progress in 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive Programmes of Measures, 
Accompanying the document, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL, The Water 
Framework Directive and the Floods Directive: Actions towards the 'good status' 
of EU water and to reduce flood risks  
Report CIRCABC 
European Commission 2015 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL, The Water Framework Directive and the 
Floods Directive: Actions towards the 'good status' of EU water and to reduce 
flood risks  
Report CIRCABC 
European Commission 2015 SPEECH - 19 NOVEMBER 2015 European Parliament Water Group Dinner  Speech CIRCABC 
European Commission 2015 4th European Water Conference Brussels, 23-24 March 2015  
 
 
Conference 
report 
European 
Commission 
website 
Eftec 2010 Scoping Study on the Economic (or Non-Market) Valuation Issues and the 
Implementation of the Water Framework Directive, Final report 
Consultancy 
report 
European 
Commission 
website 
EPI Water 2013 ECONOMIC POLICY INSTRUMENTS in European water policy Consultancy 
report 
European 
Commission 
website 
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Acteon 2012 Comparative study of pressures and measures in the major river basin 
management plans in the EU, Task 4 b: Costs & Benefits of WFD 
implementation, Financing Water Management and the Economic Crisis – A 
review of available evidence, Final report  
Consultancy 
report 
European 
Commission 
website 
Acteon 2012 Comparative study of pressures and measures in the major river basin 
management plans in the EU, Task 4 b: Costs & Benefits of WFD 
implementation, Recommendations for filling the (economics) knowledge gap  
Consultancy 
report 
European 
Commission 
website 
Acteon 2012 Comparative study of pressures and measures in the major river basin 
management plans in the EU, Task 4 b: Costs & Benefits of WFD 
implementation, Guidance note on the assessment and reporting of costs and 
benefits  
Consultancy 
report 
European 
Commission 
website 
Acteon 2012 Comparative study of pressures and measures in the major river basin 
management plans in the EU, Task 4 b: Costs & Benefits of WFD 
implementation: Final Report 
Consultancy 
report 
European 
Commission 
website 
Water Directors 2009-05-28 Informal meeting of Water and Marine Directors of the European Union, 
Candidate and EFTA Countries, Brno, 28-29 May 2009 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2009-12-01 Informal meeting of Water and Marine Directors of the European Union, 
Candidate and EFTA Countries, Malmö, 30 November – 1 December 2009  
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2012-03-29 Extraordinary informal meeting of EU Water Directors, 29 March, 2012, 
Borschette Centre, Brussels 
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2012-06-04 Informal meeting of Water and Marine Directors of the European Union, 
Candidate and EFTA Countries, Copenhagen, 4-5 June 2012  
Minutes CIRCABC 
Water Directors 2013-12-04 Informal meeting of Water and Marine Directors of the European Union, 
Candidate and EFTA Countries, Vilnius, 4th and 5th of December 2013 
Minutes CIRCABC 
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Table 8: Documents used in Chapter 4  
Doc	N°	 Author	 Date	 Title	1	 ACTeon,	ABP	mer,	The	Andersons	Centre,	&	RPA	 2015	 Assessing	affordability	of	measures	to	meet	Water	Framework	Directive	requirements	in	England	2	 Agence	de	l'eau	Adour-Garonne	 Undated	 Synthèse	de	l’étude	coûts	disproportionnés	réalisée	pour	le	second	cycle	de	la	DCE.	3	 Agence	de	l'eau	Adour-Garonne,	IREEDD,	&	Cereg	 2015	 Analyse	des	Couts	Disproportionnes	pour	les	Masses	D’eau	Impactees	par	des	Pollutions	Industrielles	et	/	ou	Domestiques,	Rapport	de	phase	2,	Analyse	détaillée	de	4	masses	d’eau	4	 Agence	de	l'eau	Adour-Garonne,	&	SCE	 2009		 Analyse	du	coût	disproportionné	pour	les	masses	d’eau	impactées	par	des	pollutions	industrielles	et/ou	domestiques,	Rapport	provisoire.	5	 Agence	de	l'eau	Adour-Garonne,	&	SCE	 2009		 Analyse	du	coût	disproportionné	pour	les	masses	d’eau	impactées	par	des	pollutions	industrielles	et/ou	domestiques,	Synthèse.	6	 Agence	de	l'eau	Artois-Picardie	 Undated	 Synthèse	de	la	justification	des	dérogations	utilisées	sur	le	bassin	Artois	Picardie	7	 Agence	de	l'eau	Artois-Picardie,	DIREN	Nord-Pas-de-Calais,	EcoWhat,	&	EcoDecision	 2009	 Les	avantages	économiques	au	bon	état	écologique	de	l’eau.	8	 Agence	de	l'eau	Artois-Picardie,	&	EcoLogique	Conseil	 2015	 Réalisation	d’une	analyse	coûts-bénéfices	des	mesures	complémentaires	prévisionnelles	2016-2021	sur	des	groupes	de	masses	d’eau	cohérents	du	bassin	Artois-Picardie,	susceptibles	de	faire	l’objet	de	demandes	de	dérogations	dans	le	cadre	de	la	mise	à	jour	du	programme	de	mesures	du	SDAGE	(2016-2021),	Rapport	final.	9	 Agence	de	l'eau	Rhin-Meuse	 2010	 Note	méthodologique	relative	aux	analyses	économiques	menées	dans	le	cadre	du	programme	de	mesures.	10	 Agence	de	l'eau	Rhin-Meuse	 2015	 Note	méthodologique	relative	aux	analyses	économiques	menées	dans	le	cadre	du	programme	de	mesures	et	de	la	détermination	des	objectifs	environnementaux.		11	 Agence	de	l'eau	Rhin-Meuse	 2015	 Note	méthodologique	de	justification	des	objectifs	moins	stricts	pour	le	deuxième	cycle	12	 Agence	de	l'eau	Rhin-Meuse	 2016	 Note	méthodologique	de	définition	des	objectifs	environnementaux	assignés	aux	
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European	Commission	 2012	 Report	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council	on	the	Implementation	of	the	Water	Framework	Directive	(2000/60/EC),	River	Basin	Management	Plans,	Commission	Staff	document,	Member	State:	United	Kingdom,	Accompanying	the	document,	European	Commission.		European	Commission	 Undated	 Common	Implementation	Strategy	For	The	Water	Framework	Directive	(2000/60/EC)	And	The	Floods	Directive	(2007/60/EC),	Strengthening	the	implementation	of	EU	water	policy	through	the	second	river	basin	management	plans,	Work	Programme	2013-2015.		European	Commission,	WRc	 2015	 Screening	Assessment	of	Draft	Second	Cycle	River	Basin	Management	Plans.		HM	Government	 2011	 The	Natural	Choice:	securing	the	value	of	nature	HM	Treasury	 2003	 THE	GREEN	BOOK,	Appraisal	and	Evaluation	in	Central	Government,	Treasury	Guidance,	London	House	of	Commons	 2015	 Water	Framework	Directive:	achieving	good	status	of	water	bodies.	Kouyoumdjian,	C.	 2014	 Justification	économique	des	reports	de	délais	d’atteinte	du	bon	état	pour	les	masses	d’eau	du	bassin	Seine-Normandie	dans	le	cadre	de	la	DCE.		Large,	A.	 2008	 Justification	des	dérogations	économiques	à	l’atteinte	du	bon	état	des	eaux	en	Seine-Normandie.	Approche	à	différentes	échelles.	Mémoire	de	fin	d’étude.	Levraut,	A-M.	 2013	 Évaluation	de	la	politique	de	l’eau.	Metclafe,	J.	 2013	 The	National	Water	Environment	Benefits	Survey	Values,	A	briefing	note.	Ministère	De	L'Ecologie,	De	L'Energie	et	Du	Développement	Durable	 Undated	 Retour	d’expérience	sur	l’économie	dans	les	SDAGE	Ministère	De	L'Ecologie,	De	L'Energie	et	Du	Développement	Durable		 2009	 Guide	méthodologique	de	justification	des	exemptions	prévues	par	la	directive	cadre	sur	l'eau.	Ministère	De	L'Ecologie,	Du	Développement	Durable	Et	De	L'Energie.	 2012	 Mise	en	œuvre	de	la	directive-cadre	sur	l’eau,	Pour	un	bon	état	des	eaux	en	2015.	Ministère	De	L'Ecologie,	Du	Développement	Durable	Et	De	L'Energie	 2014	 Guide	méthodologique	de	justification	des	dérogations	prévues	par	la	directive	cadre	sur	l'eau.	Ministère	De	L'Ecologie,	Du	Développement	 2014	 Guide	Programme	de	Mesures	
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Durable	Et	De	L'Energie	Ministère	De	L'Ecologie,	Du	Développement	Durable	Et	De	L'Energie	 2014	 Instruction	du	Gouvernement	du	22	avril	2014	relative	à	la	mise	à	jour	des	schémas	directeurs	d'aménagement	et	de	gestion	des	eaux	et	des	programmes	de	mesures	associés.	Ministère	De	L'Ecologie,	Du	Développement	Durable	Et	De	L'Energie	 2015	 Guide	DCE	Programme	de	Mesures,	Guide	pour	l’élaboration,	la	mise	en	œuvre	et	le	suivi	du	programmes	de	mesures	en	application	de	la	Directive	Cadre	sur	l'Eau.	Ministère	De	L'Ecologie	Et	Du	Développement	Durable	 2005	 Evaluer	les	bénéfices	environnementaux	sur	les	masses	d'eau.	Ministère	de	l’Ecologie	et	Du	Développement	Durable	 2006	 Circulaire	DCE	2006/17	relative	à	l'élaboration,	au	contenu	et	à	la	portée	des	programmes	de	mesures	Nera,	Accent	 2007	 Collaborative	Research	Programme	On	River	Basin	Management	Planning	Economics,	Report	on	The	Benefits	of	Water	Framework	Directive	Programmes	of	Measures	in	England	and	Wales.	Regulatory	Impact	Unit	 2003	 Better	Policy	Making:	a	Guide	to	Regulatory	Impact	Assessment.	Secrétariat	Technique	de	Bassin	Loire-Bretagne	 2014	 Programme	de	mesures	2016-2021	:	principes	d’élaboration,	Note	de	cadrage	Secrétariat	Technique	de	Bassin	Seine-Normandie	 2013	 Méthode	de	construction	du	programme	de	mesures	2016-2021	Stanley,	K.,	Depaoli,	G.,	Strosser,	P.	 2012	 Comparative	study	of	pressures	and	measures	in	the	major	river	basin	management	plans	in	the	EU,	Task	4	b	-	Costs	&	Benefits	of	WFD	implementation,	Financing	Water	Management	and	the	Economic	Crisis	–	A	review	of	available	evidence,	Final	report.		
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Appendix C: Codebook 
 
Table 10: Codebook used for the meta-analysis 
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Appendix D: Update of the meta-analysis 
 
Since Chapter 2 was published as a research paper in early 2016, I provide here an 
update on the WFD literature until 1/11/2017. The articles added are displayed in 
Table 11. The new sample is composed of 112 articles. 
 
Table 11: Articles added to the sample 
Source articles considered Countries studied Key themes 
Borrego-Marin & Riesgo 2016 Spain Planning process 
Carlander et al. 2016 Sweden Participation 
Domorenok 2017 Italy Participation 
Feichtinger & Pregernig 2016  Austria Participation 
Francés et al. 2017 Spain Policy integration 
Fritsch 2016 UK Participation, policy integration 
Graversgaard et al. 2016 Denmark Participation 
Graversgaard et al. 2017 Denmark Participation, economic analysis 
Hernandez-Mora et al. 2015 Spain Participation 
Jager 2016 Germany River basin management, 
Economic analysis  
Jager et al. 2016 Germany, Sweden, 
Poland, France 
Participation, River basin 
management  
Keskitalo 2015  Sweden Planning process 
Kochskämper 2016 Germany Participation 
Maia 2017 Portugal WFD in general 
Matti et al. 2017  Sweden Participation 
Michels 2016  Netherlands Participation 
Newig et al. 2016  Germany Participation 
Robins et al. 2017 Australia Participation, planning process, 
policy integration 
Rolston et al. 2017 Ireland Participation 
Sevä & Sandström 2017 Sweden Planning process 
Söderberg 2016 Sweden Planning process, policy 
integration 
Watson 2015 UK Participation, Planning process 
Zingraff-Hamed et al. 2017 Germany Planning process 
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The results and trends observed with this new sample are very similar to the ones 
previously identified. A few changes however deserve to be highlighted. Regarding 
publication patterns, 43 per cent of first authors now come from the UK or Germany. 
Authors from Spain and Sweden have now published almost as many papers as those 
from the Netherlands. This second cluster of authors wrote 32 per cent of all papers. 
Moreover, the number of articles published per year remains high since 2011 but 
seems to stagnate around twelve. In this context, 73 per cent of articles were released 
after 2011 and 51 per cent in the last five years. Regarding the object of study, we still 
observe a strong imbalance in the choice of countries. Member states from Eastern 
Europe in particular remain widely understudied. Amongst the most researched 
countries, the UK and Germany remain ahead with 54 articles on a total of 112. The 
Netherlands now belongs to the second most studied cluster of countries, along with 
Spain and Sweden, with a total of 48 publications. Denmark and France slowly 
emerge as a third cluster with 17 publications. In addition, most studies now focus on 
the national level, while researches interested in the river basin or catchment level are 
now equally numerous. Finally, as one could expect, there is an increasing number of 
publications studying the implementation of the first RBMPs and a few of them the 
preparation of the second management cycle. Results regarding methods and theory 
only changed marginally. 
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Appendix E: WFD negotiation history 
 
Figure 11: Timeline of WFD history 
 
 
Table 12: Main steps of the WFD negotiation process, Sources: Kaika and Page 
2003; Eur-Lex 
 	 Date Institution Event / Document 21/02/1996 European Commission Communication on European Water Policy 
30/01/1997 Economic and Social 
Committee 
Opinion on the Communication 
01/02/1997 Committee of the Regions Opinion on the Communication 
26/02/1997 European Commission Proposal for a Water Framework Directive 
01/10/1997 Economic and Social 
Committee 
Opinion on the proposal for a Water Framework 
Directive 
26/11/1997 European Commission Amended proposal following consultation 
17/02/1998 European Commission Amended proposal (Annex V) 
12/03/1998 Committee of the Regions Opinion on the proposal for a Water Framework 
Directive 
16/06/1998 Council  Adopts a common position 
08/07/1998 European Parliament, 
Environment Committee 
Report: Recommendations for 1st reading 
11/02/1999 European Parliament 1st reading 
11/03/1999 Council Agrees on a common position 
17/06/1999 European Commission Amended Proposal 
22/10/1999 Council Adopts a common position 
02/02/2000 European Parliament Report: Recommendations for 2nd reading 
16/02/2000 European Parliament 2nd reading 
23/05/2000 Conciliation Committee Formal meeting 
05/06/2000 European Commission Opinion on the European Parliament’s 2nd 
reading 
29/06/2000 Conciliation Committee Agreement on a common text 
18/07/2000 Conciliation Committee Join text approved 
07/09/2000 European Parliament 3rd reading 
October 
2000 
 Publication of the Water Framework Directive 
(2000/60/EC) 
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Appendix F: Detailed analysis of the economic analyses performed in England and France 
 
F.1.	Overview	of	the	method	used		England	 1st	cycle	CBA	were	mainly	performed	at	the	national	and	river	basin	levels	in	the	impact	assessment	framework.	Impact	assessments	mainly	 focused	on	 the	 level	 of	 ambition	 to	 set	 for	 2015	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	deadline	 extensions	 should	be	used	 (INT-EN01).	The	national	 impact	 assessment	 compared	 the	 costs	 and	benefits	of	 the	 ‘do	nothing’	 option	with	 those	of	 achieving	good	 status.	 The	 final	 river	 basin	 impact	 assessments	 compared	 the	 objectives	 set	 in	 the	 RBMPs	 for	 the	 1st	 cycle	 with	 a	reference	case	(30).	Disproportionate	costs	were	used	in	three	different	cases,	i.e.	when	there	was:	
• an	unfavourable	balance	of	costs	and	benefits,	
• a	significant	risk	that	costs	be	higher	than	benefits	(uncertainty),	
• disproportionate	burdens.	The	second	argument	(uncertainty)	was	the	most	largely	used	(39).	2nd	cycle	In	the	second	cycle,	numerous	CBA	were	produced	at	the	“operational”	catchment	level,	leading	to	over	330	CBA	(INT-EN05).	
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The	EA	produced	national	guidance	(44)	and	spread	sheets	 for	 its	 local	 teams.	EA	regional	staff	was	trained	to	perform	the	appraisals,	in	particular	through	an	online	audio	presentation	(46).	This	process	was	very	resource	and	time	consuming	(INT-EN01;	INT-EN05).		The	 CBA	 relied	 on	 a	 step-wise	 process.	 A	 qualitative	 analysis	which	 relied	 on	 an	 ecosystem	 services	 framework	was	 first	performed.	The	net	present	value	was	calculated	based	on	costs	and	different	possible	degrees	of	benefits	monetisation.	As	a	result,	 less	 stringent	 objectives	were	 set	when	 costs	 outweighed	 benefits,	 i.e.	when	 good	 status	was	 not	 considered	worth	achieving	(46;	49;	INT-EN05).		Catchment	 appraisals	were	 aggregated	 into	 river	 basin	 and	national	 impact	 assessments.	 In	particular,	 the	national	 impact	assessment	compared	two	scenarios.	The	first	aimed	to	reach	good	status	for	all	water	bodies	when	technically	feasible.	The	second	and	ultimately	adopted	scenario	only	considered	implementing	cost-beneficial	(and	technically	feasible)	measures	(49;	INT-EN01).	This	 long-term	scenario	was	then	proportioned	to	the	six	 following	years	(2015-2021)	on	the	basis	of	available	funding.	Its	costs	and	benefits	were	also	assessed	(49;	INT-EN05).		
France	
(National	level)	
1st	cycle	National	guidance	recommended	using	the	following	process	to	justify	disproportionate	costs:	
• Identify	water	bodies	with	potential	disproportionate	costs,	based	on	a	cost-effectiveness	analysis	and	the	funding	available	in	the	water	agency.	
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• Perform	a	CBA	on	the	pre-identified	water	bodies.	If	B<0,8C,	costs	are	disproportionate.	
• If	B>0,8C,	look	at	the	distribution	and	affordability	of	costs	between	sectors,	taking	into	account	subsidies.	If	costs	are	unaffordable,	set	a	deadline	extension.	(65)	2nd	cycle	It	was	particularly	stressed	that	deadline	extensions	should	serve	to	spread	costs	over	time.	As	such,	the	idea	was	to:	
• Assess	the	funding	available	in	the	river	basin	(water	agencies	subsidies,	stakeholders’	ability	to	pay	for	the	measures,	past	expenditures…)	
• Compare	different	investment	scenarios	(for	different	sectors,	based	on	a	CBA	at	the	river	basin	scale)	
• Prioritise	measures		
• Build	a	PoM	based	on	priority	measures	and	within	the	financial	amount	available	
• Measures	that	could	not	be	included	in	this	PoM	would	then	be	delayed	(a	CBA	and	an	analysis	of	stakeholders’	ability	to	pay	should	be	performed	to	confirm	that	costs	are	disproportionate	or	to	support	a	local	decision)	Several	criteria	could	be	used	to	determine	the	order	of	priority	of	measures:	
• Ecological	stakes,		
• Technical	feasibility,		
• Cost-efficiency,		
• National	political	stakes,		
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• Gap	with	good	status,	
• Cost-benefit	ratio		(67)	
Adour-Garonne	
(AG)	
Justifications	based	on	technical	feasibility	as	well	as	strongly	favouring	natural	conditions.		In	the	1st	cycle,	an	economic	appraisal	was	only	performed	on	four	water	bodies,	which	led	to	a	more	in-depth	analysis	that	included	local	data	and	a	qualitative	description.		In	 the	 2nd	 cycle,	 20	 water	 bodies	 were	 analysed	 for	 DC.	 The	 analysis	 consisted	 in	 two	 steps:	 1)	 a	 qualitative	 and	quantitative	territorial	analysis	(technical	analysis,	simplified	economic	analysis,	 identification	of	ecological	stakes	and	uses);	2)	a	monetary	CBA,	if	necessary.		When	costs	were	higher	than	benefits,	a	less	stringent	objective	was	set.	Otherwise,	affordability	was	analysed.	In	case	of	unaffordability,	a	deadline	extension	was	set	(3;	5;	INT-FR22).	
Artois-Picardie	
(AP)	
Exemptions	were	mainly	based	on	natural	conditions	and	technical	feasibility	(INT-FR03;	INT-FR05).	1st	cycle	Three	scenarios	with	different	levels	of	ambition	(no	more	investments,	current	investments,	investments	necessary	to	implement	the	WFD)	were	elaborated	to	compare	the	costs,	benefits,	impacts	on	jobs	and	activities	of	each	option	at	the	river	basin	level	(7).	Disproportionate	cost	analyses	were	mainly	based	on	ability	to	pay,	and	more	particularly	on	the	impact	that	the	PoM	would	have	on	water	bills.	CBA	at	the	water	body	level	were	scarcely	used	(22;	INT-FR05).	
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2nd	cycle	Technically	 feasible	measures	were	 first	selected	and	prioritised	based	on	cost	and	efficiency	criteria	(INT-FR02).	The	overall	amount	of	money	that	could	be	spent	was	assessed	(amounts	similar	to	those	defined	in	the	1st	cycle,	as	it	was	decided	to	keep	expenditures	steady	for	each	sector	+	estimation	governments’	funds	available).	The	PoM	was	finalised	taking	into	account	this	information	and	costs	were	spread	over	several	management	cycles	(23),	(INT-FR02;	INT-FR03;	INT-FR04).	A	CBA	was	performed	at	the	river	basin	level	to	check	the	overall	ambition.	A	CBA	was	also	performed	for	each	water	body	to	see	if	a	disproportionality	assessment	applied	(INT-FR02).	Affordability	of	each	sector	for	each	water	body	was	also	estimated	(8).	
Loire-Bretagne	
(LB)	
1st	cycle	Potentially	disproportionately	costly	measures	were	pre-identified	based	on	local	expertise	and	an	assessment	of	ability	to	 pay	 at	 the	 river	 basin	 level.	Measures	 related	 to	 hydromorphology	 and	 agriculture	were	 identified	 as	 particularly	expensive.	A	CBA	was	then	performed	on	pre-identified	groups	of	water	bodies.	When	the	results	of	the	analysis	was	in	contradiction	with	local	expertise,	ability	to	pay	was	assessed	at	the	water	body	level	(INT-FR23).	2nd	cycle	Ability	 to	 pay	 was	 assessed	 at	 the	 river	 basin	 level.	 A	 CBA	 was	 then	 performed	 on	 each	 water	 body.	 Indicators	 on	affordability	were	calculated	for	each	water	body,	for	discussion	with	the	river	basin	committee.	Costs	of	measures	were	also	compared	to	past	expenditures	(in	the	1st	cycle)	and	a	priority	order	was	established	between	measures	(75;	INT-
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FR23).	
Rhin-Meuse	
(RM)	
Costs	were	considered	disproportionate	if	there	was	both	an	inability	to	pay	for	the	measures	and	an	unfavourable	cost-benefit	ratio.	CBA	were	only	performed	at	the	water	body	level	if	there	was	an	inability	to	pay	for	the	measures	(9;	INT-FR09;	INT-FR10).	
Rhône-
Méditerranée	
Corse	(RMC)	
A	pilot	study	was	performed	to	test	the	method.	The	original	idea	was	to	choose	a	cost	threshold	below	which	bundles	of	measures	were	automatically	considered	as	not	disproportionately	costly.	Above	this	threshold,	a	CBA	was	performed.	If	0,65<CBR<0,95,	the	ability	to	pay	of	stakeholders	was	assessed.	However,	this	last	criteria	did	not	discriminate	measures	and	was	thus	of	little	help	for	the	decision.		Therefore,	in	the	final	methodology,	it	was	decided	to	only	perform	a	CBA	(no	affordability	assessment)	(13;	INT-FR25;	INT-FR27).	In	the	2nd	cycle,	the	overall	amount	of	the	PoM	was	also	compared	to	usual	expenditures	in	the	water	sector.	The	idea	was	 to	 build	 a	 PoM	 within	 stakeholders’	 ability	 to	 pay	 and	 to	 show	 them	 that	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 PoM	 was	 not	disproportionate	 compared	 to	 usual	 expenditures	 and	 available	 funding	 (and	 thus	 increase	 the	 acceptability	 of	 the	PoM)(14;	INT-FR25,	INT-FR27).	The	water	agency	also	assessed	some	economic	benefits	at	the	river	basin	level	to	show	stakeholders	 the	 positive	 impacts	 of	 environmental	 restoration	 on	 the	 economy	 (impacts	 on	 jobs,	 avoided	 treatment	costs	for	drinking	water…)	(INT-FR25).	
Seine-Normandie	
(SN)	
1st	cycle	The	river	basin	committee	agreed	to	increase	past	expenditures	by	30%.	Remaining	costs	were	spread	over	the	2nd	and	
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3rd	management	cycles	(35;	60).	A	PoM	that	would	reach	good	status	(taking	into	account	technical	feasibility	and	natural	conditions)	 was	 produced	 and	 its	 cost	 assessed	 (61).	 This	 cost	 was	 compared	 with	 average	 past	 expenditures	 and	impacts	on	households,	 industries	and	farms	(36)	 (the	method	differed	slightly	depending	on	the	locality	(INT-FR06)).		Water	bodies	and	measures	for	which	costs	were	excessive	were	thus	pre-identified.	For	those	water	bodies,	a	CBA	was	performed	at	the	water	body	level	(35;	61).	2nd	cycle	The	 river	 basin	 committee	decided	 to	 spend	overall	 similar	 amount	 of	money	on	 the	PoMs	 from	 the	 two	 cycles	 (60).	Objectives	were	set	based	on	this	financial	amount	(26).	 	Costs	of	measures	were	compared	with	past	expenditures	for	each	 sector	 (waste	 water,	 storm	water,	 industry,	 agriculture,	 aquatic	 environment,	 others)	 (INT-FR07).	 Several	 PoM	were	 proposed.	 The	 idea	 was	 to	 gather	 priority	 measures	 within	 the	 financial	 amount	 agreed	 and	 to	 maximise	 the	number	of	water	bodies	that	would	reach	good	status.	Measures	were	prioritised	based	on	several	criteria	(nature	of	the	measure	 (e.g.	 national	 policy),	 type	of	 pressures	 (e.g.	 number,	 facility	 to	 alleviate	 them),	water	body	 status	 (gap	with	good	status),	cost-effectiveness,	other	technical	criteria)	(76;	 INT-FR07).	 	Economic	appraisal	was	performed	on	water	bodies	where	measures	had	not	been	included	in	the	selected	PoM.	When	benefits	outweighed	costs,	the	ability	to	pay	was	assessed	(60).				
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F.2	Scale	of	the	analysis	
England	 1st	cycle	Economic	appraisals	were	performed	at	the	highest	possible	geographical	scale	(38),	mainly	at	the	national	or	river	basin	level	(73;	INT-EN01).	A	few	site-specific	appraisals	were	performed	to	assess	whether	costs	outweighed	benefits	when	there	was	a	high	certainty	on	the	water	body’s	status,	the	pressures	and	the	efficiency	of	measures	(33).	2nd	cycle	In	the	second	cycle,	the	CBA	were	performed	at	the	level	of	operational	catchments	(34;	INT-EN05).			
France		 National	guidance	recommended	performing	the	analysis	at	the	most	relevant	scale	(28;	65).	
AG	 Analyses	(CBA	and	affordability	assessments)	were	performed	at	the	water	body	scale	(3;	5;	INT-FR22).	
AP	 1st	cycle	The	three	scenarios	were	assessed	at	the	river	basin	level	(7).	The	weight	of	the	water	bill	on	household	incomes	was	assessed	at	the	local	level	(for	each	water	service)	(29).	2nd	cycle	A	CBA	for	the	overall	PoM	was	performed	at	the	river	basin	level	(23;	INT-FR02).	A	CBA	was	performed	for	each	water	body.	Affordability	was	also	assessed	at	the	water	body	level	(8;	INT-FR02).	
LB	 1st	cycle	
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Affordability	was	 assessed	at	 the	 river	basin	 scale.	 CBA	were	performed	at	 the	 catchment	 scale	 (groups	of	 around	10	water	bodies).	Affordability	was	assessed	again	at	the	water	body	scale	in	a	few	cases	(INT-FR23).	2nd	cycle	Affordability	was	first	assessed	at	the	river	basin	scale.	CBA	and	ability	to	pay	assessments	were	performed	at	the	water	body	level	(INT-FR23).	
RM	 Analyses	(CBA	and	affordability	assessments)	were	performed	at	the	water	body	scale	(10;	25;	INT-FR09,	INT-FR14).	
RMC	 CBA	were	performed	at	the	catchment	scale	(groups	of	around	10	water	bodies)	(13;	INT-FR27).	
SN	 Analyses	 (CBA	 and	 affordability	 assessments)	 were	 performed	 at	 the	 water	 body	 scale.	 A	 single	 CBA	 was	 undertaken	 for	groundwater	(which	included	all	water	bodies).	In	the	second	cycle,	available	funding	was	also	assessed	at	the	river	basin	level	and	a	CBA	was	performed	for	the	overall	PoM	(35;	36;	60;	76).	
	
F.3.	Screening	procedure	
England	 1st	cycle	The	EA	created	decision	trees	for	each	element	and	type	of	water	body.	The	trees	helped	to	set	the	objective	and	select	the	most	appropriate	justification	in	case	of	an	exemption.	Although	they	differed	from	each	other	in	detail,	they	shared	a	similar	pattern.	First	of	all,	appraisals	were	not	undertaken	for	basic	(mandatory)	measures.	Analyses	were	also	not	performed	on	water	bodies	
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in	good	status	(an	objective	of	good	status	for	2015	was	then	set).	When	the	status	was	uncertain,	a	deadline	extension	was	set	due	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 unfavourable	 balance	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits	 (disproportionate	 costs).	 Otherwise,	 technically	 feasible	measures	and	causes	of	 failure	were	assessed.	 If	unknown	or	uncertain,	 a	deadline	extension	was	assigned	due	 to	 technical	infeasibility.	If	known	with	high	certainty,	a	CBA	would	then	be	performed.	If	the	result	of	the	CBA	was	uncertain,	a	deadline	extension	was	set	due	to	an	unfavourable	balance	of	costs	and	benefits	(disproportionate	costs).	If	there	was	high	confidence	in	the	result,	disproportionate	burdens	and	alternative	financing	were	assessed	(33).	A	 few	site-specific	assessments	were	undertaken,	 in	particular	 for	water	 industry-related	measures.	Otherwise,	assessments	were	based	on	national	analyses	associated	with	a	specific	measure	(33).	2nd	cycle	In	 the	 2nd	 cycle,	 CBA	 were	 only	 performed	 on	 water	 bodies	 that	 were	 not	 in	 good	 status	 or	 where	 enough	 evidence	 was	available	(INT-EN05).	Then,	a	step-wise	procedure	or	“triage	approach”	was	applied	(44,	p.8).	The	idea	was	to	be	strategic	in	the	disproportionality	analyses	performed,	 i.e.	 to	perform	 in-depth	analyses	only	 if	necessary	and	where	 impacts	were	high	(74).		
France	 1st	cycle	According	 to	national	 guidance,	 economic	 appraisals	were	 to	 apply	 in	priority	 to	water	bodies	where	 technical	 feasibility	or	natural	conditions	do	not	apply	or	had	a	weak	basis	for	justification	(65).	
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A	 step-wise	 process	 was	 to	 be	 used	 for	 the	 CBA:	 in	 obvious	 cases,	 when	 costs	 were	 extremely	 high	 or	 extremely	 low,	 a	qualitative	 or	 quantitative	 assessment	was	 enough.	 Otherwise,	 a	monetary	 assessment	would	 be	 performed.	 This	would	 be	based	on	transfers	of	national	benefit	values.	In	a	few	cases,	local	studies	could	be	performed	if	necessary	(20).	Ability	to	pay	would	be	assessed	only	when	costs	were	higher	than	benefits	(65).	2nd	cycle	Economic	appraisal	were	performed	on	measures	that	could	not	be	included	in	the	PoM		(non-priority	measures	with	no	ability	to	pay)	(67).	
AG	 1st	cycle	An	 economic	 appraisal	 was	 performed	 on	 only	 4	 water	 bodies	 due	 to	 the	 water	 agency’s	 director’s	 reluctance	 to	 use	disproportionate	costs	as	an	argument	for	exemption	(5;	INT-FR22).	2nd	cycle	A	simplified	analysis	was	performed	on	20	water	bodies	(description	of	uses,	qualitative	assessment	of	benefits),	which	were	identified	locally	(cases	where	costs	were	particularly	high).	A	monetary	CBA	was	undertaken	in	three	cases	where	a	decision	could	not	be	taken	based	on	the	qualitative	analysis	only.	When	costs	outweighed	benefits,	a	 less	stringent	objective	was	set.	When	benefits	were	higher	or	around	costs,	stakeholder	ability	to	pay	was	assessed	to	set	a	deadline	extension	accordingly	(2;	INT-FR22).	
AP	 1st	cycle	
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A	CBA	at	the	water	body	level	was	performed	in	very	few	cases	and	only	when	there	was	an	inability	to	pay	for	households	(64).	2nd	cycle	Exemptions	were	only	considered	for	water	bodies	that	were	not	in	good	status	(INT-FR03).	Water	body	objectives	were	first	estimated	based	on	the	current	status,	technical	criteria	and	thanks	to	 local	experts	(INT-FRFR	04).	A	CBA	and	an	analysis	of	ability	to	pay	were	performed	on	each	water	body	(INT-FR02).	
LB	 1st	cycle	Potentially	disproportionately	costly	water	bodies	were	pre-identified	 through	an	analysis	of	ability	 to	pay	at	 the	river	basin	level	 and	 through	 local	 expertise.	 The	 analysis	 of	 ability	 to	 pay	 concluded	 that	 measures	 related	 to	 hydromorphology	 and	agriculture	were	potentially	disproportionally	costly	due	to	their	high	costs.	In	the	few	cases	where	there	was	a	disagreement	between	 the	 result	of	 the	CBA	and	 local	expertise,	 an	analysis	of	ability	 to	pay	at	 the	water	body	 level	was	performed	 (INT-FR23).	2nd	cycle	A	CBA	and	an	assessment	of	ability	to	pay	was	performed	on	each	water	body	(INT-FR23).	
RM	 Analyses	were	only	performed	for	water	bodies	that	were	not	in	good	status	(INT-FR19).	Water	bodies	that	could	potentially	apply	for	DC	were	pre-selected	based	on	an	analysis	of	stakeholders’	ability	to	pay.	If	this	first	analysis	showed	an	inability	to	pay,	a	CBA	was	performed	to	confirm	whether	costs	were	disproportionate	(9;	10).	However,	 an	 exemption	 could	 only	 apply	 if	 the	 disproportionately	 costly	 measure	 addressed	 a	 pressure	 that	 significantly	
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contributed	to	the	water	body’s	bad	status,	and	that	its	costs	were	significantly	higher	compared	to	other	measures	applied	to	the	same	water	body	(above	20%	of	total	costs)	(12;	INT-FR19).	In	the	second	cycle,	ability	to	pay	by	2033	and	2039	was	also	assessed.	If	this	analysis	showed	an	inability	to	pay	by	2039,	the	water	body	could	qualify	for	a	less	stringent	objective	(12;	25;	INT-FR10).	
RMC	 A	cost	threshold	was	set	at	10M	euros	for	all	the	measures	at	the	catchment	level.	Below	this	threshold,	the	bundles	of	measures	were	 not	 considered	 disproportionately	 costly.	 A	 CBA	was	 only	 performed	 if	 the	 costs	were	 above	 this	 threshold	 (13;	 INT-FR27).	A	qualitative	analysis	was	considered	sufficient	in	cases	of	high	costs	and	low	benefits,	and	if	the	water	body	was	not	of	outstanding	environmental	interest	(Natura	2000,	Ramsar…).	Otherwise,	costs	and	benefits	were	monetised.	An	in-depth	local	analysis	could	be	performed	if	necessary,	but	was	only	undertaken	in	rare	cases	(13).	In	the	second	cycle,	a	CBA	was	only	performed	on	water	bodies	with	an	exemption	based	on	DC	in	the	1st	cycle	and	for	a	few	water	bodies	with	costs	that	had	significantly	increased	in	the	2nd	cycle	(due	to	an	underestimation	of	costs	in	the	1st	cycle)	(14;	INT-FR27).	
SN	 1st	cycle	Water	 bodies	 that	 could	 potentially	 apply	 for	 DC	 were	 pre-selected	 based	 on	 past	 expenditures	 (costs	 were	 considered	excessive	when	above	120%	of	the	average	of	past	expenditures	on	the	river	basin)	and	an	analysis	of	stakeholders’	ability	to	pay.	 If	 this	 first	 analysis	 showed	 an	 inability	 to	 pay	 by	 2015,	 a	 CBA	 was	 performed	 to	 confirm	 whether	 costs	 were	disproportionate.	(15;	36)	
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2nd	cycle	Analyses	were	only	performed	for	water	bodies	that	were	not	in	good	status	(76).	The	economic	appraisal	was	only	performed	on	 pre-identified	 water	 bodies.	 The	 water	 bodies	 selected	 were	 those	 that	 could	 not	 be	 included	 in	 the	 PoM	 (due	 to	 its	constrained	financial	amount)	and	that	were	not	considered	as	a	priority.	They	were	pre-identified	by	local	experts.	A	CBA	was	then	performed.	If	B>C,	affordability	was	assessed	(60;	INT-FR06).	
	
F.4.	Costs	and	benefits	data	
4.1 Costs	
England	 1st	cycle	Working	groups	of	stakeholders	and	representatives	of	different	sectors	identified	measures	and	their	costs	for	the	preliminary	cost-effectiveness	analysis	(32).	They	provided	a	database	for	the	costs	of	intervention	(INT-EN08).	Both	costs	of	measures	and	administrative	costs	were	considered	(54).	2nd	cycle	Thanks	to	water	companies’	periodic	reviews,	 there	was	already	strong	knowledge	on	costs	related	to	 the	water	 industry.	A	spreadsheet	with	national	data	on	costs	(from	the	cost-effectiveness	database)	was	available	for	EA	staff	to	perform	economic	appraisals	(49)	(INT-EN05).	
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France		 The	 cost	 values	 that	were	 used	were	 those	 calculated	 for	 the	 PoM	 (28).	 Costs	were	 allocated	 according	 to	 the	 polluter-pays	principle	(67).	Only	investment	costs	were	taken	into	account	(68).	
AG	 -	Source:	Water	agency	database,	expert	evaluations,	local	data	-	Costs	taken	into	account:	investment	and	maintenance	costs	(3;	4).	
AP	 -	Source:	Water	agency	database,	data	from	the	characterisation	process	(7;	23)	and	from	existing	studies		-	Costs	taken	into	account:	investment	and	maintenance	costs	(8)	
LB	 -	Source:	Water	agency	database	(INT-FR23)	
RM	 -	Source:	Water	agency	database,	INSEE	database,	studies,	expert	evaluations	(9;	10).		-	Costs	taken	into	account:	investment	and	maintenance	costs	
RMC	 -	Source:	Water	agency	database,	expert	assessments,	studies	(13;	17).	In	 the	 second	 cycle,	 costs	 data	 were	 improved.	 Several	 studies	 were	 performed	 to	 assess	 costs,	 in	 particular	 on	hydromorphology	(INT-FR25;	INT-FR27).	
SN	 -	Source:	Water	agency	database	-	Costs	taken	into	account:	investment	and	maintenance	costs	(35;	60)	
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4.2 Benefits	
England	 1st	cycle	The	Collaborative	Research	Programme	led	by	Defra	funded	the	National	Water	Environment	Benefits	Survey	(NWEBS).	The	survey	used	stated	preference	valuation	methods:	a	payment	card	contingent	valuation	question,	dichotomous	choice	question	and	choice	experiment	(32).		2nd	cycle	Regarding	benefits,	the	qualitative	assessment	(1st	step)	was	based	on	an	ecosystem	services	framework.	The	idea	was	to	get	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	benefits	of	restoration	measures	and	to	better	value	non-monetised	and	non-market	benefits,	in	accordance	with	the	Green	Book	(58)	and	the	Natural	Environment	White	Paper	(43;	57).	The	latter	recommends	relying	on	ecosystem	services	in	environmental	management	so	as	to	better	take	into	account	benefits	and	impacts	of	programmes	(43;	44).	 This	 step	 was	 also	 important	 for	 identifying	 whether	 further	 benefits	 could	 be	 monetised	 and	 added	 to	 the	 stage	 1	valuation	 (46)	 and	 provided	 information	 on	 the	 wider	 benefits	 that	 could	 not	 be	 monetised	 (INT-EN05).	 If	 an	 important	benefit	was	 identified	at	 this	 stage	but	could	not	be	monetised,	 the	qualitative	assessment	could	serve	as	a	 justification	 for	setting	an	objective	of	good	status	(INT-EN01),	especially	when	the	cost-benefit	ratio	was	close	to	1	(INT-EN05).	This	step	was	completed	thanks	to	local	stakeholders,	experts	and	subject	specialists	(44).	The	NWEBS	survey	was	updated	 in	2012	 (63),	 to	 take	 into	account	 changes	 in	population	density,	prices,	 incomes	and	 the	latest	 knowledge	 from	economic	 literature	 (INT-EN01).	The	NWEBS	 results	were	used	 to	monetised	 recreational,	 aesthetic	
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and	non-use	values	in	the	stage	1	valuation	process	(44).	EA	staff	could	choose	the	most	appropriate	values	across	a	range	and	apply	them	to	the	area	where	improvements	were	expected.	Thanks	to	an	Excel	spreadsheet,	they	could	obtain	a	cost	benefit-ratio	and	a	net	present	value	for	each	bundle	of	measures	(46).	Local	benefits	and	those	derived	from	wetlands	were	also	used	at	this	stage	(42).	 In	stage	1+	valuation,	another	spreadsheet	could	be	used	to	take	into	account	the	non-monetised	benefits	identified	 during	 the	 qualitative	 analysis	 and	 not	 included	 in	 NWEBS	 (44).	 In	 stage	 2	 valuation,	 more	 in-depth	 benefit	valuations	 could	 be	 performed	 based	 on	 existing	 research	 or	 a	 local	 appraisal	 (46).	 Separate	 analyses	were	 performed	 by	specialists	for	protected	areas	(shellfish	waters,	bathing	areas…)	as	their	values	were	not	covered	by	the	NWEBS.	Those	values	were	included	in	the	RBMPs	and	local	plans	if	relevant	(INT-EN01).		Catchment	 appraisals	were	 aggregated	 at	 the	 river	 basin	 and	 at	 the	national	 level	 for	 the	national	 impact	 assessment.	 The	latter	was	completed	with	national	data	on	the	costs	and	benefits	of	measures	aiming	to	achieve	protected	area	objectives	and	non-deterioration	(45;	49;	INT-EN05;	INT-EN09).		
	
France		 1st	cycle	A	 national	 database	was	 created	 based	 on	 a	 review	 of	 existing	 valuation	 studies	 (19;	 21).	 It	was	 recommended	 to	 perform	specific	 studies	only	 in	 limited	 cases,	when	environmental	 and	economic	 stakes	were	 important	 (65).	Unitary	benefit	 values	would	then	be	applied	to	the	number	of	users	(20).	2nd	cycle	
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The	database	on	non-market	benefits	values	undertaken	in	the	1st	cycle	was	brought	up	to	date	(67).	Existing	data	were	updated	so	 as	 to	 take	 into	 account	 inflation.	Values	 from	new	publications	were	 included,	 although	new	 studies	were	not	numerous.	Most	of	them	were	related	to	wetlands	(28).	
AG	 The	ecological	value	of	water	bodies	was	first	qualitatively	estimated.	In	particular,	the	water	agency	assessed:	
- whether	the	water	body	belonged	to	a	classified	natural	zone	(national	park,	Natura	2000…)	
- the	ecosystem	services	provided	
- whether	the	classified	zone	would	benefit	from	an	improvement	in	the	water	body’s	status	Qualitative	 data	 were	 collected	 from	 state	 regional	 offices.	 Monetary	 benefit	 values	 for	 CBA	 were	 taken	 from	 the	 national	database	(3;	4).	
AP	 1st	cycle	The	benefits	monetised	were	mainly	market	benefits.	Non-market	benefits	were	only	broadly	assessed.	The	benefit	values	used	were	transposed	from	existing	studies	(7).	2nd	cycle	Benefit	values	were	taken	from	existing	studies	or	from	the	national	database	(8).	
LB	 Data	 from	 the	 characterisation	process	were	used.	Benefit	 values	were	 taken	 from	 the	national	database.	 Some	 local	 studies	were	also	performed	(24;	INT-FR23).	
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RM	 Benefit	values	were	taken	from	the	national	database.	Some	local	studies	were	also	performed	(9;	10;	INT-FR09).	
RMC	 Market	benefits	were	not	included	in	the	CBA.		Non-market	 benefits	 values	 (recreation)	were	 taken	 from	 the	 national	 database.	 Local	 studies	were	 performed	 to	 complete	national	data	(INT-FR27).	
SN	 Benefit	values	were	taken	from	existing	studies	or	from	the	national	database	(35;	60;	INT-FR13).	
	
4.3 Benefits	transfer	
France		 1st	cycle	The	ministry	built	an	Excel	tool	to	perform	the	CBA	(35).	Unitary	values	from	the	national	database	were	thus	transferred	as	such.	A	transfer	function	was	not	used,	because	models	from	primary	studies	were	not	always	accessible.	Furthermore,	the	limited	number	of	primary	studies	meant	a	meta-analysis	could	not	be	built.	Conditions	 for	 the	value	 transfer	were	specified	 (e.g.	 type	of	water	body,	 regular	users	as	opposed	 to	occasional	users…)	(19).	2nd	cycle	The	 ministry	 updated	 and	 improved	 the	 Excel	 tool	 for	 the	 2nd	 cycle	 (67).	 For	 instance,	 benefit	 values	 were	 introduced	progressively	 over	 time.	The	discount	 rate	 could	 also	be	 changed	 for	 sensitivity	 analysis.	 It	was	 also	possible	 to	perform	 the	appraisal	on	groups	of	water	bodies	instead	of	individual	water	bodies	(INT-FR13).	
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AG	 The	national	tool	was	not	used.	Benefit	values	were	transferred	from	the	national	database	(2;	3;	4).	Benefit	values	were	applied	to	different	population	values,	depending	on	how	popular	the	site	was	and	whether	 it	was	classified	for	 its	ecological	 interest	(e.g.	Natura	2000)	(2).	
AP	 The	national	tool	was	not	used.	Benefit	values	were	transferred	from	existing	studies	(7;	8).	
LB	 The	national	tool	was	used	in	the	1st	cycle	but	not	in	the	2nd.	Benefit	values	were	transferred	from	national	guidance	(INT-FR23).	
RM	 The	national	tool	was	not	used	(INT	09).	Benefit	values	were	transferred	from	national	guidance	(9;	10).	
RMC	 The	national	tool	was	not	used.	Benefit	values	were	transferred	from	national	guidance.	Benefits	were	applied	to	visits	rather	than	population	(INT-FR27).	
SN	 The	national	tool	was	used.	Benefit	values	were	transferred	from	national	guidance	(35;	60).		
F.5.	Uncertainty	England	 A	 quality	 assurance	 was	 performed	 on	 10%	 of	 the	 catchment	 appraisals	 and	 when	 aggregated	 for	 the	 national	 impact	assessment.	In	particular,	the	consistency	of	the	approach	and	the	right	implementation	of	the	national	guidance	were	checked	(INT-EN01;	INT-EN05).	Many	investments	were	also	made	to	improve	knowledge	on	water	bodies	and	reduce	uncertainties	on	the	water	status.	However,	 they	were	still	 taken	 into	account.	For	example,	a	95%	confidence	 level	 that	 the	water	body	was	below	good	status	was	required	before	considering	expensive	restoration	measures	(56).		
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France		 The	exemptions	set	were	mainly	deadline	extensions.	The	use	of	less	stringent	objectives	was	exceptional.	A	cost	benefit	ratio	of	0,8	was	chosen	 to	 take	 into	account	potential	underestimations	of	benefits.	National	guidance	recommended	using	a	range	of	benefit	 values	 in	 case	 of	 uncertainty.	When	benefits	 could	not	 be	 valued,	 this	 should	have	been	 clearly	 indicated	 in	 the	CBA.	Economic	analyses,	 in	particular	CBA,	were	often	not	 the	only	 criteria	 to	decide	on	disproportionality.	Rather,	 they	 served	 to	strengthen	other	considerations	(20;	28;	65;	67;	INT-FR24).	In	the	first	cycle,	due	to	the	ambitious	objective	of	reaching	good	ecological	status	in	2/3	of	water	bodies	by	2015	(INT-FR24),	several	water	bodies	with	an	uncertain	status	were	granted	an	objective	of	good	status	rather	than	a	deadline	extension	(62).	
AG	 In	order	to	take	into	account	uncertainties	on	costs	and	benefits	values,	ranges	of	costs	and	benefits	were	considered.	When	the	range	 of	 benefits	 overlapped	 the	 range	 of	 costs,	 benefits	were	 considered	 as	 potentially	 justifying	 the	 costs.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	ecological	value	of	the	water	body	was	qualitatively	estimated,	in	particular	its	uniqueness,	to	decide	whether	the	lower	or	the	upper	value	of	the	benefits	would	be	considered	(3;	5;	INT-FR22).	
AP	 Uncertainties	on	status	were	not	taken	into	account	when	setting	objectives	(INT-FR04).	However,	exemptions	were	never	set	on	 the	 sole	basis	of	disproportionate	 costs	but	were	always	used	with	 technical	 feasibility	and	natural	 conditions	 (INT-FR02,	INT-FR03).		1st	cycle	When	 comparing	 the	 three	 scenarios	 at	 the	 river	 basin	 level,	 uncertainties	 on	 costs	 and	 benefits	 were	 indicated	 (max-min	values).	When	cost	values	were	too	uncertain,	they	were	not	taken	into	account	in	the	analysis	(7).		
	 242	
2nd	cycle	A	range	of	benefits	were	used	for	water	body	level	CBA	(max-min	values)	(8).	
LB	 CBA	were	used	in	combination	with	affordability	analyses,	e.g.	costs	should	be	both	higher	than	benefits	and	unaffordable	at	the	river	basin	level	to	set	an	exemption	(INT-FR23).	
RM	 Both	inability	to	pay	and	an	unfavourable	cost-benefit	ratio	were	necessary	to	set	an	exemption	based	on	DC	(9;	10).	
RMC	 Exemptions	 were	 never	 set	 on	 the	 sole	 basis	 of	 disproportionate	 costs	 (they	 were	 always	 used	with	 technical	 feasibility	 or	natural	conditions),	due	to	the	uncertainties	on	the	cost-benefit	assessment	(14;	INT-FR25;	INT-FR27).	Several	cost	thresholds	above	which	a	CBA	should	be	performed	were	tested.	The	analysis	showed	that	the	threshold	chosen	had	a	limited	impact	on	the	number	of	water	bodies	affected.	The	 impact	on	 costs	was	even	 lower.	 In	 this	 river	basin,	measures	were	 indeed	either	very	expensive	or	very	inexpensive	(13).		
SN	 1st	cycle	Uncertainty	was	 taken	 into	 account	when	 comparing	 costs	 to	 past	 expenditures:	 costs	were	 considered	 excessive	when	 they	amounted	to	over	120%	of	past	expenditures,	i.e.	a	20%	margin	was	considered.			A	 sensitivity	 analysis	was	performed	on	CBA	 (comparison	of	 the	minimum	and	maximum	values	 for	 benefits,	 changes	 in	 the	discount	rate	used)	(35).	2nd	cycle	A	range	of	benefit	values	(minimum	and	maximum	were	taken	into	account)	(60).	
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F.6	Additional	parameters	
6.1 Cost-benefit	ratio	
France	 The	cost-benefit	ratio	used	was	0,8	(28;	65).	
AG	 Ranges	of	costs	and	benefits	were	used.	Benefits	were	considered	higher	than	costs	when	the	ranges	overlapped	or	when	the	range	of	benefits	was	higher	than	the	range	of	costs	(5).	
AP	 1st	cycle	The	costs	and	benefits	of	three	different	scenarios	were	compared,	but	their	cost-benefit	ratio	was	not	calculated	(7).	2nd	cycle	For	CBA	at	the	water	body	scale,	the	cost-benefit	ratio	used	was	1	(8).	
LB	 The	cost-benefit	ratio	used	was	0,8	(INT-FR23).	
RM	 The	cost-benefit	ratio	used	was	0,8	(9;	10).	
RMC	 The	cost-benefit	ratio	used	was	0,8	(13;	14).	
SN	 The	cost-benefit	ratio	used	was	0,8	(35;	60;	61).		
6.2 Affordability	England	 1st	cycle	“Disproportionate	burden”	was	used	when	costs	were	too	high	to	be	borne	by	specific	sectors	or	when	the	measures	required	
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were	in	contradiction	with	the	polluter	pays	principle.	In	this	case,	a	deadline	extension	was	set	due	to	disproportionate	costs	(38).		2nd	cycle	Costs	of	measures	were	compared	at	 sector	 level	with	available	 funding	 (46).	When	 the	polluters	 could	not	pay,	 alternative	funding	was	 sought	 towards	 the	beneficiaries	 and	 the	 government	 (via	EU,	 central	 or	 local	 government)	 (34).	 Funding	 that	could	 be	 spent	 or	was	 very	 likely	 to	 be	 spent	 included	 the	 Environment	 Agency’s	 environment	 and	 flood	 programmes,	 the	Countryside	 Stewardship	 Scheme,	 water	 industry	 national	 environment	 programme,	 or	 the	 abandoned	 metal	 mines	programme	(49).	Other	 funding	 sources	will	probably	be	available	 in	 the	 course	of	 the	2nd	 cycle	 to	 fund	more	measures,	but	 their	amount	or	effects	are	not	certain.	For	example,	funding	is	available	under	the	CAP	Pillar	2	for	farming	improvements.	But	because	those	actions	are	voluntary,	the	location	and	extent	of	outcomes	is	unknown	(INT-EN01).	As	another	example,	the	financial	amount	that	water	industries	can	spend	on	environmental	protection,	in	particular	through	wastewater	treatment,	is	agreed	through	a	separate	process,	 the	periodic	 review.	Every	 five	 years,	water	 companies	 agree	with	 the	 economic	 regulator	Ofwat	on	 their	business	 plans	 and	 customers	 charges	 (1).	 During	 this	 process,	 they	 have	 to	 discuss	 their	 business	 plans	 with	 other	stakeholders,	 such	 as	 CCWater.	 Water	 companies	 are	 expected	 to	 take	 into	 account	 customers’	 views	 and	 preferences,	including	 their	 willingness	 to	 pay	 for	 water	 companies’	 proposals	 (INT-EN01;	 INT-EN12).	 They	 also	 discuss	 investment	requirements	 for	 environmental	 protection	 with	 the	 environment	 agency,	 in	 accordance	 with	 customers’	 views	 and	
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preferences	(INT-EN12).	Moreover,	this	process	doesn’t	coincide	with	the	RBMP	schedule	(INT-EN01).			
France	 According	to	national	guidance,	the	costs	of	measures	had	to	be	allocated	to	polluters	or	users.	The	following	indicators	could	be	used	to	assess	affordability:	For	households:	
• Techniques	usually	implemented	
• Cost	of	the	measures	necessary	to	achieve	the	objective	and	comparison	with	past	expenditures	
• Price	of	water	and	comparison	with	the	average	price	in	the	river	basin	
• Household	incomes	and	comparison	with	the	average	income	in	the	river	basin	For	industry:	
• Best	available	technologies	usually	implemented	
• Costs	of	measures	
• Turnover	
• Gross	operating	surplus	For	agriculture:	
• Best	environmental	practices	usually	implemented		
• Costs	of	supplementary	measures	
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• Profits	before	tax	
• Gross	operating	surplus	In	 the	 first	 cycle,	 costs	 were	 considered	 unaffordable	 for	 households	 if	 the	 water	 bill	 exceeded	 3%	 of	 their	 income.	 For	industries	and	farmers,	the	threshold	had	to	be	agreed	with	the	river	basin	committee.	However,	if	costs	were	similar	to	past	expenditures	 in	 the	 sector	 and	 if	 there	 was	 no	 obstacle	 to	 investment	 (particularly	 low	 income,	 excessive	 water	 price…),	measures	 could	 not	 be	 considered	 as	 unaffordable.	 All	 forms	 of	 subsidies	 (from	 water	 agencies,	 the	 State,	 the	 EU,	 local	authorities…)	had	to	be	taken	into	account	and	deducted	from	the	costs	(65;	72).	In	the	2nd	cycle,	all	criteria	and	thresholds	had	to	be	agreed	with	local	stakeholders	and	the	river	basin	committee.	Other	criteria	could	be	taken	into	account,	such	as	the	financial	amounts	planned	or	spent	(67).	
AG	 1st	cycle	Indicators	used	to	assess	ability	to	pay	for	industries:	- Costs	compared	to	gross	operating	surplus	- Costs	compared	to	past	expenditures	(5).	2nd	cycle	Indicators	used	to	assess	ability	to	pay:	- Households:	impact	on	water	bills,	comparison	water	bill	/	income	(3%	threshold)	- Industries:	costs	compared	to	gross	operating	surplus	
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Subsidies	were	deducted	from	costs	(3).	
AP	 1st	cycle	Stakeholders’	ability	to	pay	for	the	measures	was	assessed,	in	particular	for	households	(impact	on	the	water	bill)	(INT-FR05)	The	indicators	to	use	were	decided	with	the	river	basin	committee:	- For	households:	impact	on	the	water	bill	- For	farmer	and	industries:	comparison	with	the	added	value	(6;	INT	FR	05).	For	households,	 the	 increase	on	water	bills	was	assessed	and	 compared	with	average	 incomes	at	 the	 local	 level.	The	 cost	of	measures	was	considered	disproportionate	when	the	water	bill	was	above	3%	of	households’	income	(29;	INT-FR05).	Based	on	this	assessment,	the	costs	of	measures	were	spread	over	the	three	management	cycles	(INT-FR05).	2nd	cycle	The	WA	commissioned	a	study	that	looked	at	the	ability	to	pay	at	the	water	body	level.	The	indicators	used	were	inspired	from	the	AERM	method	in	the	first	cycle.	For	 each	 sector,	 the	 remaining	 costs	 of	 measures	 (once	 subsidies	 from	 the	 water	 agency	 deducted)	 were	 assessed	 and	compared	to	various	indicators.	A	threshold	was	used	to	determine	whether	the	amount	was	acceptable	or	not.		-	Households:	weight	of	water	bill	in	households’	income;	threshold:	3%	-	Tax	payers:	impact	of	measures	on	local	taxes;	threshold:	2%	-	Farmers:	impact	of	measures	on	gross	operating	surplus;	threshold:	2%	
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-	Industries:	impact	of	measures	on	added	value;	threshold:	2%		(8;	INT-FR02)	
LB	 1st	cycle	For	 households,	 the	 cost	 of	 water	 bills	 was	 compared	 with	 the	 average	 income.	 If	 above	 3%,	 the	 cost	 was	 considered	unaffordable.	For	 farmers,	 the	costs	of	measures	were	compared	with	 the	average	 income	and	gross	operating	surplus.	 If	 above	3%,	costs	were	considered	unaffordable.	For	each	type	of	measures	(hydromorphology,	agriculture…)	costs	were	also	compared	with	past	expenditures.	(INT-FR23)	2nd	cycle	Affordability	was	first	assessed	at	the	river	basin	scale.	At	the	water	body	scale,	affordability	was	not	assessed	per	se.	Indicators	were	calculated	but	not	compared	to	a	specific	threshold.	Indicators	were	the	average	income	for	taxpayers,	the	price	of	water	for	households,	and	gross	operating	surplus	for	farmers.	Subsidies	 (water	 agency,	 European	 funds…)	 were	 deducted	 from	 costs	 in	 the	 analysis.	 Costs	 were	 also	 compared	 to	 past	expenditures	to	show	to	the	river	basin	committee	that	they	were	affordable.	(INT-FR23)	
RM	 For	 each	 sector,	 the	 remaining	 costs	 of	 measures	 (once	 subsidies	 from	 the	 water	 agency	 deducted)	 were	 assessed	 and	compared	to	various	indicators.	The	indicators	to	use	were	decided	with	the	river	basin	committee.	
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Indicators	used	to	assess	ability	to	pay:	Water	and	wastewater	services	•	Price	of	water	•	%	of	water	bill	in	household	incomes	Industries	•	Added	value	•	Gross	operating	surplus	•	Cash	flow	•	Yearly	investment	•	Profitability	rate	Craftsmen	•	Turnover	•	Added	value	Farms	•	Added	value	•	Gross	operating	surplus	•	Profit	before	tax	
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•	Cash	flow	Hydromorphology:	Local	taxes	For	 water	 services	 and	 industry,	 up	 to	 four	 points	 were	 attributed	 for	 each	 indicator,	 depending	 on	 its	 distance	 from	 the	average	in	the	river	basin.	A	total	grade	on	20	was	calculated.	If	the	grade	was	above	12,	the	cost	was	considered	as	potentially	disproportionately	costly	for	the	sector.	
	Figure	1:	example	of	points	attributed	to	each	indicator	for	industry,	source:		(9)	For	agriculture,	a	threshold	of	3%	was	used	for	each	indicator.	For	hydromorphology,	a	total	grade	of	4	was	attributed.	Costs	were	potentially	disproportionate	if	the	grade	was	above	3.	In	the	2nd	cycle,	only	one	indicator	was	changed	for	industries:	yearly	investment	was	replaced	with	turnover.	Alternative	funds	were	taken	into	account	(9;	10).	
RMC	 Ability	to	pay	was	not	used	to	justify	disproportionate	costs	(13).		
SN	 1st	cycle	
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Water	bodies	were	pre-identified	as	potentially	disproportionate	based	on	an	assessment	of	ability	to	pay	for	households	(more	than	1000	euros	over	9	years	was	considered	as	potentially	disproportionately	costly)	and	for	industries	and	farms	(more	than	30	000€	per	installation	considered	as	potentially	disproportionately	costly)	(36).	2nd	cycle	When	B>0,8	 C,	 affordability	was	 looked	 at.	 The	most	 expensive	measures	 related	 to	 agriculture.	 Affordability	was	 thus	 only	tested	for	agricultural	measures.	Subsidies	and	alternative	financing	were	deducted	from	the	costs	accruing	to	farmers.	Costs	were	considered	disproportionate	when	they	were	2,5%	above	farms’	standard	gross	production	of	(60).	
	
6.3 Distributional	effects	
England	 1st	cycle	In	the	impact	assessments,	costs	were	allocated	to	the	main	affected	groups	(water	industry,	EA,	central	government,	angling	and	 conservation,	 industries,	 navigations	 and	 ports,	 local	 governments,	 agriculture	 and	 rural	 land	management,	 urban	 and	transports)	(30;	37).	2nd	cycle	Costs	were	allocated	 to	 the	sectors	 (water	 industries,	other	 industries,	 services	and	 infrastructures,	 rural	 land	management,	government)	that	were	responsible	for	the	pressure,	although	those	sectors	might	not	necessarily	be	paying	for	the	measures	(e.g.	the	Countryside	Stewardship	Scheme	is	funded	by	government	but	costs	were	allocated	to	rural	land	management)	(49;	
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INT-EN09).		
	
6.4 Less	stringent	objectives	
England	 1st	cycle	Very	 few	 less	 stringent	 objectives	 were	 set	 (for	 only	 5	 groundwater	 bodies	 according	 to	 the	 RBMPs	 (47;	 48)).	 Deadline	extensions	were	largely	preferred.	2nd	cycle	The	proportion	of	water	bodies	with	a	less	stringent	objective	was	much	higher	(25%)	(49).	Once	economic	appraisals	were	performed,	bundles	of	measures	with	costs	higher	than	benefits	were	flagged.	The	measures	responsible	for	the	negative	ratio	and	the	water	bodies,	or	even	the	elements,	 that	they	were	supposed	to	 improve,	were	 identified.	A	 less	stringent	objective	was	then	set	for	the	water	body	or	the	element	concerned.	The	objective	set	was	the	highest	objective	for	which	the	benefits	of	measures	outweighed	the	costs	(34;	INT-EN05).	
	
France	 Less	 stringent	 objectives	 had	 to	 be	 used	 exceptionally	 (deadline	 extensions	were	 preferred)	 and	 only	 if	 good	 status	was	 not	achievable	by	2027	(65;	67).	In	the	2nd	cycle,	water	bodies	that	could	apply	for	a	less	stringent	objective	could	be	pre-identified	based	on	expert	judgements	and	technical	criteria,	i.e.	in	cases	of:	
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• Heavy	urbanisation	requiring	expropriations;		
• Heavy	industrial	activity	requiring	stopping	the	activity;		
• Fishponds.		(67)	
AG	 Number	of	less	stringent	objectives	set	based	on	DC	(INT-FR01):	1st	cycle:	2	2nd	cycle:	5	
AP	 Number	of	less	stringent	objectives	set	based	on	DC:	1st	cycle:	4	(INT-FR01)	2nd	cycle:	13	(23;	INT-FR04;	INT-FR03)	
LB	 Number	of	less	stringent	objectives	set	based	on	DC:	1st	cycle:	2	(52)	2nd	cycle:	0	(INT-FR01)	
RM	 Number	of	less	stringent	objectives	set	based	on	DC:	1st	cycle:	0	2nd	cycle:	2	In	 the	 2nd	 cycle,	 about	 30	water	 bodies	were	 pre-selected	 for	 a	 less	 stringent	 objective,	 i.e.	 the	 costs	 of	measures	were	 still	
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unaffordable	after	2039.	Only	two	water	bodies	had	a	less	stringent	objective	based	on	disproportionate	costs	in	the	end,	due	to	a	lack	of	time	to	perform	studies	to	justify	the	alternative	objective.	For	these	two	water	bodies,	the	impact	of	possible	measures	on	 the	water	 body	was	modelled	 and	 the	measures	with	 the	 highest	 cost-efficiency	 and	 cost-benefit	 ratios	were	 selected	 to	determine	the	objective	to	set.	(11;	25;	INT-FR	9)	
RMC	 Number	of	less	stringent	objectives	set	based	on	DC:	1st	cycle:	0	(13)	2nd	cycle:	0	(14)	
SN	 Number	of	less	stringent	objectives	set	based	on	DC:	1st	cycle:	0	(36)	2nd	cycle:	0	(INT-FR07)	
	
		
 		
